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PETROS QAMBUKUSA MAGAGULA - S~JAZll.AND 1 S RELATIONS WITH BRITAIN AND 
SOUTH AFRICA SINCE 1968 
Abstract 
This work looks into Swaziland•s political. economic, social and 
cultural relations with Britain (its former colonial master) and South 
Africa (its big and rich neighbour) in the period since Swaziland•s 
Independence in 1968. The focus is on how Swaziland•s relations with 
Britain and South Africa influence its socio-economic and political 
developments, and its internal and external security. As a 
micro-state, with a population of less than 0.7 million people, the 
assumption is made that Swaziland•s progress and security can be 
reasonably assessed by examining its relations with the two powerful 
states with whom it has close links. This assumption arises from the 
fact that (i) Swaziland inherited political institutions from Britain, 
(ii) there were strong economic links (investments, trade, aid) between 
it and Britain at Independence and these ties continue today, (iii) 
there were, and still are, economic links in almost every aspect 
between Swaziland and South Africa at Independence and (iv) South 
Africa dominates the Southern Africa region militarily and 
economically. The main arguments in the Thesis are (a) that the 
economic 1 inks between Swaziland and the two states pro vi de economic 
growth for the former, thus helping to maintain stability, although 
South African domination threatens to undermine Swaziland•s 
independence (b) that Swaziland has pursued a 11 tightrope policy 11 in 
Southern Africa, and that this regional strategy has, on the whole, 
succeeded in helping the country•s survival; and (c) that the 
political system of Swaziland has an in-built tension in that the 
traditional institutions exist alongside modern ones and this is a 
threat to political stability. 
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GLOSSARY 
1. INCWALA: a ritual ceremony held every year in December to January 
to commemorate the end of the year and to welcome the new crops of 
the season. It is also a cleansing ritual for the iniquities of 
the year and symbolises the rejuvenation of the Swazi nation 
through the Monarch. 
2. INDUNA (INDVUNA): an administrative position in Swazi tradition 
system which is not inherited~ as opposed to that of chiefs and 
the Monarch, but is acquired through appointment taking into 
consideration an individual's character and intellect. 
3. KHONTA: a Swazi word meaning to ask for settlement under new 
authority to whom you will pay allegiance. This is initially 
accompanied by tribute gift or fee to the authority from whom one 
seeks to reside. 
4. LIBANDLA: was a body of all male adults involved in the Swazi 
state affairs. The English name is the Swazi National Council 
(SNC). Libandla was the main decision-making body in the country. 
For decisions to be carried there had to be a consensus of 
L i bandl a and Ngwenyama. Neither of the two cou 1 d take major 
decisions without the consent of the other. Since it was 
difficult to get all adult male Swazis to meet as often as 
necessary, a standing committee existed which consisted of all 
chiefs and senior councillors who took decisions on behalf of 
Libandla. 
- i X -
5. hLQOQQ: an advisory body of a few men drawn from a 1 i st of sen·i or 
chiefs and councillors. It advised the Monarch in all matters of 
the state policy and day to day running of the country. Liqoqo 
did not have the power assigned to Libandla. although members of 
Liqoqo could participate in decision-making when they sat in 
Libandla. The English word equivalent to Liqoqo is the Inner 
Council. 
6. PITSO: a decision-making body consisting of all male adults. It 
operated at both chieftainship and national levels. 
CHAPTER 1 
Introduction 
The Significance and Focus of the Study 
Swaziland has been independent for two decades 9 yet 10 years 
before its Independence on 6 September 1968 the British Labour Party 
and the Conservative Political Centre published pamphlets on the 
smaller colonial territories stating that full sovereignty was not 
possible for the great majority of them. 1 When British politicians 
and academics debated the future of these small territories 9 the 
main concern was their economic viability and security. It was felt 
that small states9 both in physical and population sizes 9 could not 
create economies of scale which would sustain their existence. 
Small as they were9 it was felt9 these states would be defenceless 
and vulnerable to external attack 9 economic exploitation and/or 
internal upheaval. 
However9 no viable alternative to independence emerged. The 
idea of federation was tried but failed in places as diverse as the 
West Indies and more pointedly in Central Africa. The federations 
created in the 1950's were disintegrating in the early 1960's. With 
regard to the High Commission Territories (HCTs) of Basutoland9 the 
Bechuanaland Protectorate and Swaziland the likelihood of their 
incorporation into South Africa had become remote although "South 
Africa9 both as a Dominion and a Republic9 has looked to the High 
Commission Territories; their incorporation would be invaluable for 
the full implementation of the Bantustan policy." 2 At the same 
time 9 and with recent experience in mind 9 the HCTs' geographical 
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location~ i.e. the fact that they were detached from each other and 
separated by several hundred miles made it inconceivable to think of 
bringing them together in some form of federation. 
Due to lack of viable alternative solutions to the future of 
small territories and the pressure to decolonize. Britain decided to 
give independence to many of them. Swaziland was one of these, and 
it has been independent for 20 years. It is, therefore, a 
worthwhile exercise to examine the territory's progress since 
Independence. Moreover, the international community's concern for 
the security of small states still persists. In the 1980's the 
concern was aroused by two events : the Fa 1 kl ands War in 1982 and 
the invasion of Grenada in 1983. In both occasions the micro-states 
were defenceless. As a resuit of these two events the David Davies 
Memorial Institute of International Studies commissioned a study on 
the future security of small states. 3 The findings of this research 
group confirmed the fear that small states are vulnerable to both 
external invasion and internal revolts. They further observed that: 
11 As the world has so often learned in the past, 
and at such great cost, wars break out and 
alliances fall apart, not so often as a result 
of deliberate decisions by the major powers, but 
as the result of the inability of the great 
power system, and the alliance which support it, 
to cope with the problems of small countries in 
the faraway parts of the globe. 11 4 
In view of the fact that Swaziland has been independent for two 
decades and that the concern for micro-states persists, it is of 
significance that a study of Swaziland's survival be undertaken in 
its own right. Added to that, however, is the international 
importance of Swaziland's regional setting. The micro-state is 
3 
situated firmly within the troubled region of Southern Africag and 
borders directly into the Republic of South Africa itself. 
Because it is a micro-state it was felt that Swaziland•s fate 
can be better examined by looking into its relationship with Britain 
(the former colonial master) and South Africa (its big and rich 
neighbour which in the past anticipated incorporating the 
territory). The raison detre for the feeling that Swaziland•s 
survival as a micro-state can be better understood by examining its 
relations with these two states is that: 
(i) the territory inherited political institutions from 
Britain; 
(ii) there were strong economic links (investmentsg trade9 aid) 
between it and Britain at Independence and these ties 
continue to exist. 
(iii) there were, and still are 9 strong economic links in almost 
every aspect between Swaziland and South Africa at 
Independence; and 
(iv) the shadow of South Africa looms over the whole Southern 
African region - a region which was dominated by colonial 
and minority regimes at the time of Swaziland•s 
Independence and which is still bedevilled with security 
problems arising mainly from the intransigence of these 
minority regimes. 
The focus of the study is on how Swaziland•s relations with 
Britain and South Africa influence or affects development, and 
internal and external security. Internal security embodies both 
4 
economic and political issues~ i.e. does Swaziland•s economic 
strategy and political system enhance stability? This is an 
important question in the study of mirco-states as the David Davies 
Memorial Institute of International Studies observed: 
11 But apart from military and diplomatic 
measures. it becomes apparent thnt the best 
guarantee against subversion of mirco-states, 
from without or within, is the firm 
establishment of democracy and its 
buttressing by economic development. 11 5 
On the issue of external security Swaziland is very vulnerable in 
that it is sandwiched between two powerful or bigger states of South 
Africa and Mozambique. The latter was a Portuguese colony, and 
therefore minority-ruled, at the time of Swaziland•s Independence. 
At that time both the Portuguese and South African Governments were 
facing opposition from anti-colonial and anti-apartheid forces which 
used Swaziland as an escape route, a refugee place or an 
infiltration conduit. Today the problems in South Africa and to a 
certain extent those of Mozambique continue to spill-over into 
Swaziland. 
The main argument in this work is that: 
1. economic links between Swaziland and the two powerful 
states of Britain and South Africa provide the former with 
economic growth, thus enhancing internal security. At the 
same time South Africa•s domination of the economy 
threatens to undermine Swaziland•s independence and, 
therefore, its ability to pursue an independent regional 
strategy. 
5 
2. The political system of Swaziland has an in~built 
conflicting tendency in that the traditional institutions 
exist alongside modern ones. This dichotomy is not likely 
to enhance political stability and is therefore a threat 
to internal security. 
3. Swaziland•s policy in the Southern Africa setting and its 
regional strategy has9 on the whole 9 succeeded in helping 
the country•s survival although Southern Africa has been 
an unstable region since Swaziland•s Independence. 
Organisation and Scope of the Work 
In order to put the study in a proper perspective it was felt 
that a historical background of the links between Swaziland, on the 
one hand, and Britain and South Africa on the other, was imperative. 
In Chapter 2 this background is discussed and focus is on the 
development of Swaziland•s political, economic, social and cultural 
links with the two countries since the late nineteenth century. Of 
particular interest is the type of British rule which evolved during 
the colonial period and the type of political system that emerged at 
Independence. The assumption that the HCTs would be absorbed by 
South Africa is a 1 so important at this juncture in that strong 
economic, social and cultural ties were forged on the basis of this 
assumption. Hence the importance of South Africa in the study of 
the pre- and post-Independence state of Swaziland. 
In Chapter 3 an assessment of the relationship between the 
British-designed Constitution (and thus the political structures) 
and the rulers of Swaziland, viz. the Swazi Monarch and his 
6 
traditional supporters 9 is undertaken. It is shown here that the 
parallel rule which existed during the colonial period continued 
after Independence and that the Swazi Monarch did not 1 ike the 
Independence Constitution. Due to the latter 9 and coupled with 
growing support of the opposition Ngwane National Liberatory 
Congress (NNLC) by the electorate 9 the traditionalists conspired to 
repeal the Constitution. It is argued in this chapter that the 
political system which emerged thereafter was not necessarily 
superior to the one inherited at Independence; that it did not 
reflect the aspirations of the twentieth century Swazi society. 
Hence the assertion that the present political system does not 
enhance political stability. 
The point that security of a micro-state 9 apart from military 
and diplomatic measures9 is rooted in the firm establishment of 
democracy and its support by economic development is discussed in 
Chapters 4 to 6. In Chapter 4 a study of British investments and 
their socio-political effect on the domestic institutions of the 
country reveal two seemingly contradictory results. The first is 
that the investments provide revenue for the Swazi 1 and Government 
and employment for the individual Swazi. This promotes stability 
and internal security. The second effect is that investments are a 
source of erosion of the traditional institutions which are the 
power-base of the present Swazi State. In the 1970's one scholar 
observed this development in the following words: 
"The growth of Swazi involvement in the modern 
sector must create a new class of managers and 
capitalists. Where these are not drawn from and 
identified with the traditional leadership9 they 
will constitute a threat to the traditional 
system ... "6 
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Workers in modern industries are semi-detached from the chieftaincy 
institution in that most of the time they are absent from the 
chiefdoms and earn their livelihood from paid employment. 
Chapter 5 examines trade between Swaziland and Britain, but it 
is not possible to exclude South Africa Swaziland trade from the 
discussion. Therefore in this chapter the latter trade permeates 
throughout the discussion. This is due to the fact that most of 
Swaziland's imports - about 90 per cent7 - come from South Africa 
and a substantial volume of exports go there. It is clear from the 
ex ami nation of the trade pattern that South Africa has gradually 
become as important a market as Britain for Swaziland's exports. A 
discussion of this trade pattern and its implications for Swaziland 
is undertaken. This is related to all the aspects of economic links 
between Swaziland and South Africa which are analysed in Chapter 6. 
These aspects are picked up and continued from Chapter 2 where the 
colonial economy is discussed. 
The conspicuous aspects of Swaziland-South Africa economic 
links are: (i) trade, (ii) the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), (iii) the transport system, (iv) monetary co-operation, (v) 
tourism, (vi) South African investments and (vii) the migrant labour 
system. These facets show that Swaziland is more linked, 
assymetrically, to South Africa (its big and rich neighbour) than it 
is to Britain (its former colonial master). This dependence on 
South Africa above all other countries impels one to ask the 
following questions : To what extent can Swaziland adopt a policy 
towards Pretoria which the latter considers to be hostile? What 
policy options does a micro-state like Swaziland have in the 
8 
political uncertainties of Southern Africa? Can it and should it 
ignore the iniquities of racism? If not9 what strategy should it 
adopt? 
Chapter 7 examines the policies and strategies adopted by the 
Swazi State since 1968, It is maintained that there are six main 
factors which influence Swaziland•s policy formulation in the 
region. They are: 
l. The economic considerations- the important issue being 
that it is asymmetrically linked to apartheid South 
Africa, 
2, The existence of minority regimes - at the time Swaziland 
became independent Mozambique, South Africa9 Rhodesia, 
Angola and Namibia were ruled by minority governments. 
Today only Namibia and South Africa are still under 
minority governments. 
3. The existence of anti-minority regime forces, including 
guerrillas, in the region who are compelled to use 
Swaziland as an escape route, a refugee sanctuary, and/or 
a base for attack on these regimes. 
4. The nature of the Swazi State, i.e. the fact that 
Swaziland is a Monarchy, conservative and a micro-state. 
The Swazi rulers• fear of communism and left-wing 
governments in the region is an input in their pol icy 
formulation and strategy design. 
9 
5. The desire by the Swazi State to maintain internal 
security vis~a~vis the internal opposition. The Monarchy 
has always been concerned with internal opposition. mainly 
the NNLC. For instance 9 the repeal of the Independence 
Constitution in April 1973 was triggered by the NNLC • s 
victory in the Mphumalanga Constituency in the 1972 
general elections. NNLC was very close to South African 
movements9 particularly the Pan Africanist Congress (PAC). 
6. Swaziland's membership of international organizations such 
as the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and the 
Southern African Development Co-ordination Conference 
(SADCC). 
In examining how these factors influence Swaziland's strategy in the 
region certain historical events and themes are analysed. On the 
whole the analysis reveals that Swaziland evolved a pragmatic policy 
and a "tightrope strategy" in order to try and satisfy these 
interests which are more often than not contradictory. 
A summary and assessment of the work presented in this Thesis 
is undertaken in Chapter 8. This chapter provides the Conclusion 
where a policy for survival of a micro-state is suggested. 
10 
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Introduction 
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CHAPTER 2 
Historical Backgrounq 
The purpose of this Chapter is to pro vi de background 
information about the evolution of the present Swazi State, the 
relations that built up between the Swazis on the one hand and the 
British and South African Governments on the other. The main areas 
examined are (a) period of early contact between Swazis and Whites, 
(b) the economic and social links that emerged, (c) the nature of 
the British Colonial Administration in Swaziland, (d) the period of 
nationalism in Swaziland, and (e) the Independence Constitution and 
nature of the Swazi State at Independence. 
Period of Early Contact with Whites 
In the first half of the nineteenth century parts of Africa 
south of the Limpopo River experienced a series of wars of 
nation-building. These wars are historically known as 11 Mfecane 11 in 
Swazi/Zulu or 11 Qifaqane 11 in Sotho/Tswana. Amongst the great names 
of this period were Shaka, King of the Zulus, Sobhuza, King of the 
Swazis and Moshoeshoe, King of the Basotho. 
It was during the reign of Mswati, Sobhuza 1 s son and successor, 
that the Swazi society became a well organized government which had 
central administration as well as decentralised institutions. The 
power of the monarch was ensured by his prerogative to appoint his 
representatives to all regions, and also by establishing a system of 
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regiments which periodically assembled at the King's royal 
residences and directly paid primary allegiance to him and not to 
the chiefs, although they were followers of their respect chiefs. 
The boundaries of Swaziland then extended beyond Barberton and 
Carolina in the north~west and as far as Pongola River in the south 
and Lubombo mountains in the east. 
It was during Mswati's rule (1839-1868) that the Boers first 
appeared in large numbers in Swaziland. They came from the west and 
were looking for an outlet to the sea through Swaziland to Kosi Bay 
on the Indian Ocean. The Boer approach to Swaziland was initially 
not hostile9 they were "friendly"9 seeing that Mswati had a powerful 
army. They asked Mswati to sell them some of his war captives; 
they asked him to give them some piece of territory to attach to the 
Lydenburg Republic; and they needed help to suppress a rebellion of 
the Lydenburg people. To all requests Mswati agreed. 
After the death of Mswati there was a succession struggle for 
about 10 years which weakened the power of the Swazi nation. The 
ultimate successor was Mbandzeni, one of Mswa ti 's sons who was 
chosen "less for his exceptional qualities than for his lack of 
them". 1 Mbandzeni was a compromise candidate and the Boers had 
played an "advisory" role to the palace during the power struggles. 
By the late 1870's the British, who took over the 
administration of the Transvaal in 1877 were in contact with the 
Swazis. The British promised the Swazis protection against the 
Boer's threat to their independence in return for the 1879 Swazi 
assistance to the British military campaign against Sekhukhuniland. 
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These years marked the beginning of a period whereby Swaziland was 
to play the role of "a pawn in the complex struggle between Boer and 
Britain for hegemony in Southern Africa". 2 The British and the 
Transvaal Boers guaranteed Swaziland•s independence in the 1881 
Convention whereby the British rescinded the Transvaa 1 0 However 9 
the boundaries drawn at this time between Swaziland and the 
Transvaal were not the traditional boundaries of Swaziland and this 
marked the beginning of the distortion of the borders - an issue 
which has persisted ever since. (An examination of the border issue 
in the post-independence period is dealt with in Chapter 7). 
In the early l88o•s traces of minerals such as gold and tin 
attracted a 1 arge number of both Boers and British to Swazi 1 and 0 
Mbandzeni then granted a series of concessions which led to a 
dispute between the Swazi authorities 9 on the one hand 9 and the 
white settlers and British Administration on the other. More will 
be said about these disputes in this Chapter. The inflow of the 
settlers and the granting of concessions resulted in a conflict of 
interests amongst the settlers, and between them and the Swazis. 
Mbandzeni failed to provide an effective administration to control 
the disputes. He decided to seek advice from the British and 
requested them to send a resident commissioner to de a 1 with the 
European settlers affairs. The request was initially turned down, 
but later Theophilus Shepstone, Secretary of Native Affairs in 
Natal, sent his son as advisor. Despite Shepstone Junior•s presence 
the concessions granting continued unabated and the chaotic 
situation worsened. Both the British and the Transvaal Governments 
were concerned with this deteriorating state of affairs. Their 
reaction was to issue the 1890 Convention whereby they guaranteed 
14 
Swaziland•s independence~ established a provisiona·l government to 
replace the Shepstone Junior Committee and set up a special court to 
adjudicate all disputes involving Europeans and to undertake a 
judicial enquiry into the validity of all disputed concessions 
between Swazi authorities and the concessionaries. The court 
validated most of the concessions. 
The guarantee was affected by the inland expansion of the 
Germans in South West Africa (Namibia) and the western expansion of 
the Transvaal Boers threatened to block the Cecil John Rhodes long 
time dream of the Cape to Cairo route. The immediate British 
priority became that of occupying Bechuanaland to prevent the 
closure of this route. During the 1893-1894 negotiations the 
British gave the Transvaal Boers the right to administer Swaziland 
but not to incorporate it. This agreement went ahead despite the 
Swazi rulers• objections. In 1895 the Transvaal Boers started to 
administer Swaziland; they introduced Transvaal laws and taxation 
into the territory. 
Territorial interests between the Boers and the British 
resulted in increasing conflicts and the eventual outbreak of the 
Anglo-Boer War in 1899. It was during this war that British troops 
first occupied Swaziland. At the end of the war (1902) the British 
appointed a special commissioner to Swaziland who was responsible to 
the Governor of the Transvaal. The special commissioner who resided 
in the Transvaal was basically charged with the duty of policing 
Swaziland, implementing the laws of the Transvaal and collecting 
tax. 
15 
The immediate problem for the British Administration in 
Swaziland was the control of land - the granting of concessions had 
caused so much misunderstanding that there were quarrels between 
Swazis and settlers and amongst the settlers themselves. According 
to the settlers' view they had bought the land, while the Swazi 
authorities' understanding was that the settlers were given land to 
use just like any new comer in the country who comes to Khonta (pay 
tribute) and that the gifts they gave to the Monarchy were tribute 
presents or tribute fees. The dispute amongst the settlers was that 
their claims over some pieces of land overlapped. This situation is 
not difficult to comprehend given the land tenure system of 
Swaziland at that time. If some white man came to Mbandzeni and 
asked to graze his sheep or cattle on plot A~ he probably gave him 
the right; another one came a few weeks later to ask for the same 
right over the same land, Mbandzeni probably gave the right. 
According to the communal land use in this particular farming 
activity in Swaziland, there was no conflict of interests (and that 
is still the case for the Swazi Nation Land tenure system). Faced 
with the land disputes the British Administration set up a 
concessions commission, under the chairmanship of George Grey, with 
the power to recommend demarcation to solve these disputes. This 
commission was set up in 1904, after Swaziland had been formerly 
placed under British rule by the 1903 Order-in-Council. 
The Colonial System of Administration 
The 1904 Proclamation converted the title of the Special 
Commissioner, who had been appointed in 1902~ into that of Resident 
Magistrate who continued to report to the Governor of the Transvaal. 
By Order-in-Council of 1906 the territory was transferred from the 
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Transvaal Governor's control to the High Commissioner for South 
Africa. The following year a proclamation was issued which 
introduced a Resident Commissioner for the first time 9 abolished the 
Resident Magistrate portfolio 9 and appointed a Government Secretary 
and Assistant Commissioners (the title later changed to District 
Commissioners). A police force was established whose duty was to 
keep law and order. Police sub-inspectors also assisted the 
Assistant Commissioners with clerical work 9 for example 9 the 
collection of native tax. 
The head of the Colonial Administration for the territory was 
the High Commissioner in South Africa and this arrangement only 
changed after South Africa had left the Commonwealth in 1961. The 
nature of the changes which took place then was to alter the title 
of Resident Commissioner to that of Her Majesty's Commissioner 
reporting to the Colonial Of-fice in Britain and not to the Briti-sh 
Ambassador to South Africa. The 1960's changes brought about a 
degree of relief amongst the senior colonial officers in the 
territory who had been complaining that the High Commissioner in 
South Africa was more concerned about his diplomatic work than he 
was about his colonial duties, that he lacked the understanding of 
the territory which resident governors had 9 and that he did not have 
enough time for the territories (they include Basutoland and 
Bechuanaland). This dissatisfaction was summed up by one of the 
senior colonial officers who later became Resident Commissioner/Her 
Majesty's Commissioner in Swaziland in 1958-1964 when he wrote: 
11 The High Commissioner's time is not all at the 
disposal of the affairs of the territories since 
at least half of it must be devoted to his 
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ambassadorial functions. Living as he does 
outside the territories~ he cannot hope to have 
anything but a superficial understanding of 
those problems in which local knowledge is 
important, and the sense of responsibility which 
stems from residence in a territory is lacking. 
Because of these factors the High Commissioner 
cannot be compared with a Governor of an 
ordinary colony 11 .3 
Why were the territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and 
Swaziland the responsibility of the British High Commissioner to 
South Africa? The answer lies in the Schedule to the 1909 South 
Africa Act, which was an instrument for the creation of the Union of 
South Africa and gave that Union a degree of independence. The 
Schedule had clauses which made provision for the incorporation of 
Basutoland, Bechualand and Swaziland into the Union. At the 
formation of the Union it was assumed that it was just a matter of 
time as to when these territories would be incorporated. Hence it 
made sense to the British Government that the territories should be 
the responsibility of the Governor/Governor-General/High 
Commissioner, these 3 territories were then to be known as the High 
Commission Territories (HCTs). 
It is important to note that the British plan was to build an 
empire in Southern Africa based on the Union as the core. It was 
mooted in London that Southern Rhodesia would join the Union as 
well; that it might be possible to bring in Northern Rhodesia and 
Nyasa 1 and. The empire engineers even thought of buying out the 
Portuguese in Mozambique, and after the League of Nations mandated 
German East Africa (Tanganyika) to Britain, these empire architects 
entertained the idea of exchanging this mandate for Mozambique so 
that there could be a smoother and neater geographical contiguity of 
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this empire. Immediately after World War I~ the idea of this empire 
seemed a real possib·ility to these empire builders because there had 
been co=operation between South Africa and Britain in fighting the 
Germans. South African forces had invaded and occupied South West 
Africa (Namibia) and they had campaigned in Tanganyika. 4 
It was against this background, i.e. that incorporation into 
South Africa was a foregone conclusion, that the HCTs were governed. 
The immediate problem of the British Administration in 
Swaziland was the land disputes resulting from the concessions 
granted by Mbandzeni in the nineteenth century. In 1904 the British 
Administration set up the concessions commission under the 
chairmanship of George Grey. The commission•s report resulted in 
the promulgation of the 1907 Land Partition Proclamation whose 
effect was to set aside one third of the territory as reserves for 
Swazis, to give the bulk of the land to the white settlers, to give 
the remainder to the Crown and to bring the minerals under the 
control of the Colonial Administration. This humiliated the Swazi 
authorities but their protests brought no positive fruits. In the 
same year Queen Regent Gwamile sent a deputation of five chiefs to 
London to protest against this demarcation, but they won no favours. 
However, demarcation remained a major issue in the colonial politics 
of Swaziland. The Swazi authorities persistently protested against 
the demarcation. In the l920 1 s King Sobhuza II made a court 
application to test the validity of this land partitioning. He lost 
the application and the judges rule that " By Order in Council of 
November 2nd 1907 Section 1 (b) the area in question which had been 
subjected to the concession, became Crown Land, as having been 
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expropriated. As Crown Land a portion of it was granted to the 
Respondent Company as compensation under section 4 (3) of 
Proclamation 28 of 1907 •.. the effect of the Proclamation under 
such Order extinguished the rights claimed by the applicant over the 
land of the Respondent Company. The application must therefore be 
dismissed with costs. 115 
The Swazi rulers did not give up. In 1941 Sobhuza II and the 
Swazi National Council 6 petitioned the King-in-Parliament in London 
on a number of grievances, including the land issue whereby they 
complained about the taking away of two-thirds of the land from the 
Swazis and pointed out that the Queen Regent Gwamile had protested 
against this alienation. The petition stated that 11 the 
Administration, however, refused even to pay attention to the 
protests that were made by the Queen Regent and her Council of the 
Swazi Nation and apparently took the view that the country should be 
reserved for the coming white population, the land and all sources 
of wealth be reserved for them also, while the Swazis are being 
exposed to the slow starvation and impoverishment in their own 
country so that they may be forced to work as servants for the White 
people. 117 This petition referred to Sir Alan Pim•s 1930 report 
(Command No. 4114) on the land situation in Swaziland. This report 
had pointed out that there was overcrowding and overstocking on the 
Swazi Nation Land which was causing serious soil erosion and that 40 
per cent of the White 1 and owners were absent from the country at 
any given time thus resulting in their land being fallow. 
The Swazi authorities were further urged to write petitions on 
this issue by the continuing deteriorating relations between the 
White landlords and the Swazi squatters. In 1908, when the 
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demarcation decision had been made7 the British High Commissioner 
said 11 I want many of the Swazi to stay on the farmers' 1 and and work 
for them the way they do in the Transvaa1 11 • 8 That Swazis should be 
squatters had been the intention of the High Commissioner~ but this 
did not work well because the Swazis refused to abide by some of the 
terms of squatting~ especially that of providing cheap labour 7 and 
when they did not turn up for labour there were either threats of~ 
or actua17 evictions. Sobhuza's case against Alliser Miller and his 
Company in the 1920's was triggered by these evictions. In this 
case Sobhuza challenged the validity of Miller's rights over land 
which he had received through the concessions. The monarch lost the 
case both in the High Court of Swaziland and the appeal before the 
Privy Council in London. 
As the Swazi population grew 7 there was a real threat of a 
breakdown of law and order. Faced with this threat the British 
Colonial Administration presented the problem to the British 
Government in London. The result was a decision to purchase some of 
the alienated land and make it available to Swazis. In the 1940's a 
grant of £1407000 was approved from the Colonial Development and 
Welfare Funds for the purchase of land to make it available to 47000 
landless Swazi families resident as squatters on land owned by the 
White landlords. 9 The scheme also covered the settlement of the 
demobilized World War II Swazi soldiers who wished to be 
accommodated. 11 Pains were taken to run the scheme within the 
framework of the tribal system. The settlers must not be allowed to 
feel that they were no longer Swazi7 divorced from their allegiance 
to the Paramount Chief and their own chiefs and therefore~ settlers 
from another chief's area were obliged to go through the customary 
21 
arrangements for changing allegiance ... 10 The Colonial 
Administration controlled the use of land by legislation. The 
scheme was started in 1943 but in 1947 Mr. V. Liversage who was sent 
to conduct an economic survey in the Territoryg recommended that it 
should be stopped because it was consuming too much Government 
revenue. He recommended a general rural development scheme. 
Even just a few months before independence the land issue was 
still a point of disagreement between the Swazi authorities and the 
British. Sobhuza II instructed the delegates to the final 
Independence Constitution talks in February9 1968 to raise the 
issue. They stated the case thus: 
"Forty-three per cent of the country was sti 11 
in the hands of whites, many of whom were 
absentee landowners with vast acreages for 
grazing their sheep in winter. Others9 as 
individuals or corporations were ~ngaged in 
cultivating or ranching on a large commercial 
scale. But Sobhuza's own people needed land for 
food; Swazi areas were congested, farm tenants 
were insecure and the grievance of concessions 
was kept alive by their discontent. 11 11 
At the Independence ta 1 ks the British position was that the only 
solution to the problem was that the land should be bought by the 
Swazis and that UK was prepared to include this in the Aid Programme 
if the Swaziland Government presented a plan about how it would use 
the land purchased. Making a statement in the House of Commons on 
the Swaziland Independence Conference on 26th February 19689 the 
Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs 9 Mr. George Thomas9 had 
this to say on the issue: 
"The Swaziland Government also presented to the 
United Kingdom Delegation a claim in respect of 
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the remainder of the land of the Swazi Nation 
which had been alienated in consequences of 
Orders in Council empowering such alienation 
after Britain assumed responsibility for the 
administration of Swaziland in 1903, The United 
Kingdom Delegation stated that 9 as they had 
consistently made clear in the past9 they could 
not accept this claim, It proved impossible to 
reconcile the views of the two delegations on 
this matter,"l2 
The 11 Report of the Swaziland Independence Conference" underscored 
the disagreements of the Delegations, Paragraph 27 informs us that: 
"While it proved impossible to reconcile the 
views of the United Kingdom and Swaziland 
Delegations9 the United Kingdom Delegation 
suggested that a practical way of tackling the 
prob 1 ems might be for the Swaziland Government 
to include suitable land settlement projects in 
the Development Plan they were now formulating 9 
and the question of assistance towards the 
financing of this Plan could then be discussed 
with the United Kingdom in the context of future 
aid negotiations, The Swaziland Delegation 5 
however, stated that their claim for the 
restoration of the land as of right was an issue 
separate from a development aid programme,"l3 
This debate was continued even after independence and more shall be 
said later in this work. 
The British Administration and Swaziland Status 
The British Colonial Administration of Swaziland was not based 
upon a structure of indirect rule which was introduced in the other 
British African Colonies. Up to the period of independence all that 
had managed to evolve was a parallel rule whereby the Swazi 
traditional system existed alongside the Colonial Administration5 
albeit subordinated to the latter in many issues, especially 
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securitys law enforcement~ taxations economic productions etc. The 
Monarchy in Swaziland resisted what he perceived as an intrusion 
into matters of Swazi law and customs. In his resistance to 
admi ni strati ve changes Sobhuza constantly referred to the British 
and Transvaal guarantees of Swazi independence in the last two 
decades of the nineteenth century. The significance of this 
intransigence was observed in the 195o•s by B.A. Marwick when he 
said : 
11 The Swazi still firmly believe that the 
guarantee of their independence by the 1894 
Convention and previous Conventions still exist 
and that in any event they have been guaranteed 
freedom to manage their internal affairs. There 
has been no authoritative statement of the true 
constitutional position of the territorys and 
until this issue is faced there is scope for 
untold harm through misunderstanding. 11 14 
While the constitutional position of her 2 s-ister HCTs had been made 
clear when the British Government took over their administration, 
that of Swaziland had not. Basutoland had been declared a colony 
and Bechuanaland a protectorate. 
In the 1930 1 s Mr. Alan Pim was assigned by London to make a 
general survey of the HCTs. Following his reportss 15 which 
concentrated on the financial and economic situation of the 
territories, the British Administration effected some administrative 
changes, amongst other things. With particular reference to 
Basutoland, Pim had observed that the British policy had been that 
11 0f non-interference. of proferri ng a 11 i ance. of 1 eavi ng two 
parallel Governments to work in a state of detachment unknown in 
tropical Africa, while under indirect rule native institutions are 
incorporated into a single system of government and subjected to the 
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continuous guidance~ supervision and stimulus of European 
officers. 1116 Discussions were made by the H·igh Commissioner and his 
officers on legislation for 11 Native Administration and Native 
Courts 11 of the 3 HTCs. Following these discussions draft 
proclamations on native administration and judicial affairs wer~ 
first introduced in 1932 for Bechunaland. Discussions on these 
drafts continued in Bechuanaland until the proclamations were 
promulgated in 1934. But some chiefs opposed these proclamations 
until 1941 when the British Administration itself realised that the 
proclamations could not work - there was too much interference with 
the internal affairs of the Batswana. A redraft of both the Native 
Administration and Native Courts Proclamations was made 9 this time 
by peop 1 e with experience in indirect ru 1 e in Northern Rhodesia. 
Proclamations were issued in September 1943 and started working in 
January 1944. 
In Basutoland draft proposals had been made as early as 1929 by 
Sir John Sturrock, Resident Commissioner. These proposals were 
rejected by the chiefs. The matter was revived in 1935 following 
Alan Pim's report, the appointment of a new Resident Commissioner 
from Tanganyika and the Bechuana 1 and proc 1 amat ions of 1934. After 
long discussions proclamations were finally promulgated in 1938 
defining the powers of chiefs and the native courts. The 
proclamations were effective from January 1939. These proclamations 
were a result of the cooperation of the Monarch who only consulted a 
few trusted chiefs. The Basuto pitso* (congregations/community 
meetings) were informed only after the promulgation. 
* see glossary 
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Draft proclamations for Swaziland were also made immediately 
following the 1931 general discussions. Sobhuza II and the Swazi 
National Council (SNC) rejected the draft proposals as completely 
unsuitable for the Swazi way of life. After the 1938 Basutoland 
proclamations~ further attempts were made and copies were given to 
Sobhuza and the SNCo On this occasion Sobhuza and the SNC took 
their time to respond to the documents. When the Resident 
Commissioner~ Mr. Bruton~ approached Sobhuza to receive the response 
of the Swazis9 Sobhuza told him that he and his SNC had difficulties 
with the proposed proclamations. It was during this time that the 
High Commissioner accused Sobhuza of being obstructive and the 
latter figured out that these accusations could only have been made 
by Bruton. 17 B.A. Marwick~ then District Commissioner of 
Hlathikhulu~ was asked by Bruton to talk to Sobhuza about this 
misunderstanding and about facilitating the finalisation of the 
draft proclamations. Marwick found Sobhuza very upset about the 
charge of being obstructive and said that he had submitted a 
memorandum to Bruton which had not been replied to. Marwick tells 
us that Sobhuza 11 ••• added that he was at a 1 ass to understand 
Bruton who continually brought up the same questions to which he 
always gave the same replies . . . He blamed Bruton for the High 
Commissioner•s censure of obstructiveness on the grounds that only 
Bruton could have made the charge. He also hinted that he saw no 
course but to resign and go to live in some place like Laurenco 
Marques. 1118 
According to Marwick Sobhuza was in his most disagreeable mood 
and informed him that he (Sobhuza) was 11 drafting something 11 • 
Marwick reckons that 11 Something 11 was the 1941 Petition sent to the 
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British King. In that petition Sobhuza objected strongly against 
the interference of the British Adm·inistration with the method of 
appointment of chiefs and revocation of their appointment and that 
of the Paramount Chief. He reminded the British Monarch that the 
British Government guaranteed Swazi independence in the nineteenth 
century. He argued that: 
11 If the proposed legislation were to be passed 
in the form suggested it would mean not only 
that complete despotic power of deposition of 
Chiefs9 Sub~Chiefs and Headmen would be placed 
in the hands of the High Commissioner 9 but also 
that he would be able to refuse to recognise as 
Paramount Chief that person who by all rights of 
native law and custom is the rightful Paramount 
Chief ... the Paramount Chief will but become 
the mouthpiece of the High Commissioner and his 
ancient rights will no longer exist. He will no 
longer be the sole trustee and representative of 
his people. 11 19 
The very last sentence of the petition implored the British Monarch 
11 To authorise the definition of the Status of Swaziland under the 
provisions of Convention of 1894 and the protocol of 1898, such to 
be a declaration of the position of Swaziland under the 
Constitutional Law of the British Empire. 1119 
The resistance of the Swazi Monarch against subjecting his 
appointment and that of Chiefs to the Colonial Administration proved 
to be a success. The SNC operated without the control of the 
British Administration. Hence the description of the administration 
of Swaziland during the colonial period as parallel rule. The Swazi 
Monarchy was again to prove indefatigable on his claim of supreme 
position over the Swazi people during the constitutional talks which 
led to independence. 
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Although the High Commissioner had issued the October 1944 
Native Administration Proclamation which purported to subject the 
appointement of traditional rulers under him 5 in May 1949 the 
Resident Commissioner reported that it had died 11 an unnatural 
death 11 • 20 
Marwick explained that the contact between the British 
Administration officers and the SNC or its standing committee was 
not effective. For instance 9 the Resident Commissioner used to go 
to address the SNC standing committee and leave. He would then 
return after a few days to 1 is ten to their responses or hear new 
issues they wanted to raise. There were no debates between the 
committee and Government officers on any points raised. Later on 
the Government created a system whereby the Monarchy had ad hoc 
representation in the Administration. The Monarch appointed his 
liaison officers in Mbabane to be attached to the Resident 
Commissioner•s Office where they were assigned to various 
departments. At districts level there were Swazi liaison officers 
in the person of indvuna.* These were attached to the District 
Commissioners • Offices . They assisted with the hearing of 
complaints brought to the district officers and also helped him in 
keeping in touch with Swazi thought and opinion in his district. 
But it should be born in mind that all liaison officers (either at 
district or headquarters level) were appointees of the Swazi 
tradition a 1 authority and the British Administration had no 
authority over them as appointees. In other words, the liaison 
officers were 11 ambassadors 11 of the Swazi traditional authority 
within the framework of British Administration in Swaziland. 
* see glossary 
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The resistance by traditional authorities of the HCTs to have 
the power of their appointment and revocation of appointment 
invested in the High Commissioner \'Jas partly due to the fear that 
Britain might be preparing for transfer to the Union of South 
Africa. In these proclamations there were similarities to the Union 
Native Administration Act of 1927. In this Act the Union Government 
reserved the power to appoint and dismiss chiefs. In the eyes of 
the HCTs traditional authorities the threat of incorporation into 
South Africa was more rea 1 than imaginary. The Union was putting 
pressure on Britain to transfer the HCTs. Britain had never assured 
them nor the Union whether or not there would be incorporation, 
until the 1960's when South Africa became a republic and left the 
Commonwealth. 
While the Union Government was being frustrated by Britain's 
failure to hand over the HCTs, they were still hoping that Britain 
would eventually give them the Territories. After all, at the 
formation of the United Nations Britain did support the South 
African ambition to incorporate South West Africa; 21 this support 
kept the hope alive for the incorporation of the HCTs. The decision 
to delay the incorporation, in the first place, had been due mainly 
to the anti-British Afrikaner nationalism and to the increasingly 
racist ideology of the Union State both of which eventually led to 
the creation of the Republic and the subsequent withdrawal from the 
Commonwealth. 22 
Although Britain maintained the political control of HCTs, 
economically and socially they were closer to South Africa than they 
were to Britain. This shall be examined below when discussing the 
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colonial economy with particular reference to Swazi"land. St'l}aziland 
had a substantial white settler community as compared to the other 
two HCTs. As a result the European Advisory Council was established 
as early as 1921. This body represented the interests of the 
settler community to the Administration. rhe significance of this 
body is demonstrated in the period of constitutional developments in 
the Territory. 
III The Colonial Economy and Infrastructure 
11 The economies of Botswana, Lesotho and 
Swaziland, although ostensibly •British 
Protectorates• have always been integrated into 
that of South Africa and little has changed 
s i nee independence, although the precise forms 
that their •integration• takes has not been the 
same in all three. 11 23 
This observation by Bush, Cliffe and Jansen cannot be farther from 
the truth. In this section we briefly examine the nature of the 
colonial economy in Swaziland and the socio-economic infrastructure. 
The economy of the Territory during the colonial period had two 
distinct features : (a) there was the subsistence economy practised 
by most, if not all, Swazi households. The main activity was the 
cultivation of sorghum and maize, and the rearing of cattle, goats 
and chickens. (b) The second feature was the commercial economy 
practised by the white settler community and a few Swazi households. 
The main activities here initially were the growing of cotton, 
tobacco, maize and cattle raising; there was also mining of 
asbestos and from the 1940 1 s there were established the sugar, 
foresty, and citrus fruit industries by companies of both British 
and South African origin. 
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The economies of the HCTs were conspicuously 1 inked to the 
South African one through the creation~ in 1910~ of the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) whose membership was (and still is) 
South Africa~ Basutoland (Lesotho)~ Bechuanaland (Botswana) and 
Swaziland. The existence of SACU meant the free movement of goods 
within the member states. There was a common external tariff at the 
South African rates. Since South Africa was the only country with 
access to the sea9 she was the main collector of the import duties. 
The agreement included a specified percentage share of the customs 
and excise revenue pool to be received by each partner. The 
calculation of this percentage was based on an estimate of the 
customs and excise duty content of imports into Basutoland 9 
Bechuanaland and Swaziland of the period 1906-1908. The eventual 
total percentage for the HCTs was 1.31 and this remained so until 
1969 despite the fact that by 1966 the HCTs were accounting for 4 
per cent of SACU imports. 24 There was no provision in the Agreement 
for periodic revision of percentage allocations. 
Consequent to the Agreement the South African currency became 
the sole legal tender in the HCTs although there was no specific 
provision to this effect. The explanation to this was that the 
British Government initially thought the HCTs would be absorbed into 
South Africa. The use of the South African currency continued even 
when South Africa changed from the Pound to the newly decimal ised 
Rand in 1960. It became common to refer to these four countries as 
the 'Rand Area'. The use by the HCTs of the South African currency 
over which they had no controlg and neither had the Colonial master9 
meant they were influenced by any fiscal policy changes which the 
South African Governments made, some times without necessarily 
paying attention to the State of affairs of the formers' economies. 
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The commercial economy of Swaziland was largely in the hands of 
the settler community. Their main activity was farming~ having been 
given the bulk of the land by the 1907 Land Partition Proclamation. 
They grew cotton~ ma·ize and tobacco on a large scale. The market 
for these crops was South Africa~ but maize was sold in Swaziland as 
\-Jell. The creation of this Swazi market was due to the fact that 
the Land Partition Proclamation gave only one third of the land to 
the Swazis and according to Alan Booth 25 only 15 per cent of these 
reserves had soils and slopes well suited to crop production. So 
the Swazis were gradually relying on the White settler maize 
produce, and this became more so as the population grew. At a later 
stage maize imports had to come from South Africa to supplement the 
production in Swaziland. South Africa was the sole market for the 
settlers; live cattle until 1965 when the Swaziland Meat Corporation 
was established. This meant the cattle could be slaughtered and 
processed into different meat products in Swaziland. From that time 
meat products were sold in Britain and Zambia, in addition to the 
South African market. 
In 1938 the Havelock Asbestos Mine was opened by Newall and 
Turner, a British company. The mine was to become the biggest 
private sector single employer and source of government revenue 
until the establishment and consolidation of the forestry and sugar 
industries in the 1950s. The mine was one of the world•s five 
largest asbestos mines 26 and created 2,340 jobs; but Booth27 points 
out that nearly 70 per cent of the workers were foreign - South 
African, Mozambican and Nyasa. By 1940 11 about 70 per cent of income 
tax and almost all base metal royalty receipts were accounted for by 
the mine 11 • 28 
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There was also mining, on a small scales of gold at Forbes 
Reef, tin near Mbabane, beryl at Sinceni Hills, kaolins barytess 
pyrophyll i te s silver and diaspore. Altogether these accounted for 
1.87 per cent of the minerals sold in 1964s the rest going to 
asbestos. The mining sector grew larger in the Territory with the 
opening of the iron ore mine at Ngwenya and the coal mine at Mpaka 
in 1964. The Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company (SIODC) was 
formed by a combination of capital from Anglo-American Corporation 
(S.A.) and Guest, Keen & Nettlefolds (U.K.). Yawata and Fuji iron 
and steel groups of Japan signed a contract with SIODC to buy the 
iron ore for a period of 10 years. Capital for the construction of 
the railway from the iron ore mine to Lourenco Marques for shipment 
of the ore was provided by the Commonwealth Development Corporation 
{CDC), about £4 million, Anglo-American, about £1 million, and the 
South African Mutual Assurance Society, about £4.26 million. 
Roberts Constructions Murray and Stewart, and Rand Earthworks were 
the South African firms which constructed the railway. This railway 
was a 1 so to benefit the forestry indus try and the co a 1 mine at 
Mpaka. Mining rights at Mpaka had been given to the Rand Mines Ltd. 
and the Johannesburg Consolidated Investment Company - both of them 
South African firms. By 1966 the export earnings of iron ore had 
overtaken that of the asbestos. In that year asbestos earnings were 
R4,954,300 whereas that of iron ore were R8,546s800. In the same 
year coal earned R37s700 while the rest of the minerals earnings 
totalled R26,90o. 29 The earnings of the mineral products taken 
together represented 35.37 per cent of the value of domestic exports 
of Swaziland in 1966. 
The post-war period saw large investments in the forestry and 
agricultural industries, largely stimulated by the Colonial (later 
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called Conunonwealth) Development Corporation (CDC). In the late 
1940's CDC planted eucalyptus and pine trees on large tracts of 
land. This was called Usuthu Forestry. When the timber was ready 
for processing CDC and Courtaulds Ltd. (U.K.) formed the Usuthu Pulp 
Company which established the pulp mill to process the timber into 
unbleached woodpulp. IViining timber was also produced, mainly for 
the South African market. At about the same time that Usuthu 
Forestry was born, Anglo~American established Peak Timbers Ltd. 
which grew timber in the northern port of the Territory. The 
combined size of the forestry industries gave Swaziland the second 
largest commercial forestry acreage in the world. 
Another significant deve 1 opment was the es tab 1 i shment of the 
sugar industry by CDC and other companies. In 1950 CDC bought large 
tracts of land in the North-Eastern part of the Territory and set up 
a company called Swaziland Irrigation Scheme (SIS). SIS 
experimented with a variety of products such as citrus fruit, rice, 
vegetables and sugar cane. By the late 1950's CDC and Sir John 
Hullet & Sons (S.A.) had formed a company called Mhlume Sugar 
Company. This new company bought some of CDC 1 and to grow and 
process sugar cane. The projects (both for SIS and Mhlume) were 
successful. In the mid 1960's CDC bought out Sir John Hullet & Sons 
so that Mhlume Sugar Company became a wholly owned subsidiary of 
CDC. CDC also had a role in the Ubombo Ranches sugar project, in 
the south east of the Territory. In this project South African 
capital was the major shareholder. Ubombo Ranches Ltd. project was 
also successful. In 1968 Lonrho (U.K.) bought the whole of Ubombo 
Ranches Ltd. The sugar industry soon became the largest single 
employer in the Territory. By 1968, "less than 20 years after its 
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inception~ the sugar industry was providing work for 22 per cent of 
Swaziland•s wage .. earning popu'lation~ with 10 per cent of the entire 
population depending on it for their livings. 1130 
These post~war private investments were stimulated by CDC and 
the British Treasury•s spending on the infrastructure following the 
Colonial Development and Welfare Acts. Between 1945 and 1963 
Britain provided loans for this purpose amounting to £20~180,000. 31 
The Colonial Administration noted the importance of the 
infrastructure (roads, telephone facilities. training of manpower, 
etc.) for the purposes of economic development. In their 1964 
Report they wrote: 
11 Duri ng the 1950 Is the Territory saw 
considerable economic activity with the 
Administration concentrating on providing the 
necessary infrastructure. As a result, the 
private sector began to pl~y, for the first 
time. a major part in the development of the 
agricultural resources of Swaziland. In the 
northern Highveld two forestry companies planted 
a considerable acreage of pines and eucalypts, 
and the Malkerns and Big Bend areas saw a 
dramatic expansion of the irrigated areas ... 
As a result the economy has become more broadly 
based; a measure of its development is the 
steady decline of Swazi tax as a revenue 
component from 41 per cent in 1936-37 to 5 per 
cent in 1956-57. Although the contribution of 
Havelock Mine is still a major importance, 
Swaziland is less dependent on one single 
commodity, and the 1962 exports of processed and 
manufactured goods had overtaken mineral exports 
for the first time, sugar becoming Swaziland•s 
major export. 11 32 
What should be noted is that this large-scale investment came 
from both British and South African based companies. The investment 
challenged the settler based production which almost entirely relied 
on South Africa for its market. The big companies had the 
35 
capability of breaking this tradition and venture into new markets 
abroad~ as was the case with sugar (e.g. UK~ USA~ Canada markets) 
and forestry products (e.g, EECi Middle~east~ Zambia markets). 
Another significant point to note is that British investments 
exceeded those of South Africa at the time of independence. 
However 9 these points do not necessarily mean Swaziland was no 
longer 11 integrated 11 into the South African economy. There were 
stronger ties which militated against this. Firstly~ there was SACU 
which was discussed above. Secondly~ South Africa remained the main 
source of Swaziland's imports - both foodstuff and industrial 
production goods. For instance, in 1968 (year of Independence) 
Swaziland's imports from South Africa constituted 91.2 per cent of 
the total value. 33 The third element of linkage to South Africa was 
that of transport and communications. Until the completion of the 
railway to Lourenco Marques all goods going out to and coming from 
overseas went through South African ports. The Lourenco Marques 
port could not be a total substitute - in any case9 it could not 
handle all Swaziland's needs. In any case there was no political 
motive to make drastic changes because both Mozambique and South 
Africa had minority regimes. The i nternationa 1 telephone system 
linkage of Swaziland was controlled in South Africa. Swaziland had 
no international airport and had to use Jan Smuts Airport in 
Johannesburg. 
Linkages of Swaziland to South Africa were further consolidated 
by the education and the legal systems. Until the 1950's Swazi 
students wrote the Joint Matriculation Board (JMB) examinations for 
their school-leaving certificate. This arrangement came to an end 
when South Africa introduced the Bantu Education system in her 
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schools and when she announced that she would stop taking secondary 
school pupils from Swaziland. Swazi students then wrote the 
Cambridge G.C.E. •o• Levels examinations. But Swazi students 
continued to receive training in South African Colleges and 
Universities. The University of South Africa continued to offer 
degrees on behalf of Pius XII College - a predecessor of the former 
University of Botswana~ Lesotho and Swazi 1 and which was born in 
1964. One interesting aspect of education link was the teaching of 
Zulu as vernacular in Swaziland schools. This continued until the 
1970 1 s when Zulu was replaced by Swazi. The education linkage also 
had a manpower dimension in that many schools depended on South 
African teachers. The British Administration did not do much for 
the education of the Swazi. One observer pointed out that the 
Government in 1962 spent 9.7 times as much on every white child as 
on every African child at school~ 4.3 times as much as on every 
Eurafrican child; and that 11 Even South Africa~ which uses education 
to maintain master-servant relationship, had in 1959 only 1:8 cash 
ratio on black:white schooling ... 34 So the industries and Government 
used South African personnel in many fields which needed skilled 
1 abour. 
The legal system of Swaziland was an inheritance from that of 
the Transvaal. The British Administrator did not change the legal 
system that had been introduced by the Transvaal Government in 
Swaziland in the late nineteenth century. 
The most glaring and important link between South Africa and 
Swaziland was the migrant 1 abour of Swazis to the mines of South 
Africa. There are several reasons for the existence of Swazi 
migrant labour to these mines. Some were natural causes and others 
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were man-made. Rinderpest struck Swazilandg killing many cattleg in 
1894. In 1902 there was the visitation of the East coast Fever. 
Together these cattle epidemics killed nearly 90 per cent of the 
Swazi herd. 35 This meant loss of food in the form of milk and meat. 
But it also meant loss of pulling-power in crop cultivation because 
by this time harnessed oxen were used to pull ploughs. In addition 
to theseg cattle in Swaziland are regarded as a form of wealth and 
source of pride and dignity. In order to replace the cattle and to 
supplement their foodstuffs9 some Swazi male adults went to the 
mines in South Africa. Although before the turn of the century only 
a few hundred Swazis had been known to go to the South African 
mines9 the figure stood at 49000 by 1910. Other natural causes for 
migrant labour were the periodic droughts and infestation of swarm 
of locusts which devoured crops. 
The 1907 Land Partition Proclamation, mentioned above, also 
resulted in migrant labour. Rather than work as a squatter on the 
settler's land, many young men preferred to sell their labour in a 
"free" market. So they went to the South African mines despite the 
settlers' objections. By 1911 over 11 per cent of the male 
population of the territory sold their labour yearly in South 
Africa. 36 Swaziland's industries could not absorb all the labour 
power. The first large industry of any significance was the 
Havelock Asbestos Mine established in 1938. Moreover9 the mines in 
S.Africa were paying relatively high wages compared to Swaziland's 
establishments. Hence the lure to the South African mines. It 
subsequently became a prestige for young Swazi males to have been to 
the Rand or coal mines of northern Natal. They eventually regarded 
themselves as "been tos", spoke a certain type of dialect when they 
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l~eturned home9 dressed up in a particular style and generally looked 
down upon any young men who had never been to the mines. It became 
fashionable to work in the mines. 
The imposition of tax upon Swazis was another cause for migrant 
labour as the taxed Swazis needed money to pay. There were also the 
Swazi Monarch's levies on male adults for purposes of the Crown 
Pri nee • s education 9 for the expenses for deputations to London to 
protest against the land partitioning process. The Monarchy also 
imposed levies for the purpose of buying back the land. Many young 
men were persuaded to go to the mines and deposit a certain 
percentage with the royal family to create the land purchase funds. 
Recruiting agencies also paid capitation fees to the Monarchy so 
that it could use influence on Swazis to go to the South African 
mines. Both the royal levies and capitation fees were eventually 
stopped by the British Administration in the 1920's. 
The establishment of big forestry9 citrus fruit and sugar 
industries in the Territory in the post-war period created a problem 
for the South African mines and the settler community in Swaziland. 
These industries created competition for Swazi labour and this meant 
higher wages than before. It also meant that the recruiting 
agencies were to be more active - at some stage they travelled 
around the country on recruiting campaigns 9 even bought free beers 
for potential recruits. In turn the local industries made 
recruiting campaigns9 provided free transport to new recruits9 
allowed their workers to go home at least once a month (after pay 
day) for a weekend. The latter condition became the most attractive 
condition of service since workers could go home more frequently 
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TABLE 1 NUMBER OF PEOPLE FROM SWAZILAND RECRUITED FOR THE SOUTH 
AFRICAN MINES 
SOURCES (a) 
(b) 
(c) 
Year 
1922 
1932 
1942 
1952 
1962 
1968 
Number 
7089 
4205 
3031 
3440 
9200 
7829 
Alan R. Booth, Capitalism and the Competition 
for Swazi Labor 1945-1960, paper presented at 
Free University, Amsterdam, February 1986. 
Swaziland Annual Reports 1961-1964, London, 
HMSO. 
Swaziland Annual Statistical Bulletin, 
Mbabane, Central Statistical Office 1971. 
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than working in the South African mines where they only went home at 
the end of their contracts which could be 3, 6 or 9 months. 
The South African mines' response was to hike wages so that the 
Swazis continued to migrate as labourers. For instance the 1962 
figure (Total) in Table I represented about 18 per cent of the Swazi 
working age male population actually employed. The most hard hit 
during this competiton was the White settler farmer in the 
Territory. He could not rely on squatters as most Swazis would not 
work under those harsh terms. If he tried to enforce them Swazis 
simply moved out of his land and sold their labour elsewhere or went 
to squat somewhere else. "It was this relative freedom of movement 
which gave tenants some bargaining power and severely emasculated 
the landlord threat." 37 
The big industries in the Territory responded by recruiting 
labour from outside. For instance in 1951 the total percentage for 
all industries employing more than 50 workers was 20.82 per cent 
foreign labour, in 1960 the figure stood at 22.16 per cent. Foreign 
workers came mainly from Mozambique, Nyasaland and South Africa. 
This competition for Swazi labour was being gradually reduced by the 
population increase whose rate was higher than that of industrial 
expansion. In the post-independent period Swaziland once again 
found herself with the problem of unemployment. 
IV Period of Nationalism and Constitutional Development 1960-1968 
Nationalism and the call for self-determination in Swaziland 
were sparked off mainly by the events in Central, East and West 
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Africa ltJhere Africar. people had been engaged in the struggle for 
independence for several years by the late 1950 1 s. Some of these 
colonies experienced the militant version of nationalism, for 
example the Gold Coast~ and others even took up armed struggle~ for 
example~ Kenya. Due to the fear that Swaziland might experience 
either of these two versions~ the European Advisory Council 
petitioned in the late 1950's, the High Commissioner in South 
Africa9 Mr. Liesching, to have it converted into a Legislative 
Council. The EAC fears were not unfounded seeing that in 1957 Mr. 
J.J. Nqukug one of the prominent and educated Swazis, had made an 
overseas tour of England, the USA and several European countries and 
came back full of ideas of 'democracy and progress' in Swaziland. 
In examining constitutional development what should be 
underlined is that Swaziland experienced a difficult period of 
constitution drafting due mainly to two reasons : (a) the position 
and political strength of the Swazi monarch and traditional 
institutions, and (b) the existence of a large white settler 
community compared with that of the other HCTs. The discussion of 
the Swaziland's constitutional development leading to independence 
will be concentrated on four main distinct actors : (a) the White 
settler community through the European Advisory Council (EAC) which 
was later converted into the United Swaziland Association (USA); 
(b) the Swazi monarch and his traditional supporters who eventually 
formed the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM); (c) the nationalist 
movements - (i) the Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP), (ii) the 
Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC), (iii) the Swaziland 
Democratic Party (SOP) and ( i v) the Mbandzeni Nati anal Convention 
(MNC); and (d) the British Government - both in London and in 
Swaziland. 
42 
When the European Advisory Council (EAC) petitioned the High 
Commissioner to have them converted into a Legislative Council, the 
latter referred the matter to the Resident Commissioner of 
Swaziland. The EAC was contemplating a political change in the 
territory similar to that which took place in Southern Rhodesia in 
1923. However, the Resident Commissioner•s reply was that that line 
of political development could not be taken; he argued that 
Swaziland was, as far as he was concerned, a protectorate, with the 
undertaking by the British Government to respect the rights and 
institutions of the Swazis. 38 Consequent to this reply, the EAC 
changed its petition in 1960 to that of a request for a joint 
advisory council between the EAC and the Swazis. When the idea was 
communicated to Sobhuza as the native authority he rejected it on 
the grounds that it would mean a derogation of Swazi power because 
the Swazi National Council (SNC) already had legislative and 
executive powers whereas the EAC was only advisory. It should be 
recalled that the Swazis had no institutional framework which played 
an advisory role to the British Administration, except that 
ambiguous role played by the traditional institutions which had not 
been subordinated to the British Administration by any legislative 
instrument or proclamation. It is for that reason that the 
Administration of Swaziland has been described as parallel rule in 
the section dealing with the Colonial System of Administration. 
While Sobhuza rejected the EAC proposals, he could not turn a 
blind eye to the events happening in Central, East and West Africa 
and the general mood of the workers and educated Swazis. So in the 
same year (1960) he condemned militant nationalism in the north, 
saying that it was foreign to Africans and certainly unwanted in 
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Swaziland. He then proposed a Legislative Council whereby the White 
community was to elect its representatives in their own system and 
the Swazis were to choose theirs in the way they were used to ~ by 
acclamation. Sobhuza suggested that this Legislative Council should 
have no jurisdiction over Swazi custom nor land and mineral rights. 
This separate ba 11 ot based on race and the 11 federa 111 Leg co became 
known as Sobhuza's version of 11 racial federation 11 resembling that 
advanced by Sir De Villiers Graaf of the United Party of South 
Africa. Whether or not Sobhuza was being influenced by the United 
Party policies is not clear, but what is clear is that he was aware 
of the major political developments in South Africa. 
The Formation of SPP 
The views of Sobhuza provided an impetus for the formation of 
the first political party in the territory - the Swaziland 
Progressive Party (SPP). SPP was formed in July 1960 by the 
leadership of the Progressive Association which had first been 
formed in 1929 by a group of educated Swazis for the purpose of 
articulating the interests of the educated Swazis. Due to Sobhuza's 
pressure the Colonial Administration had decreed that the 
Association should be affiliated to the SNC. This did not cause 
much serious conflict of interest until the talk of political and 
constitutional changes in the Territory. Hence the formation of the 
SPP. 
The SPP Manifesto had the following points : (a) it called for 
a non-racial policy in order to bring about the democratic 
enfranchisement of all persons in Swaziland- in short they were 
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demanding a one mano one vote ballot system in a common national 
voters roll in contrast to Sobhuza • s 11 racial federation 11 system; 
{b) it called for a vigorous opposition to the South African 
continuing attempts of incorporation; (c) it urged that Swaziland 
adopt the UN Declaration on Human Rights and abide by this document; 
and (d) it called for a complete integration to be achieved in every 
sphere of life and racial discrimination in all its forms to be 
ended immediately. 
The SPP leadership was composed of the educated Swazis. For 
instance its president 9 Mr. J.J. Nquku had been a school-teacher, 
then an inspector of schools. His right~hand man Dr. A.P. Zwane was 
a medical practitioner; Prince Dumisa (Sobhuza•s nephew) had been a 
University student in Roma, Lesotho, before he withdrew to 
participate full time in the politics of Swaziland, Mr. Arthur Khoza 
was a university graduate. Nquku had come from South Africa to live 
in Swaziland in the late l920 1 S and Dr. Zwane had made acquaintance 
with black political leaders in South Africa when he was studying 
medicine in the University of the Witwatersrand. These leaders 
included Nelson Mandela and Robert Sobukwe. Zwane returned home to 
practise medicine but because of the institutionalised racism in the 
terri tory he suffered di scrimi nation to the extent that he 1 ater 
resigned from Government employment and became a full time 
politician. The extent of this discrimination is highlighted by Sir 
Brian Marwick, who was Resident Commissioner, when he wrote to Hilda 
Kuper: 
11 You may not have heard of the uproar when Owen 
Strong as District Commissioner Mbabane 
allocated a house in the •European• area to Dr. 
A.P. Zwane. The Urban Area Advisory Committee 
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... mounted their high horses and were about to 
organi1.e a petition and a Press campaign in the 
Repub 1 i c to have me removed from office. I 
summoned them and listened to the expected 
nonsense about land and social values~ etc. 
Bowman expected to chill my blood by saying that 
a professor friend of his whom I had met would 
certainly not now come to settle in Swaziland. 
I explained to them the facts of life and dwelt 
on Zwane's professional qualifications after 
long training at University (I knew none of them 
had been to University) and the matter fizzled 
out. 11 39 
Marwick goes on to mention that Bowman was later taking him 
(Marwick) to task for not doing enough to integrate the Swazis and 
Europeans in the virtues of the 50/50 constitutional solution. This 
idea of 50/50 constitutional solution was actually the view shared 
by the EAC with Sobhuza and his traditionalist supporters. The EAC 
rejected the SPP position, especially the call for one man one vote. 
They went along with Sobhuza•s view of the 11 racial federation 11 after 
having dropped the petition for a joint advisory council. 
The First Constitutional Committee 
The political mobilization and organization of the late 1950 1 s 
and 1960 resulted in the establishment of the first Constitutional 
Committee in Swaziland. In November 1960 the Secretary of State for 
Colonies authorised the setting up of this committee. Its terms of 
reference were as follows : (a) to examine the circumstances which 
militated against common purpose and co~existence, (b) to consider 
what form of constitution was desirable for Swaziland and to draft 
accordingly and (c) to consider the need for the development of 
subordinate or local forms of government in Swaziland, for example, 
at district level and for urban areas. 
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The Committee consisted of the EACg the Ng~venyama ( 11 King 11 ) in 
Libandla (SNCL the British Administration in Swaziland and the 
Swaziland Combined Executive Association representatives. SPP 
members were included in the Committee as members of Libandla (SNC) 
and not as representatives of SPP. However, the SPP members did not 
stay long in this Committee. The main issue of controversy was 
their recognition as representatives of SPP. The other 
representatives refused to recognise them as such and insisted they 
should be taken as SNC representatives. As a result of this 
controversy, J.J. Nquku, President of SPP, was expelled. 
Disagreement continued with the remaining SPP members who resigned 
less than four months later. At resignation Dr. Zwane said 11 lf we 
are to be discouraged from speaking out, as in Mr. Nquku•s case we 
will be false to our convictions while giving the public the 
misleading impression that the Swaziland Progressive Party is having 
a hand in the shaping of the new constitution when, in fact, the 
position is quite different.•.4° After their withdrawal, the SPP 
leadership made a formal request to be represented in the Committee 
as a movement. The request was rejected by the Resident 
Commissioner. 
Following the rejection of their request by the Resident 
Commissioner, the SPP drafted a petition to the UK Government in 
London. The petition contained a wide spectrum of issues. They 
requested the establishment of a Legislative Council on the basis of 
a common voters• roll, thus allowing for universal adult suffrage; 
they wanted the establishment of non-racialism in all aspects of 
Swaziland•s political, economic and social life; and the 
elimination of the very large number of racially discriminating 
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laws~ some of which had been kept ·in force since Swaziland \'t!as 
subjected to the jurisdiction of the Transvaal Republic in the 
nineteenth century. The document asked for the entrenchment in 
agreed constitution- of a Court-enforced Bill of Human Rights 
including full freedom of political organization (no doubt this was 
the reaction of SPP to being forced to operate within the SNC). 
They requested the UK Government to take steps towards the peaceful 
integration of the traditional chieftainship into modern democratic 
structures of government. (Here the SPP were venturing into a very 
sensitive issue because Sobhuza had successfully resisted the 
integration). SPP also requested that Swaziland should have a 
democratically elected form of local government~ especially in the 
main townships. The last point was a request to recognise Swaziland 
as a Protected State and to establish the Paramount Chief's position 
as Head of State in the form of constitutional monarch. As far as 
the first part of this last point was concerned, Sobhuza and the SPP 
agreed : together they believed that Swaziland had never lost 
independence. Sobhuza's claim that the country be given to him and 
not to political parties was based on this premise. But to the 
monarch it seemed illogical for the SPP to want him politically 
neutralised as the second part of the last request suggested. 
Historically Swazi kings ruled effectively and were not just 
political figureheads. 
The SPP did not get any response from the British Government 
which simply awaited the report of the Constitutional Committee from 
which SPP members were either expelled or had resigned. The absence 
of the SPP in the constitutional talks did worry the Resident 
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Commissioner9 Marwick. He urged Sobhuza and Car'l Todd~ leader of 
the European Community9 to include the nationalists in the 
discussions but did not succeed. 
In 1961 the Constitutional Committee made their report vJhich 
was very controversial on some issues. The first recommendation was 
to end all the existing racial discriminatory legislation and 
practices in the territory. The second was the establishment of an 
Executive Council consisting of a Governor, 3 ex-officio members, 1 
official, 4 nominated members, and 4 unofficial members (2 Swazis 
and 2 Europeans). Thirdly, they recommended the establishment of a 
Legislative Council consisting of equal numbers of Swazis, chosen by 
acclamation, and Europeans elected by western methods (secret 
ballot). This recommendation reflected the idea of a "racial 
federation 11 • The fourth recommendation was that the Ngwenyama 
(King) should have a right to withhold his consent to Bills until he 
had satisfied himself that the legislation would be in the best 
interest of the Territory. The last recommendation was a call for a 
Bi 11 of Rights which wou 1 d 1 ay down persona 1 1 i berti es such as 
freedom of expression and assembly, but this bill should not allow 
major changes to the socio-political framework of the Territory. 
(This qualified freedom of expression and assembly was, no doubt, 
meant to prevent the formation of political parties, by the Swazi, 
outside the SNC). 
The Resident Commissioner and some official members of the 
Committee expressed their reservations about the 50/50 11 racial 
federation 11 and the exclusion of modern political organization (the 
SPP). In an interview Sir Brian Marwick revealed that he was at 
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pains trying to point out to Sobhuza that in the modern world it was 
impossible to prevent people from forming political organizations 
according to their own persuasion9 that if Sobhuza wanted to 
participate in Swazi politics he could use his supporters to form a 
political party. 41 On the 11 racial federation•~ Sir Brian was to 
write later (to Hilda Kuper) that 11 1 was convinced that acceptance 
of the 50/50 principle would be an unforgivable betrayal of HMG 1 S 
responsibilities as the protecting power and would make even more 
difficult any attempt to satisfy Swazi grievances over land etc. and 
the erosion of Swazi institutions in the future ... I felt that the 
50/50 principle would further imperil the objective of ensuring that 
Swazi interests eventually predominated. 1142 Neither did the 
Secretary of State for the Colonies agree with these two proposals 
by the Constitutional Committee. He felt that a common voters! roll 
would undoubtedly be required if the non-traditional elements among 
the Swazis were to be included. 
When the Committee•s proposals were not accepted by the 
Colonial Office in their entirety 9 Sobhuza decided to test the 
popularity of the 50/50 principle amongst the Swazis. In February 
1962 he convened a meeting of all Swazi men (SNC) at Lobamba royal 
kraal and addressed them on the Committee•s proposals. The 
recommendations were rejected - the most notorious being the 50/50 
principle. The youth so rudely attacked it that Sobhuza was shocked 
because no Swazi had ta 1 ked to him 1 ike that before. However 9 he 
again tested the proposal at a local inkhundla (meeting place) at 
Mbabane. He did not attend but used his supporters. Mbabane was 
not the right place for him to sell the 50/50 principle. Here he 
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rece·ived the same rebuff as at Lobamba. Sobhuza vJas not prepared to 
accept defeat. On 3 July 1962 a meeting of all adult Swazis was 
called at l.obamba. When the people turned in large numbers~ he and 
the councillors addressed the people on irrelevant issues~ instead 
of the constitutional proposals. This beating about the bush 
continued until the following month. As a result people were tired 
of remaining at Lobamba 9 with no accommodation nor enough food. 
Most left. Key people~ like the princes 9 chiefs9 councillors~ 
members of the Constitutional Committee and SPP leadership 9 remained 
behind. It was at this time that the leaders of SPP were called to 
appear before the Executive Council of SNC - the L iqoqo - to be 
interrogated and threatened. The SPP refused to be intimidated and 
continued with their policies. 
To many people's amazement the councillors announced on 9 
August 1962 that the Swazi nation had unanimously accepted in 
principle the Constitutional Committee's proposals. Sobhuza and his 
supporters had played delaying tactics so that they would fool the 
people. But many people never accepted the 50/50 principle and 
Sobhuza was to back-track on this issue later. 
Formation of more Political Parties 
More political parties were formed during this 50/50 debate. 
In March 1962 the Swaziland Democratic Party (SOP) was formed. SOP 
was the first multi-racial party in the Territory. One of the 
leaders was Mr. Vincent Rozwadowski who had emigrated9 after World 
War 119 from Poland to South Africa9 but later moved to Swaziland 
having found South African racism unbearable. Another leader was 
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Mr. Simon Sishayi Nxumalog a former school-teacher who had become a 
businessman; there was Mr. Jordan Ngubaneg a former national Vice 
President of the South African Liberal Party; and there was Dr. 
Allen M. Nxumalos a medical practitioner. SOP called for a united 
Swaziland under the one man one vote democratic principle; they 
advocated a constitutional monarch similar to the British system ~ 
indeed Rozv<~adowski was a great admirer of the British political 
system. SOP rejected traditionalismg they accused SPP of being 
racists and did not endorse Pan-Africanism. 
In July 1962 the Mbandzeni National Convention (MNC) was 
formed. This party argued that Swaziland had in fact never lost its 
independence. Hence they called for the restoration of its 
sovereignty s but under the system of one man one vote. The leader 
of the Party was Dr. George Msibi 9 a medical practitioner. The 
party was never really popular because of lack of clarity. For 
instance, they stated in their Manifesto that all laws should be 
valid and legal when they bore the signature of the Ngwenyama but 
did not state whether the Ngwenyama had a right of veto. 
As early as 1961 the SPP split into 2 factions: SPP-Nquku 
faction and SPP-Zwane faction. The Zwane faction accused Nquku as 
President of SPP of misusing Party funds and also of being 
dictatorial. This split was to prove costly to the movement because 
by this time SPP was receiving material support from some 
independent African countries in the north 9 for instance, Ghana. 
These countries did not know which faction to recognise. The split 
culminated in the Zwane faction becoming the Ngwane National 
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Liberatory Congress (NNLC) in April 1963. NNLC eventually had the 
largest following amongst the modern political parties, 
The 1963 Imposed Constitution 
Because of the continuing constitutional disagreements~ the 
British Government decided to convene a conference in London in 
January 1963, The Swaziland Delegation consisted of the Resident 
Commissionerg 4 seats for the EACg 1 seat for Eurafricans 9 6 seats 
for SNC, 3 seats for the political parties (SPP 9 SOP and MNC) and 
one independent member - Dr, David Hynd 9 who was head of one big 
Christian mission station in Swaziland which ran schools, a teacher 
training college, a nurse training collegeg a large hospital and 
several clinics. Dr. Hynd was taken to be a representative of 
missionary opinion in Swaziland, As this conference took place when 
SPP had 2 factions, the British Administration had problems as to 
which one to invite, There had never been any polling which might 
have helped indicate which faction had the majority support. They 
ultimately invited the Nquku faction on the basis that it was the 
original SPP. 
The London Conference ended on 12 February 1963 without any 
sign of agreement. One of the major issues of disagreement was that 
of mineral rights. The British Government wanted mineral rights to 
be vested in the Legislative Council, while the SNC and EAC wanted 
Sobhuza to be in control of them, the EAC was in collusion with SNC 
on this matter due to the 50/50 concession offered by SNC; they 
also feared the militancy and growing popularity of the nationalist 
movements, This Conference ended without agreement. 
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On May 20 1963 the British Government announced the 
promulgation of the Swaziland Constitution. This is what became 
known as 11 the imposed constitution 11 • One of its main features was 
that it gave the Executive powers to Her Majesty's Commissioner 
(formerly the Resident Commissioner) who was to be assisted by an 
Executive Council of 3 ex-officio members plus 5 members appointed 
by Her Majesty's Commissioner. The Legislative Council was to 
consist of the Queen's Commissioner~ the Speaker~ 24 Elected members 
and 4 official and nominated members. The electoral process was 
complicated : 8 Swazis were to be elected through traditional 
methods~ 4 Europeans to be elected on the European roll~ 4 Europeans 
to be elected on a national roll, and 8 persons of any race were to 
be elected on a national roll. 
This constitution provided that the Ngwenyama would be entitled 
to see all papers sent to the Executive Council and would receive a 
copy of every Bill passed by the Legislative Council. He was also 
empowered to bring matters before the Executive Council for 
consideration. Another provision stated that ownership of the 
mi nera 1 s was to be vested in the Ngwenyama on beha 1f of the Swazi 
nation, but that the Legislative Council was given power over their 
allocation. In short, the Legco had control over the minerals. 
None of the protagonists were pleased with this constitution. 
Sobhuza, his traditionalists and EAC were unhappy about the minerals 
issue. On top of that, the Ngwenyama was not given legislative 
powers - meaning that he was being politically neutralised. On the 
other hand, the nationalist movements were not happy with the 
electoral process, especially that of reserving one-third of the 
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Legco's elected seats for the European community; they also 
complained about the traditional methods of electing the 8 Swazis. 
So both sections were protesting against this constitution. 
The traditionalists and EAC found a friend in the Conservative 
Party (UK)9 Major Sir Patrick Wall9 M.P. They asked him to table 9 
on their behalf9 in the House of Commons a petition. He agreed. and 
the contents of the petition were as follows : (a) they asked for 
recognition of the powers of the SNC to legislate. (b) they asked 
for the rights of the Swazi Nation (through the Ngwenyama in 
Council) to control the land and minerals, (c) they petitioned that 
the Swazi King be given a right to participate in legislation, to be 
recognized as a symbol of the Swazi nation, (d) they did not like 
the electoral system. especially the 8 persons of any race to be 
elected on a national roll - they were still sticking to their 50/50 
'racial federation'. and (e) they called for a recognition of 
Swaziland as a Protectorate and not as a colony. This petition 
received little support in the House of Commons. 
It is interesting to note that Wall saw the imposed 
constitution as favouring Dr. Zwane's party. Later he wrote : 11 You 
may recall that the then Commonwealth Secretary. Mr. Duncan Sandys. 
decided to impose a Constitution on Swaziland which would assist Dr. 
Zwane and his political party. I presented a petition to Parliament 
on behalf of the Swaziland Government to oppose this imposition. I 
visited King Sabuza (sic) and he eventually decided to start his own 
political party, which as you will know won the subsequent 
elections. 1143 Dr. Zwane and his supporters were themselves accusing 
the British Government of favouring the traditionalist and the EAC, 
55 
as stated above. Wall states he presented the petition in 
Parliament •on behalf of the Swaziland Government•. It is not clear 
why he is referring to Sobhuza and his supporters as the •swaziland 
Government•. He certainly would not be referring to the British 
Admi ni strati on in Swazi 1 and because the 1 atter was opposed to the 
•racial federation•; they had been trying to instill into the 
traditionalists mind that if they wanted to run the country they 
should form their own political movement. 
Despite the protests and petitions from all directions, the 
British Government insisted on the application of the Constitution. 
Sobhuza•s 1964 Plebiscite and Formation of INM 
The insistence of the British Government on the constitution 
made Sobhuza decide to test his popularity vi s-a-vis the 
Constitution. In January 1964 he called for a plebiscite for the 
Swazis to register their objection to the Constitution. The people 
were given 2 symbols to vote for : either a Reindeer symbol or a 
Lion (Ngwenyama). They were told that if they supported their King 
they should vote for the Lion symbol and if they did not, then they 
should vote for the Reindeer symbol (a strange animal in Swaziland). 
Chiefs instructed their followers to vote for the Ngwenyama or else 
they would be evicted from their chiefdoms. The EAC endorsed the 
plebiscite, while the political parties rejected the referendum and 
even tried to persuade the people not to participate. The British 
Administration in the Territory announced that they would ignore it. 
In the campaign SNC and the chiefs accused political parties of 
being ready to cause a civil war/divide the nation (Umbango) since 
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they were 11 against 11 the Monarchy. It was further alleged that the 
colonial government wanted to perpetuate this civil war because they 
11 Supported 11 the political parties. Amongst the traditionalists it 
became anathema to be associated with political parties (to be 
called 11 Uyiphathi 11 in siSwati was tantamount to being labelled a 
traitor). The political parties were depicted in the symbol of the 
reindeer - a strange animal with horns lacking a straight direction. 
To the illiterate Swazi 9 this symbol really represented confusion. 
The plebiscite was conducted at tinkhundla (traditional meeting 
places). The results of the elections showed that 1229000 adults 
chose the lion 9 out of a total electorate population (i.e. Swazi) of 
125 9000 9 only 154 chose the reindeer. 44 The authenticity of the 
figures 1229000 and 154 may not be verifiable9 seeing that no 
neutral personnel were involved in the supervision and counting of 
the votes. But there is no doubt that the majority voted for the 
Ngwenyama and this boos ted Sobhuza • s confidence after the 
humiliating rebuffs 2 years back at Lobamba and Mbabane. 
Elections based on the imposed constitution had been set for 
June 1964 and Sobhuza•s plebiscite was held in January 1964. In 
April 1964 Sobhuza announced he would contest the elections through 
the Imbokodvo National Movement (INM). This marked the formation of 
the 11 King•s Party 11 • Different people have been credited with the 
idea of forming INM. Robert P. Stevens45 apportions credit to a 
South African 1 awyer 9 van Wyk de Vries 9 who was a member of the 
Broederbond. There is open evidence that the Broederbond did advise 
Sobhuza during this period of constitutional discussions. Hilda 
Kuper 9 who is a great admirer of Sobhuza9 wrote in the Monarch•s 
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biography that "Sobhuza made contact with Jan van Wyk de Vries who~ 
as Sobhuza's critics pointed outs had ready access to Verwoerd. But 
Sobhuza argued that if his advice was sound he would take it; if 
nots he was under no obligation to follow it nor did it prevent him 
from hearing or considering other legal opinions". Sir Brian 
Marwick maintains that he always advised Sobhuza to form a party if 
he wanted to participate in the politics of modern Swaziland. Sir 
Patrick Wall indicates in his letter (quoted above) that he gave 
Sobhuza the advice to form a political party. 
All these claims and apportionment of credit do not tell us who 
exactly convinced Sobhuza. It could have been one or all of them. 
It could have been none of them as Sir Francis Loyd's opinion 
indicated in an interview with him. 46 The question asked was how 
much influence the South African advisers had on Sobhuza. Sir 
Francis' answer was that there could have been some influence from 
them but there was no proof; he pointed out that Sobhuza accepted 
anybody who came to his office with pieces of advice and did not 
tell anybody offs so that one could leave the office believing that 
Sobhuza had taken his word. But at the end Sobhuza made his own 
decision. There is no intention to debate this issue in detail~ but 
it is perhaps necessary to point out that there is no evidence as to 
who Sobhuza actually believed in. Of course~ if one was his 
political rival 9 he could easily capitalise on his association with 
a Broederbond. 
There are two important points which this claim to advice 
always overlooks. The first one is that the British Government had 
decided on the elections and were not going to change their mind. 
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So Sobhuza had either to boycott the elections or participate. But 
before he made the decision he had a good idea of testing his 
popularity in the January 1964 plebiscite. This plebiscite is the 
second point referred to above. It was the result of this 
plebiscite which gave Sobhuza the confidence. If the results had 
been disastrous9 it is not easy to tell what he would have done. 
Would he have proceeded to form the INM or would he have threatened 
to abdicate as he had done in 1941? His decision to participate in 
the election was based on the results of the plebiscite. Moreoverg 
the influence of experts (whether constitutional, political or 
economic) on Sobhuza is sometimes exaggerated. He once said 
11 Experts often spend a long time first finding out and then telling 
us what we already know, but then they put forward their solutions 
without consulting us ... 47 
Having formed the INM the traditionalists used both persuasion 
and threats to leadet·s of the opposition to disband their parties 
and join INM. Dr. George Msibi, leader of MNC 9 left his party to 
join INM and was appointed Secretary-General. Two months after the 
June elections Mr. S.S. Nxumalo resigned from the executive of SOP 
to join the traditionalists. In March 1965 Dr. A.M. Nxumalo, 
President of SOP, left his party to join INM at the same time urging 
his followers to do the same. Both SOP and MNC eventually ceased to 
exist. SPP and NNLC continued to exist, with the NNLC becoming more 
popular despite defections of some of its members to INM. One of 
the defectors was the one time acting Secretary-General of NNLC, Mr. 
Arthur Khoza who was immediately made Private Secretary to the Prime 
Minister- designate, Prince Makhosini. Khoza was a University of 
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Basutoland~ Bechuanaland and S~-.Jaziland graduate and had been sent 
for further training in the Kwame Nkrumah Institute of Ideology by 
NNLC. 
The June 1964 Election~_and First Legislative Council 
In order to contest the June 1964 elections the EAC formed the 
United Swaziland Association (U.S.A.). However 9 close links were 
being forged between the traditionalists and the White settler 
community. For instance, Carl Todd, former Chairman of EAC ran in 
the elections as an INM candidate and won. The election results 
were as fo 11 ows USA won 6 White seats; one seat went to an 
independent White; INM won all the African seats (having polled 
85.45 per cent of the votes~ NNLC polling 12.3 per cent, SPP Nquku -
0.6 per cent, SPP Mabuza faction polled 0.25 per cent 9 and SOP got 
1.4 per cent); INM also won the 8 seats on a national roll. 
The first Leg co was formed by USA ( 6 seats) , one independent 
and INM (17 seats - including that of Carl Todd). Thus the Legco 
that had been gazetted as far back as 1960 was finally constituted 
and it met for the first time in September 1964. 
Severa 1 factors contributed to the humi 1 i ati ng defeat of the 
nationalist parties. The first one was the nature of the campaign 
conducted by INM. The INM told the unsophisticated Swazis that 
political parties (NB - INM was never referred to as a political 
party by its leaders~ it was called a Swazi nation movement) were 
against the Monarchy; that they wanted to cause a civil war; and 
the chiefs went to the extent of being hostile to SPP, NNLC and SOP 
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campaigners. Some chiefs used threats of eviction to their 
followers if they voted parties. The SPP9 NNLC and SOP complained 
to the Government about this unfair campaign and threats. But 
according to Sir Francis Loyd the Government did not have prima 
facie evidence of this 9 although he did not rule out its 
occurrence. 48 No doubt the majority of the people would have voted 
INM as 1 ong as it was associated with the Monarchy 9 but there is 
room for arguing that not as many would have done so had the other 
parties been given a fair chance. 
The industrial strikes tha.t hit Swaziland in 1962-1963 also 
contributed to the SPP and NNLC's bad performance in the 1964 
elections. These strikes spread over Big Bend9 Mbabaneg Usuthu Pulp 
and Havelock Asbestos Mine and were largely engineered by SPP/NNLC. 
Prime Dumisa played a major role in arousing the feelings of the 
workers. During these strikes leaders of the SPP/NNLC were arrested 
and prosecuted for causing public disturbance. The important point 
is that at the time of preparing for the June 1964 elections Dr. 
Zwane 9 President of NNLC 9 and Prince Dumisag its Secretary-Generalg 
were in jail for some time. So they did not have all the time they 
needed to prepare for the forthcoming elections. 
The Internal Self-Government and Constitution Talks 
In August 1965 a Constitutional Committee was set up following 
the INM's request for independence not later than the end of 1969. 
Members of the Committee were drawn from the Legislative Council 
only. It was during these talks that Sobhuza and his INM changed 
their mind on the idea of the "racial federation". They then called 
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for one man one vote in a common voters • ro 11 0 Sobhuza had been 
gaining more confidence since the January 1964 plebisciteo His 
confidence was boosted by the defections to INM of some leaders of 
SOP~ MNC and NNLC. The USA leaders failed to persuade INM on this 
change of mindo They then decided to put in their lot with INMo 
An important point to note is that no opposition party 
participated in the constitutional discussionso These parties 
demanded that they be allowed to participate in this major task of 
shaping the future of the country9 but their demand was not accepted 
by the Legco and the Government. The explanation to this exclusion 
by the then Queen•s Commissioner 9 Sir Francis Loyd~ was that 
Colonial Office policy was that only parties represented in the 
Legco should be involved in the discussions. The rational behind 
this policy was that a line had to be drawn somewhere as to who 
should participate, otherwise one would end up inviting all 
political groupings who would render the work of Constitutional 
Committee impossible. What the Swaziland Legco did was to invite 
the views of the political parties not represented in the 
Committee. 49 
The report of this Constitutional Committee was published on 24 
March 1966. One of the main issues on this report was that which 
involved the status of the Ngwenyamao The INM felt that the Swazi 
monarch should be recognised as the King of Swaziland with political 
and executive powers over all issues. The British officials 
documented this issue in the following words: 
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11The fundamental problem with v11hich the 
Constituti ona 1 Committee was concerned was one 
which has long been at the root of Swazi 
constitutional thinking~ namely the restoration 
of what the Swazis regard as the original treaty 
relationship which Swaziland had with Britain in 
the. nineteenth century and the recognition of 
the kingship of the Ngwenyama (Paramount 
Chief) 11 .50 
Linked to this was the mineral rights issue. The Swazis argued that 
the mineral rights should be vested in the Ngwenyama. The early 
request to have the Constitutional Committee sprang as much from 
their dissatisfaction over the previous decision on minerals as from 
their dissatisfaction with the status accorded to Swaziland and to 
the Ngwenyama. As per the 1963 Constitution the minerals were under 
the control of the Government through the Queen's Commissioner. 
The British position on the first issue was that the Swazi 
monarch would become the King of Swaziland as soon as Swazi 1 and 
became a Protected State following elections after the finalisation 
of the new constitution. On the second issue, the decision was that 
the power to dispose minerals would lie with the (Swazi) King who 
was obliged to act on the advice of the Cabinet when Swaziland 
became a Protected State. 
The new constitution set up an electoral system where a 
national voters roll was established and Swaziland was divided into 
8 constituencies each returning 3 members to the House of Assembly. 
The executive authority for Swaziland was vested in the King who 
exercised it through the Cabinet presided over by a Prime Minister. 
The King appointed the Prime Minister from the elected members of 
the House of Assembly who appeared to him to be likely to command 
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the suppo~t of the majority of the members of that House. With the 
advice of the Prime Minister the King would then appoint the rest of 
the Cabinet from the House. The King also had a right to nominate 6 
MPs to add to the 24 e 1 ected MPs. The 30 MPs then e 1 ected 6 
Senators and the King nominated 6 others. Thus the Swaziland 
Parliament would be constituted : 30 MPs and 12 Senators. 
According to this new constitution Her Majesty's Government 
reserved the right to amend or replace it; Her Majesty was in 
charge of the external affairs and defence, of internal security, 
finance and the pub 1 i c service. Where they deemed necessary 9 the 
Office of Her Majesty's Commissioner could initiate legislation 
through the Swaziland House of Assembly. 
The Protected State of Swaziland and the Independence Conference 
In April 1967 the first general elections without any reserved 
seats were held in Swaziland. The INM won 80 per cent of the votes 
and the NNLC about 20 per cent but no seats in Parliament. On April 
259 1967 Swaziland became a Protected State. In the same year the 
Swaziland Parliament requested the United Kingdom Government to 
grant independence on 6 September 1968. In November 1967 the UK 
accepted the request. Arrangements were then made for an 
Independence Conference .of UK and Swaziland Delegations. The 
Conference was eventually held at Marlborough House in February 
1968. It discussed proposals for adopting the Constitution of the 
Kingdom of Swaziland for the Independence Constitution. These 
proposals had been approved by the Swaziland Parliament unanimously. 
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There were a few main proposals in regard to the changes to the 
1966 Constitution. The first one referred to the minerals control. 
The Swaziland Parliament proposed that minerals "should vest in the 
Ngwenyama as head of the Swazi nation~ and ipso facto the trustee of 
its property rather than in the King as a constitutional monarch~ 
obliged to act in accordance with the decisions of the Government of 
the day. n 51 This was a significant departure from the 1966 
Constitution which obliged the King to act according to the advice 
of his Cabinet. The proposal took away the control of the minerals 
from the modern government of Swaziland to the traditional 
authority. This proposal also reflected the continuing parallelism 
between modern government (which had been exercised by the British 
Administration) and the traditional system of rule. This time the 
pat~allelism manifested itself in the office of the King ( in modern 
government) and the office of the Ngyenyama (in the traditional 
system) although both were held by one incumbent - Sobhuza. The 
British Government accepted this proposal. But some British MPs 
questioned the wisdom of giving the minerals control to the 
Ngwenyama and not to Cabinet or Parliament during the "Swaziland 
Independence Bill" in the House of Commons in July 1968. In 
response the Under-Secretary of State for Commonwealth Affairs, Mr. 
William Witlock, stated that "Whether wise or not, it is the feeling 
of the Swazis that the control and disposal of those rights should 
rest with the person who holds them and not with the Government of 
Swaziland." 52 The Swazi nation land, i.e. land not owned by the 
White community, was also vested in the Ngwenyama and not to the 
modern Government. 
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-rhe K·ing was given the power to appoint the Prime r1linister 9 
nominate 6 Senators (half the Senate) and nominate 6 MPs, He was 
made an executive authority acting on the advice of the Cabinet whom 
he appoints after consultation t'l!ith the Prime Minister, The King 
participated in both the modern government and the traditional 
authority, To ensure that these two were kept distinct the 
chieftaincy institution was not incorporated in the modern 
government9 the Independence Constitution entrenched the separation 
of SNC from modern government whereas the SPP/NNLC had proposed that 
chieftaincy should be gradually and peacefully incorporated in the 
modern system of government. Sobhuza 9 and the INM successfully 
resisted the interference with their power-base, 
Sobhuza 1 S power as King was checked by some provisions of the 
Independence Constitution (and this is why he fought hard to have 
the land and minerals vested in him as Ngwenyama), In many issues 
he had to act9 as an executive authority, in accordance with the 
advice of his Cabinet, Article 2 of the Independence Constituion 
stated categorically that 11 this Constitution is the supreme law of 
Swaziland and if any other law is inconsistent with this 
Constitution9 that other law shall 9 to the extent of the 
inconsistency, be void. 1153 It went on to state that the alteration 
of this specially entrenched provision required a joint sitting of 
the House of Assembly and the Senate, with a majority of not less 
than three-quarters of all members and that this decision should be 
submitted to a referendum of the electorate who must support it with 
not less than two-thirds of all the votes validly cast. It is only 
then that the bill could be submitted to the King for assent. 
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There were several other entrenched and specially entrenched 
provisions which were cause for concern to the Swazi monarch. He 
had wanted to be the supreme authority in Swaziland. So all these 
checks and balances did not please him. However. he had his 
traditional support base intact. i.e. the chieftaincy and their 
control of the land. at the time of Swaziland's independence on 6 
September 1968. 
Summary 
This chapter is about the historical background which is 
essential to the understanding of independent Swaziland and its 
relations with Britain and South Africa. The period of early 
contact between the Swazis and people of European origin is 
significant in three respects. Firstly. during this period 
(1877-1899) Swaziland's independence was guaranteed by both the 
Boers and British. This created an understanding amongst the Swazi 
leaders that Swaziland had its independence even after the British 
had taken over the administration of the Territory as contained in 
the Order-in-Council of 1903. This Swazi view was used to resist 
implementation of indirect rule in the Territory. It also led to 
the call by the Swazi monarch in the 1960s to hand over the country 
to him and not subject it to political parties. The second issue 
was that when Swaziland's independence was guaranteed by the 1881 
Convention (by both British and Boers), they also delineated the 
boundaries between Swaziland and the Transvaal which the Swazis 
never accepted. This issue persists today. Thirdly, it was during 
the period of early contact that the land concessions were granted 
to the Europeans by Mbandzeni. The concessions became one of the 
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major sources of dispute between the British Admi ni strati on and 
Swazi authorities. Even at independence there was no agreement. 
The discussion of the colonial system of administration has 
revealed two important issues : the question of Swaziland's (and the 
other HCTs) transfer to South Africa and the parallel rule that 
existed up to independence. When the British Government gave the 
Union of South Africa independence in 1910, they thought the HCTs 
would be transferred to the Union. Hence the head of administration 
of the HCTs was the British High Commissioner to South Africa. The 
British attitude towards the HCTs was ambivalent. Hence the delay 
in bringing British personnel who had experience in indirect rule as 
practised elsewhere in Africa. The second issue, i.e. parallel 
rule, was due largely to the intransigence of the Swazi monarch who 
kept reminding the British of their guarantee to Swaziland's 
indepencence and their plea to respect Swazi law and custom. As a 
result Swazi traditional system existed alongside British 
Administration up to independence. 
The purpose of discussing the colonial economy was to reveal 
the nature of the Swaziland economy at independence. The basic idea 
that HCTs would one day become part of South Africa contributed a 
lot to their economies being gradually integrated into the big 
neighbour's economy. This was reflected in SACU, the use of South 
African currency, trade relations whereby most of their exports went 
to South Africa while most of their imports came from there, the 
migrant labour of HCTs citizens in the gold, coal, platinum mines of 
South Africa and the transportation system whereby most of (all in 
the case of Basutoland) their goods travelled through South Africa 
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to and from the outside world. In the case of Swaziland the nature 
of the colonial economy experienced some changes in the post-war 
period due to large investments of British capital 9 sometimes in 
partnership with the South African capital. This created a 
possibility of nell'/ markets for Swazi products. Hence the 
diversification of the export market. 
investment capital which surpassed 
independence in 1968. 
It also meant a large British 
that of South Africa at 
The main objective of writing about the period of Nationalism 
was to show the evolution of the political structure and type of 
Constitution which brought Swaziland to Independence. It was 
pointed out which forces were involved in shaping the nature of the 
Swazi State at Independence. The main forces were the EAC, the 
Swazi monarch and his traditional supporters (who ultimately formed 
INM), the nationalist movements (mainly SPP and NNLC), the British 
Administration in Swaziland and the Colonial and Commonwealth 
Offices in London. Finally in this section it was argued that the 
Swazi monarch and his supporters had mixed feelings about the 
Independence Constitution. They had won some concessions (e.g. 
control of minerals by Ngwenyama) from the British Government but 
were not totally satisfied. 
It is against this background that Swaziland's post-
independence relations with her former colonial master and her 
powerful neighbour can be properly examined. 
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CHAPTER 3 
Swaziland's Post~Independence Politics__£ 
Change and Continuity 
It is argued in this chapter that the post-independence 
politics of Swaziland largely reflects a legacy of the colonial 
period in as far as parallelism continued, i.e. the existence of 
both the modern system of government and the traditional system. 
The main difference is that the head of both governments now is one 
incumbent whereas during the colonial period it was the High 
Commissioner (for South Africa), Queen's Commissioner and the 
Ngwenyama respectively. It is further argued that later the repeal 
of the Independence Constitution in 1973 not only entrenched 
parallelism but also tilted the balance in favour of the traditional 
political institutions; that this strengthening of traditional 
institutions alienated many educated Swazis from political 
participation. 
These political changes were welcomed by South Africa because 
they removed, even if temporarily, the possibility that Swaziland 
might one day be governed by political radicals. Despite these 
political changes Swaziland still kept, or attempted to keep, warm 
relations with Britain; for instance, they continued to invite 
members of the British Royal Family to major political and cultural 
occasions, and the Royal Swaziland Constitutional Commission (which 
sought ideas about a new Constitution for Swaziland) visited 
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Britaing amongst other countries. in May 1974. Lastly, it is argued 
that although the traditional institutions were strengthened at the 
expense of modern political organisations, the basic bourgeoise 
tenets, such as rights to private property, were maintained. 
Parallel Rule since 1968 
It was pointed out in the preceding chapter that the Swazi 
Monarch and his supporters had mixed feelings about the Independence 
Constitution which curtailed the Monarch's powers. The Constitution 
gave every Swazi freedom of speech and political organisation. 
Hence at the time of Independence there existed opposition parties, 
albeit unrepresented in Parliament. The Constitution and the 
opposition parties were the traditionalists; great concern. King 
Sobhuza II did not like political parties at all. His INM was never 
referred to as a political party. Instead, it was depicted as a 
movement for the Swazi nation as a whole, a movement that signified 
the whole Swazi nation moving towards progress with their King who 
was a symbol of unity. According to the Swazi Monarch political 
parties were a source of disunity in many African countries. To 
emphasise the point that INM was not a political party, its 
candidates for both the 1967 and 1972 general elections were chosen 
by traditional regional committees (tinkhundla) and presented to the 
King for approval. They were then shown to the people in a huge 
national meeting at Lobamba Royal Kraal. So their key campaign 
words to the people were : 11 We are from the Royal Kraal 11 (Siphuma 
Esibayeni saka Lobamba). 
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The Monarch used his office to campaign for INM. At the 
Incwala ceremony* in December 1971 he told the Swazi warriors to 
vote for INM and not to abstain or stay away from the forthcoming 
1972 general elections. He warned that if they stayed away" •.. the 
nation would suffer for there are two ways of electing a person. In 
Western procedure you go to vote to elect a person. If you abstain 
from voting9 thinking that by staying away you are not electing 9 you 
are in fact electing another by increasing his total against the one 
you really wanted in power."1 
The chieftaincy institution was used by INM as a campaigning 
base. The chiefs were instructed by the Monarch and INM leaders to 
tell their followers to vote for INM. The chiefs carried the 
instructions; some even used threats of eviction to those foiiowers 
who contemplated voting for 11 political parties. 11 So the King and 
INM relied on the traditional system to get them into political 
positions of modern government. This was largely enhanced by the 
fact that most of the leaders of INM were chiefs, princes or close 
relatives of the royal family. Their traditional status meant that 
they were automatically members of the Inner Council of the Swazi 
National Council (SNC) which met whenever necessary to take 
decisions on behalf of the SNC which consisted of all adult male 
Swazis. 
Although Sobhuza succeeded, on the whole to maintain the 
balance, the parallel rule was not without contradictions. One 
example of these contradictions was the introduction of a certain 
* See glossary for description of this ceremony 
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law by the Swaziland House of Assembly in July 1967. This was "The 
Sedition (Amendment) Bill 1967" whose 11 main purpose is to give the 
person of His Majesty King Sobhuza II of Swaziland~ his heirs and 
successors the same degree of protection as the law gives to the 
person of Her Majesty~ Queen Elizabeth~ her heirs and 
successors ... "
2 The penalty for the crime of sedition t'llas to be 2 
years imprisonment of £100 (R200) fine or both for the first 
offender 9 and 3 years for subsequent offenders. One MP~ Mr. M.S. 
Matsebula 9 spotted the inconsistency between this law and the Swazi 
customary law on the offence of sedition. According to the latter 
anyone guilty of a crime of insulting the Monarchy would receive 
punishment from his Chief-in-Council. This may be a fine or 
deportation from the chiefdom. 2 But according to the 1967 Sedition 
Bill a person accused of the same crime would be committed to modern 
courts of law; however9 this did not necessarily exclude the 
jurisdiction of the Chief-in-Council. Although this was an 
important observation by the MP, the Bill was passed without 
alteration 9 which meant an individual could be punished twice for 
the same crime. Indeed 9 it is not uncommon in Swaziland for a 
person to receive judgements from both modern and traditional 
courts. A conversation between me and a chief•s runner (umgijimi) 
in 1985 revealed that his chief•s council was strongly advocating 
for double punishment. 
Problems of parallel rule are also manifested in having two 
bodies with legislative powers: the Swaziland Parliament and SNC. 
Theoretically the Parliament is supposed to leave issues pertaining 
to Swazi law and custom to the SNC. But in the twentieth century 
society it is difficult 9 if not impossible9 to draw a line between 
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modern issues and issues falling exclusively under Swazi law and 
custom. For example~ in September 1979 a meeting of the SNC (which 
this time included adult females) was convened at Lobamba to discuss 
a wide spectrum of national issues~ including the concept of dowry 
(lobolo)~ types of marriages suitable for Swazis and the wearing of 
trousers/jeans by women in the country.3 On the last issue 9 the SNC 
decided it was unSwazi for women to wear trousers/jeans. 
However9 women continued to wear trousers/jeans. Thereupon 
Chief Mlimi Maziya (member of both Inner Council of SNC and 
Parliament) asked the Minister of Home Affairs~ in Parliament~ when 
he would enforce the law which barred women from wearing the 
trousers. The issue was 11 rejected as unnecessary and interference 
with the freedom of the individual by Prince Gabheni ~ who was 
supported by the Prime Minister and other MPs. 113 This case 
illustrates the difficulty in identifying which issues were modern 
and which ones were traditional custom. The Home Affairs Minister 
and the Prime Minister were defending and upholding a bourgeois 
right, i.e. the freedom of individuals to live their own lives, 
whereas according to the MP and SNC it was against Swazi 1 aw and 
custom for women to wear trousers. As a traditionalist, the MP 
viewed the adoption of 'foreign culture and practices' as the cause 
for the erosion of the Swazi way of life, amongst Swazi women. When 
Swaziland attained Independence in 1968, many traditionalists hoped 
that there would be a halt to this erosion of Swazi culture. 
These traditionalists' aspirations were also frustrated by the 
fact that they lacked the control of the law enforcing institution -
the police. Hence the MP's appeal was made in Parliament to a 
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Cabinet Minister. The police are under the control of modern 
government. The traditionalists could only resort to chiefs' powers 
to levy a fine on women who continued to wear trousers in their 
chiefdoms. But the chiefs' powers could not be extended to the 
urban, industrial and private property areas where women are more 
likely to wear trousers, anyway. 
The potential conflict between these two systems was avoided by 
the power and skilful manoeuvre of Sobhuza. He had to assent to 
both SNC and Parliamentary Bills before they became law. In the 
case of the former the decision of the SNC (which includes the 
Advisory Council - L iqoqo) was taken to the Ngwenyama for assent. 
He would receive detailed explanation from L iqoqo about the SNC 
decision. If he agreed the decision became law. If he did not 
agree the matter would be referred back to the SNC for another 
debate until both the SNC and the Monarch reached consensus. 
Consensus was the backbone of decision-making in Swazi society. 
Decision by voting was unknown. 
But during Sobhuza • s rule the SNC was taken as more of an 
advisory body than a legislative one. Sir Brian Marwick, Mr. Arthur 
Khoza and Dr. A.P. Zwane bear witness to this constitutional 
deviation by the Swazi Monarch. 4 He was hardly questioned on this 
constitutional violation due to the reputation he had established in 
dealing with the Colonial Government on issues which affected the 
Swazis, viz. land issue, introduction of indirect rule, etc. By the 
time of Independence he was counted amongst the oldest statesmen and 
certainly one of the few educated ones. The combination of his age, 
experience, education, astuteness and being Ingwenyama gave Sobhuza 
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great stature in the eyes of the SNC, Hence they accepted their 
relegation from a legislative body to an advisory one. Ironically, 
section 135 of the Independence Constitution states that the SNC 
11 Shall continue to exercise its functions of advising the Ngwenyama 
on all matters regulated by Swazi law and custom and connected with 
Swazi tradition and culture. 11 Thus, the relegation of SNC was built 
into the constitution in such a way that one would be led to believe 
that its role had always been advisory. One would have expected 
strong opposition from his own traditional supporters. Instead they 
acted as henchmen and sycophants. 
In modern government the Monarch had (according to the 
Constitution) to assent to all Parliamentary bills before they 
became law. He had the power to refuse assent if he did not agree. 
In that case he had to refer these bills back to the joint sitting 
of the House of Assembly and Senate, with reasons and suggested 
amendments. This power to refer the bi 11 s back is contained in 
Section 76 (2) (titled 11 Reference back of bills by King 11 ) of the 
Independence Constitution. It reads: 
11 When a bill to which this section applies, 
having been passed by both Chambers of 
Parliament sitting separately (that is to say 
passed without amendments or with amendments 
agreed by both chambers) , is presented to the 
King for assent, the King, acting in his 
discretion, may by message refer back either the 
whole bill or such provisions that he may 
specify for consideration at a joint sitting of 
the Senate and the House of Assembly and 
the provisions of Schedule 1 shall apply. 11 5 
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The relevant proviso of Schedule 1 is section 4 which reads: 
11 (l) Where a joint sitting of the Senate and 
House of Assembly is summoned for the purpose of 
considering a bill referred back by the King in 
accordance with section 76(2) the following 
provisions shall apply -
(a) if the whole bill has been referred back 9 
the joint sitting may deliberate and shall 
vote upon the bill as presented to the King 
for assent together with any amendment to 
any provision of the bill which may be 
proposed in the joint sitting; 
(b) if the bill has been referred back for 
consideration of provisions of the bill 
specified by the Kingg the joint sitting 
may deliberate and shall vote upon the bill 
as presented to the King for assent 
together with any admissible amendment 
which may be proposed in the joint sitting; 
(c) if the bill is affirmed with such 
amendments (if any) as are mentioned in the 
preceding sub-paragraph and are agreed by 
the joint sittingg it shall be deemed to be 
duly passed. 
(2) For the purpose of sub-paragraph (l)(b) 
there shall be admissible only amendments 
to the provisions specified by the King and 
such other amendments as are re 1 evant to 
the matters contained in the King 1 s 
message, and the decision of the person 
presiding in the joint sitting as to the 
amendment that are admissible shall be 
final. 11 5 
These two provisions (section 76 and Schedule 1. Section 4) on 
legislative procedure are silent on one major issue : the question 
of what happens if the joint sitting of the two Houses still feel 
the bill should be passed as it was originally presented to the 
King, i.e. if they do not accept the King 1 s suggested amendments. 
The provisions either assume that they (the Houses) are obliged to 
accept the King 1 s amendments or that they will accept these 
amendments. What eventually transpired was that the King 1 s 
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suggestions carried majority support. In any case consultation 
between him and his Cabinet would have taken place even before the 
original bill was presented to Parliament, After all. the ruling 
INM was his party. In effect the provisions of the Constitution 
wh·i ch purported to make checks and balances on the powers of the 
Monarch were largely ineffective. One former British High 
Commissioner to Swaziland testified to the contents of the preceding 
sentence when he wrote~ 11 In any case. Westminster constitution or 
no~ the reality of power lay with the King before the abrogation of 
the constitution. just as much as it lay with him after. 11 6 So in 
both the traditional system and modern government the Swazi Monarch 
wielded power that was not necessarily constitutionally granted him. 
He had the ability to usurp power and his rule was bordering on 
dictatorship. 
The Repeal of the Independence Constitution 
In this section the discussion is about the reasons and events 
which led to the repeal of the Independence Constitution on 12 April 
1973~ the British and South African reaction to the repeal, the 
establishment of the Armed Forces of Swaziland and the political 
detentions~ which followed the repeal of the Constitution. 
It was mentioned in the preceding chapter that the Swazi 
Monarch was not totally happy with the Independence Constitution 
inasfar as he had to act on the advice of government organs~ namely. 
the Cabinet, the Public Service Commission, the Judicial Service 
Commission. etc. He interpreted this as a restriction to his 
'right' to rule. Hence the Independence Constitution became a 
81 
target for frequent attack. As early as 1969 he criticised the 
Constitution in an address to chiefs who had convened at Lobamba. 
He likened the Swazi Parliament 11 to a train which is directed by the 
railway line. A train only goes where the railroad leads it. It is 
not turned to different directions by needs; where the railroad 
bends, it also bends. This is the nature of the Constitution we 
have been given by the British. There are binding and unchangeable 
rules, which we have to abide by under all circumstances. The Swazi 
may not agree with what we do but we rea 1 i se that we are bound by 
the Constitution ... unless the non-Swazi clauses are changed , we 
specifying what we want according to our custom and not just take 
the white man• s ways, we shall have hardship. 117 He pointed out that 
it was the Swazi Nation that had the power to change the 
Constitution and not the government in Mbabane. No doubt the 
criticisms he levelled against the Constitution were a preparation 
for its ultimate revocation. 
After having dissolved the first Parliament on 15 March 1972, 
Sobhuza invited the Parliamentarians to Lobamba Royal Kraal so that 
they could make a report to the Swazi Nation for the 5 year period 
of service. The meeting was held on 26 March 1972 and on behalf of 
the MPs the Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini, made the report. He 
complained of the difficulties the MPs had had and blamed the 
Constitution for this. 
It was during this occasion that the Monarch took another 
opportunity publicly to condemn the Constitution. He said the 
Constitution 11 had tried to marry two systems but there was a lot of 
discord in the union because it was difficult to know what was the 
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best to select from both cultures ... It is necessary for us to 
rectify what we considered wrong ... There are things done here 
which were and are not done even in Britain itself, and some things 
which were not done even during British rule. When they handed over 
independence to us they then decided that we should do those things 
in our country. They tell us to do certain things which they did 
not do and bound us by working these things into our Constitution. 118 
The Monarch did not spell out 11 these things 11 that the British wanted 
the Swazis to do, which the British themselves did not do. Neither 
did he spell out those things the British introduced into the 
Constitution which the British did not do during their rule. 
However, his address to the Swazi Nation at Lobamba on 19 March 1973 
does shed some light to these issues. On that day he said : 
11 Ask yourselves (a) are we really independent like the British, the 
French or the Germans? Or are we nominally independent? (b) Do we 
have a Parliament that is supreme 1 ike that of the British, the 
French and other independent nations? Or do we have a token 
independence? 119 
The concern of the Swazi Monarch was the supremacy of the 
Constitution over him and his Parliament. He felt that this was 
tying their hands in such a way that they could not act as they 
wished. The feeling was that the British Colonial Government did 
not have a Constitution which had the same control over it as that 
of the Independence Constitution of the Swaziland Government. Hence 
the camp 1 a i nt that 11 they te 11 us to do things which they did not 
do 11 • While the British Government were concerned about establishing 
a 11 democratic 11 political system at Independence, the Swazi Monarch 
and his supporters were busy comparing the colonial structure, which 
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was not a democracy. with the system that was being handed over to 
them. Jack Halpern made an observation which supports the view 
expressed in the preceding sentence. He wrote: 
11 lf they (Africans) want a one-party State and a 
personality cult leader9 then that9 distasteful 
as Englishmen may find it9 is their business ... 
Certainly if the Government of an independent 
Swaziland or Basutoland wished to restrict the 
liberty of the subject, it would not have to 
pass any fresh legislation. It would suffice to 
take over the powers previously held - and 
exercised by Britain•s Commissioners. 
Authoritarianism is no new story in Africa : it 
applies wherever the white man has ruled or, to 
an even greater degree, where he has settled. 11 l0 
In his speech Sobhuza also compared the status of the Swazi 
Parliament with that of the House of Commons. The former was 
subordinate to the Constitution whereas the latter was supreme (the 
British Constitution being unwritten). It is noteworthy that the 
March 19 1972 speech was made during a series of Government defeats 
in the courts in an application to declare Mr. Thomas B. Ngwenya 
(the case is discussed below in this chapter) a non-citizen of 
Swaziland. 
The repeal of the Constitution was, no doubt, in the pipeline; 
but it was triggered off by the NNLC 1 s winning 3 seats in Parliament 
in the May 1972 general elections and the Government•s subsequent 
losses in court actions against Ngwenya. 
The first post-independence general elections were held in May 
1972. Five political parties contested the elections : the INM, the 
NNLC (Zwane faction), the NNLC (Samketi faction), the Swaziland 
United Front and SPP. INM won 21 seats out of the 24 elected seats 
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and 3 seats went to NNLC (Zwane). This was the first time an 
opposition had turned in MPs. This was bad news for the King and 
his supporters9 as Hilda Kuper puts it: 11 This came as a great shock 
to the King in Council. 1111 The INM obtained 78.3 per cent of the 
electorate in the 1972 elections whereas they had polled 80 per cent 
in the 1967 elections. On the other hand, in 1967 the opposition 
parties had polled 20 per cent whereas in 1972 they obtained 21.7 
per cent of the electorate. This showed the growing support of the 
modern political parties. Hence the concern of the traditionalists. 
The greatest support of the modern parties came from the urban 
and industrial areas. For instance 9 the NNLC were voted into 
Parliament by the Mphumalanga Constituency which straddled the 
sugar. citrus fruit, rice and ranching complex of Mhlume and 
Tshaneni in the north-eastern part of Swaziland. The NNLC had 
continued, after independence to 11 champion 11 the interest of the 
workers and petty bourgeoisie; and they stuck to their po 1 icy of 
curtailing the powers of the Monarchy and Chieftaincy. These 
policies earned the NNLC a support from the employed and educated 
youth. For instance. the Swaziland National Union of Students 
(SNUS) declared an open support of NNLC in 1972. 
These political developments scared the Monarch and his 
supporters. To them it was imperative that they did something 
before it was too late, i.e. before they lost their majority in 
Parliament. At the time of nominations Prince Mfanasibili, an INM 
candidate, had objected to the candidacy of Mr. T.B. Ngwenya on the 
grounds that he was not a Swazi citizen. The objection was placed 
with the local Electoral Officer who communicated it to the Chief 
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Electoral Officer~ Mr. Patrick Forsyth Thompson. H·is ruling was 
that Ngwenya was a Swazi citizen; Ngwenya had participated in 
previous elections and other political activities and he had been 
placed on the CDc•s. Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF) Scheme 
(discussed in Chapter 4 below) as an outgrower on the basiS 9 amongst 
other things, that he was a Swazi. 
Mfanasibili lost the elections, together with two other INM 
candidates, to Mr. Ngwenya and two NNLC candidates in the 
Mphuma 1 anga Constituency. But the Monarch and his supporters did 
not leave out Mfanasibili in the Parliament and Cabinet. The King 
nominated him to Parliament and created a new ministry for him - the 
Ministry of Commerce and Cooperatives. Constitutionally the King 
was allowed to nominate a person who had lost an election. But in 
the case of Mfanas i bi 1 i, the event was a negation of the British 
Government intentions in the constitution. During the final 
Independence talks the Swaziland Delegation presented a 
constitutional proposal which said that the Monarch should be barred 
from nominating someone who had just been defeated in the elections. 
The British Delegation was concerned about the opposition parties 
who, although they had polled more than 12 per cent in 1964 and 20 
per cent in 1967, had not been represented in the subsequent 
governments. They then suggested that this barrier be removed, with 
the whole intention of allowing the Monarch to nominate opposition 
party candidates who had gained no seats but had shown substantial 
national voters support at the polls. In the Report of the 
Swaziland Independence Conference the British Delegation stated 
that: 
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11 The Swaziland Delegation stated that they were 
fully alive to the risks which could arise if 
there were no substantial opposition in the 
country unable to secure representation in 
Parliament. They pointed out, however, that the 
circumstances in Swaziland are such that shades 
of pub 1 i c opinion can be made known in 
Parliament~ and that in addition, the 
Constitution would continue to provide for 
nomina ted members in both Houses to represent 
interests not otherwise represented. On this 
latter point they accepted the suggestion of the 
United Kingdom Delegation that the provision in 
the existing Constitution which precludes the 
appointment as a nominated member of the House 
of Assembly of a person who had stood as a 
candidate and failed to secure election 9 should 
be dropped from the Independence 
Constitution. 11 12 
It is worth noting though that the Monarch never nominated a 
candidate or supporter of any opposition party. He made a mockery 
of the constitutional provision by nominating his supporters. In 
any case, the British Delegation should not have expected Sobhuza to 
nominate from the opposition parties because he was opposed to party 
politics; he had formed INM under duress (when the British decided 
party politics was their card). Once the British had gone g there 
would be nothing to compel Sobhuza to nominate his opponents. 
After the results of the 1972 elections, Prince Mfanasibili 
took his complaint about Ngwenya to the Deputy Prime Minister(DPM) 
who was the Minister responsible for Immigration. The DPM declared 
Ngwenya a prohibited immigrant and deported him to South Africa a 
day before the opening of the new Parliament. So when Parliament 
opened Ngwenya' s seat was empty. After the de porta ti on, Ngwenya 
came back to Swaziland, was arrested, charged and found guilty, by a 
magistrate 9 of being in the country illegally. He was sentenced to 
12 days' imprisonment. In the meantime Ngwenya applied to the High 
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Court to have the DPM's dec·ision that he was a prohibited immigrant 
quashed, The case was seen as a serious political case, Ngwenya's 
lawyer9 Mr. Musa Shongwe~ instructed a well known South African 
advocate~ David Soggott to appear for his client. (Soggott had 
represented Dr, Zwane and the other NNLC leaders during the trials 
connected with the 1960's workers' and Mbabane residents' strikes, 
After the Ngwenya episode Soggott was declared persona non grata in 
Swaziland). 
The Ngwenya case exposed the vulnerability of INM. Dr. Zwane 
attacked the Government in Parliament for their treatment of 
Ngwenya9 and he topped his attack by lashing criticisms of the 
previous and present Governments' socio-economic policies. But what 
was of more concern to INM leaders was the split the Ngwenya case 
brought within INM. Some INM MPs and supporters felt Ngwenya was 
being victimisedg that Ngwenya was a Swazi citizen. These INM MPs 
criticised the DPM for his instant action against Ngwenya although 
they did not do it in Parliament. This rift between the INM caucus 
and the feeling of distate towards Dr. Zwane's speeches in 
Parliament resulted in many INM MPs boycotting Parliamentary 
proceedings. Some MPs felt they wou 1 d not support Government in 
Parliament over the Ngwenya case; the other MPs felt Government was 
being soft on Ngwenya by having a 11 owed him to have redress in 
court; instead of going to Parliament they were operating behind 
Parliament's backs using the Cabinet and King to act swiftly on the 
state of affairs. INM leadership had to work hard to bridge the 
rift within the INM : they had to assure the dissenters that all 
will be right after Ngwenyag that no one else would suffer; at the 
same time they had to cool down the impatient supporters. 
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The extent of the boycott is revealed by the 12 July 
Parliamentary proceedings, On that day there were only 8 MPs out of 
the expected 29 (Ngwenya having been suspended) and the House was 
11 adjourned until tomorrow, .. 13 But as the majority of MPs continued 
to boycott Parliamentary proceedings the House was adjourned until 
further notice, 
On 29 August 1972 the High Court of Swaziland delivered their 
judgment in which they ruled that Ngwenya was a Swazi citizen, This 
meant Ngwenya could take his seat in Parliament, A meeting of the 
House of Assembly was called by the Speaker for 11 October 1972, 
When the Speaker stood up to open the meeting he noticed that there 
were only 3 MPs - Dr, A,P, Zwane. Mr, Mageja Masilela and Mr, T.B, 
Ngwenya, all of NNLC, INM MPs had come to Parliament but stayed in 
their offices, they did not come to the House even when the Clerk to 
Parliament rang the bell once more, The speaker then adjourned the 
proceedings to a later date. 
While all this parliamentary bickering was going on. the 
Monarch and Cabinet decided over the establishment of a tribunal to 
decide cases of doubtful citizenship. The members were to be 
appointed by the Prime Minister and his decision, on appeal, was to 
be the final authority on deciding the citizenship cases. The 
verdict of the PM would supersede any previous court judgements. It 
was to a tribunal system that the traditionalists wanted to take 
Ngwenya • s case although they had appealed against the High Court 
decision of 29 August 1972, The DPM presented the tribuna 1 bill 
before the House of Assembly in November 1972, Parliament was well 
attended, which showed that the INM, leadership had succeeded in 
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bridging the rift. Or. Zwane challenged the constitutionality of 
the Bill~ whereupon the Attorney-General assured the House that the 
Bill did not change the constitution, nor was there any 
inconsistency, Within 30 hours the Bill had passed all the 3 
readings in both Houses. The King then gave his assent and the Bill 
became the Immigration Amendment Act 1972, Consequently a tribuna 1 
was gazetted. 
While the tribunal proceeded with its work of collecting 
evidence on the background of Ngwenya, the 1 atter cha 11 enged the 
validity of the Immigration Amendment Act 1972. His legal argument 
was that the Act was ultra vires the Constitution and, therefore, 
the Tribunal was unconstitutional. In January 1973~ a new Chief 
Justice, C.J. Hill, declared the Act intra vires and that therefore 
the Tribunal was not unconstitutional, On 29 January 1973 the 
Tribunal found that Ngwenya was not a citizen of Swaziland. Ngwenya 
appealed to the Court of Appeal against the verdict of C.J. Hill. 
The Court of Appeal consisted of the following South African legal 
practitioners : J.P. Schreiner, J.A, Milne and J.A. Smit (It is 
common practice that Swaziland draws its judges of the Court of 
Appeal from South Africa who come occasionally to conduct court 
sessions and return to South Africa. In other words Swaziland does 
not have Justices of Appeal resident in the country). 
Some time during the hearing of the case by the Court of Appeal 
a meeting of the Swazi nation was called at Lobamba. The Monarch 
ordered that the ex-service men (veterans of World War II) arrive at 
Lobamba earlier than the date of the national meeting. No doubt, 
this was a mobilization programme although there were no disclosures 
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on the talks between the King and these ex~servicemen. As the 
traditionalists followed the case in the Appeal Court~ it was 
becoming more and more clear that the verdict would be against them. 
It was during this national meeting at Lobamba, on 19 March 1973, 
that the Monarch took an opportunity to attack the Constitution = 
this attack has already been referred to above. It is worth noting 
that the decision of the Appeal Court had been expected to be on 17 
March 1973; so that many people came to the meeting expecting some 
major constitutional changes on that day because the INM had 
indicated they would not accept defeat. It was during this case and 
the move towards the constitutional changes that the real decision 
to establish the army was made. 
On 27 March 1973 the Court of Appeal read their judgment which 
was in favour of Ngwenya. The Court ruled that the enactment of the 
Immgiration Amendment Act 1972, which made it possible to establish 
the Tribuna 1, was ultra vi res the Constitution, that it did make 
constitutional changes which could only be made according to section 
134 of the Constitution, i.e. the Bill had to be passed by a joint 
sitting of the Houses of Assembly and Senate, then followed by a 
referendum of the electorate and finally the assent of the King. 
Since this procedure had not been followed the Act was quashed. The 
Tribunal was declared null and void and Ngwenya once more ruled to 
be a Swazi citizen. It was after this judgment that the Monarch and 
INM decided they could not succumb to the power of the Courts. To 
put it in the words of one of the leading INM members : 11 It was at 
this stage that the Swazis (sic!) decided that the Constitution 
which was given to them by the British was not suitable, i.e. the 
Swazi Nation (sic!) should not and could not be ruled by judges. 1114 
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The decision was made to repeal the Constitution. The INM 
politicans met with the Council of Chiefs at Lobamba on several 
occasions to deliberate on the mode to be adopted in abrogating the 
Constitution and thus making the first major political change since 
Independence. It was decided that Parliament should convene to 
declare that the Constitution was unworkable. On the same day a 
meeting of the Swazi Nation should be called so that after the 
Parliamentary motion had been passed the Prime Minister would lead 
the MPs from the Chambers to Lobamba Roy a 1 Kraa 1 (a 5-l 0 minutes 
walk). At Lobamba meeting the PM would announce the decision of 
Parliament and the Monarch would make a speech. 
In the afternoon of 12 April 1973, Parliament met and the PM~ 
Prince Makhosini, read the motion in the House of Assembly to 
declare the Constitution unworkable, and that it proved to be the 
direct cause of many difficult and sometimes insoluble problems in 
that (a) the safeguard provisions were a derogation of sovereignty 
of legislature which should normally rest in His Majesty and the 
House of Parliament~ (b) that restrictions were placed on the 
executive powers of Ministers and the King-in-Council~ (c) that the 
Constitution permitted of particularly undesirable political 
activities bordering on subversive and incompatible with the normal 
and peaceful way of life of the Swazis~ and (d) that the accumulated 
effect of the provisions derogating from the sovereign powers of the 
legislature and the executive rendered the Constitution an 
ineffective instrument for peace, order and good government. He 
stated that the restrictions which the Constitution imposed did not 
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apply even to the British Parliament itself. 15 Having thus spoken 
he proceeded to read the motion in these words: 
11 NOW THEREFORE IT IS RESOLVED: 
(a) That the Constitution is unworkable; 
(b) that we call upon His Majesty-in~Council 
forthwith to consider ways and means of 
resolving the Constitutional crisis; and 
(c) that the House of Assembly of the Kingdom 
of Swaziland and the individual members 
thereof place themselves entirely at the 
disposal of the King-in-Council. 11 15 
The Minister of Finance, Mr. R.P. Stephens, the Minister of 
Agriculture, Mr. A.K. Hlophe and the Deputy Speaker, Mr. R.V. 
Dlamini spoke in support of the motion. Mr. R.P. Stephens made a 
reference to the U.S. experience in constitutional development. He 
said 11 The great Constitution of the United States of America which 
is perhaps the earliest of all written Constitutions has been 
altered 25 times. When Abraham Lincoln moved his famous 13th 
Amendment, he likened the great American Constitution to the pants 
of a smal-l boy a comparison which rather shocked the 
constitutional American experts. He said that as the boy grew, so 
the pants must be changed to keep pace with his deve 1 opment. n 16 
Whether or not the Swazi Nation had grown to such an extent (since 
1968) that it needed 11 new pants 11 is arguable. The Constitution had 
not been accepted to the traditionalists even at the time of 
Independence; the Monarch had publicly attacked it as early as 1969, 
as has been stated above. Perhaps the only growth of the Swazi 
Nation which earned it the need for 11 new pants 11 was their increased 
support they were giving to opposition parties. 
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In his speech Mr. A.K. Hlophe9 Minister of Agriculture and a 
long~time outstanding member of SNC9 attacked the university 
students union which had moved towards affiliating with NNLC. He 
said that he was "amazed at the callous attitude adopted by some of 
our own university students. They seem to regard people, other than 
themselves 9 as imbeciles ..• they forget that it is these people 9 
their parentsg to whom they owe so much and who are the founders of 
,-
this country." 1 No one spoke against the motion and hence the 
motion was deemed to have been passed unanimously. No doubt, the 
NNLC was against the motion but their MPs dared not speak due to 
fear of arrest. They had been observing the mobilization of the 
traditionalistsg including the establishment of an army for 
internalg as opposed to externalg security. 
The same motion was read in the Senate by the Minister of 
Justice, Senator Polycarp Dlaminig the motion was supported by 
Senators Douglas Lukhele, Dr. V. Leibrandt and Dr. G. Msibi. No 
Senator spoke against it and therefore the motion was declared 
passed unanimously. 
At Lobamba in the Afternoon of 12 April 1973 
People had started arriving at Lobamba Royal Kraal in the 
morning hours. They were used to waiting for the Monarch who always 
arrived in the afternoon and would not address them until about 
3.00-4.00 p.m. On this particular day there was a great atmosphere 
of anxiety, as many people were aware of the impending major 
constitutional changes. The crowd was estimated at 7000-8000. 18 A 
new picture was conspicuous at Lobamba: a modern Swazi army which 
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few people knew existed. Swazis were only used to seeing the Royal 
Swaziland Police and the traditional regiments. Therefore, the 
sight of a modern army was a shock. {The speed with which the 
Government was able to get personnel into the army was facilitated 
by the conversion of some youth who were in the National Youth 
Service which was being run by Israel. This National Youth Service 
is called GCINA). 
After the motion was passed in Parliament MPs walked to Lobamba 
Royal Kraal. The Cabinet fetched the Monarch from his office and 
led him to the Kraal where the people were by now assembled. The 
P.M. read the Parliament's resolution. The P.M. was followed by 
Chief Sifuba, one of the leading members of SNC. Chief Sifuba 
addressed the Monarch "on behalf" of the Swazi Nation and told him 
that the Nation wanted complete sovereignty and independence and 
that therefore the King should take steps to fulfil the "wishes" of 
the Swazis. 
The King then read his pronouncements. His speech, titled "TO 
ALL MY SUBJECTS- CITIZENS OF SWAZILAND", was recorded. He referred 
to the resolution of Parliament and ensured the audience that he had 
given great consideration to it. He had then come to the 
conclusions that (a) the Constitution had failed, (b) the 
Constitution was the cause for the unrest and an impediment to free 
and progressive deve 1 opment in a 11 spheres of 1 i fe, (c) it had 
"permitted importation into our country of highly undesirable 
political practices alien to, and incompatible with the way of life 
in our society and designed to disrupt and destroy our own peaceful 
and constructive and essentially democratic methods of political 
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activity 11 ; 19 (d) there was no constitutional way of effecting the 
necessary amendments of the Constitution; and (e) he and his people 
heartily desired at long last to achieve full independence under 
their own constitution. The King then made the following brave 
pronouncements: 
11 Now therefore I~ Sobhuza II~ King of Swaziland 
hereby declare that~ in collaboration with my 
Cabinet of Ministers and supported by the whole 
nation9 I have assumed supreme power in the 
Kingdom of Swaziland and that all Legislative 9 
Executive and Judicial power is vested in myself 
and shall, for the meantime9 be examined in 
call aborati on with a Counci 1 constituted by my 
Cabinet Ministers. I further declare that, to 
ensure the continued maintenance of peace, order 
and good government, my Armed Forces in 
conjunction with the Swaziland Royal Police have 
been posted to all strategic places and have 
taken charge of all government places and all 
public services. 11 20 
The Monarch went on to decree that the Independence Constitution was 
thereby repealed9 and that all laws with the exception of the 
Constitution thereby repealed, would continue to be in force. 
However, there were laws from the Constitution which would be 
brought back to operation. He called upon the Attorney-General to 
read those laws. 
The Attorney-Genera 1 read these 1 aws which referred to the 
continuance of public appointment posts, such as judges, public 
servants, po 1 ice and prison service; the section referring to the 
status of the Monarchy would be preserved (except the sub-section 
that gave Parliament the power to decide on the amount for the civil 
list of the Royal Family); the Cabinet would continue to operate but 
Parliament would not meet; the section that guaranteed the 
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independence of SNC from modern government remained in force. 
Political parties and similar bodies were dissolved and prohibited; 
freedom of assembly was curtailed in that 11 no meetings of a 
political nature and no processions or demonstrations shall be held 
or take place in any public place unless with the prior written 
consent of the Commissioner of Police ... 21 It was further decreed 
that for a period of 6 months from then~ the King~in-Council would 
have the power to detain any person for a period of time not 
exceeding 60 days9 but after the 60 days the person could be 
re~detained if necessary in the public interest, and that 11 No Court 
shall have power to enquire into or make any order in connection 
with any such detention. n22 
Some of the decrees announced by the Attorney-General on behalf 
of the King-in-Council were a contradiction to some of the 
pronouncements by the Monarch a few minutes earlier. For instance, 
the Monarch had blamed the Constitution for failing to provide 
11 essenti ally democratic methods of pol iti ca 1 activity. 11 Yet the 
Attorney-General was immediately reading decrees which made it 
illegal to hold a meeting of a political nature - freedom of 
assembly and of speech is one of the tenets of democracy. The 
Attorney-General read the decree which gave the King-in-Council 
power to detain an individual who was to have no recourse to a court 
of law. Not only were the courts ruled out, the King-in-Council 
became both the accuser and the judge in their own case. This was a 
breach of the two fundamental principles of natural justice which 
are the basic foundations of democracy. The first one was that no 
person should be condemned to imprisonment without giving him an 
opportunity to hear his side of the story (audi alteram partem) i.e. 
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the accused must be given a chance to defend himself. The second 
principle is that no man should be judge in a case that he had an 
interest (nemo judex in causa sua). The King-in~Council was given 
the right to decide on the nature of punishment by this decree. 
At the end of the meeting at Lobamba on the afternoon of 
12 April 1973 there was jubilation by one section of the population 
and the gnashing of teeth by the other. The INM supporters 
commended their leaders for bravery while the NNLC supporters were 
puzzled by the fact that they were no longer allowed to organize, 
that their voice had been silenced, and they could foresee a 
possible incarceration of some of them. The fear of detention was 
soon confirmed when detentions started in the same month (April). 
By the end of May 1973 7 NNLC 1 eaders were in detention without 
trial. They were Messrs. S. Myeni, Dr. Zwane, M.M. Motha, T.B. 
Ngwenya, J. Groening, M.M. Mathonsi and B. Mbuli. Ngwenya was 
eventually deported to South Africa, and the act confirmed that the 
Monarch and INM were not going to be ruled by the judges. The South 
African Government received Ngwenya who went to the Ka Ngwane 
homeland. 
Implications of Repeal of the Constitution 
The constitutional changes which prohibited 11 political 11 
activity and stopped Parliament from functioning did not totally 
destroy the modern way of life in Swaziland. The right to private 
property was not affected, no one was deprived of their property and 
capitalist accumulation continued. The Cabinet (i.e. modern 
government) functioned albeit without responsibility to Parliament. 
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The judicial system was in operation, although it did not have 
juri sdi cti on over pol iti ca 1 detention cases and the Civil Service 
system, which is the backbone of modern government, continued to 
operate in spite of the abolition of the Public Service Commission-
a body which used to oversee the appointments and activities of 
civil servants and disciplined them. 
The abrogation of the Independence Constitution did not, 
therefore, mean a return to traditionalism as some people were made 
to believe. What it meant was the curtailment of some bourgeois 
rights and powers which the Monarch and INM felt were a hindrance to 
their rule. It also meant the tilting of the balance between the 
modern government institutions and the traditional system in favour 
of the latter. For instance, the Monarch no longer had to rely on 
Parliament to approve his declaration of a State of Emergency as 
provided by section 18 of the repealed Constitution. He did not 
have to wait for Parliamentary Bills to legislate; he did not have 
to wait for the recommendation of the Public Service Commission 
before he could appoint or dismiss a Permanent Secretary of a 
Ministry, or an Accountant-Genera 1 or Auditor Genera 1. However, 
this tilting of the balance may be more theoretical than practical -
one can argue that the Monarch always had it his own way, 
Constitution or no Constitution, without much ado. 
The real changes were the prohibition of political opposition 
parties and the power of the Swazi Government to detain its citizens 
at its will. Once the Constitution was scrapped and once the decree 
to detain without trial was issued, the bridle for the unruly horse 
no longer existed. Although Swaziland is a haven inasfar as human 
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rights are concerned when compared with many African countries 9 
detention without trial has been used on several people. Without a 
platform (e.g. Parliament) to question the Government on the 
question of detainees 9 it has been very difficult to know how many 
people were detained at any one time. The report from a local 
newspaper in 1980 informed that all political detainees had been 
released and addressed by the Prime Minister 9 Prince Mabandla. It 
said that they were 14 and 11 most of them detained since 1978 1123 Dr. 
A.P.Zwane had also been arrested in 1978 (9th February) after the 
King had announced elections under the Tinkhundla system (discussed 
below in this chapter) but escaped from prison to live in exile in 
Tanzania. The February 1978 detention was his fourth spell in 
detention since 1973. 24 When he escaped to live in Tanzania he had 
spent a total of 420 days for his fourth spell. 
The Swaziland record on human rights i.e. few detentions as 
compared to many African States~ the non~exi stence of mysterious 
deaths in detention and no known cases of torture9 has been 
attributed solely to the good and humanitarian nature of Sobhuza•s 
Government. This view neglects three important factors. The first 
one is the fact that the only serious challenge to the Monarchy was 
NNLC which had only 3 seats in Parliament out of 24 elected seats. 
Secondly, in Swaziland there were no serious internal conflicts, as 
found elsewhere in Africa, due to the fact that the Swazi nation is 
largely a homogeneous society. And, lastly~ the Swazis~ 
particularly peasants, are basically conservative, and they revere 
their Monarchy. Therefore there has never arisen a need to be harsh 
as other African Governments. The contention in this thesis is that 
the detentions that occurred were too harsh given the conditions 
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which obtained in Swaziland and also seeing that there was never a 
real threat to overthrow the Government by force, 
The British and South African Reaction to the ~~£~-~l~~pf___!!l~ 
Constitution 
The conservatism of the Swazi ruling class who repealed the 
Constitution influenced the reaction of both the British and South 
African Governments. Since Independence in 1968 Swaziland has 
always been one of the most conservative and pro-capitalist 
countries in Africa. She has never made any rhetoric statements 
about the desire to implement socialism or "African Socialism" as 
many African countries have done at one stage or another. She has 
never threatened to nationalise foreign-owned industries. In fact, 
Sobhuza hated socialism, especially the "Soviet" blend of socialism, 
He warned against the USSR policies as early as 1960 when he 
addressed a delegation of the Colonial Government and members of the 
SNC. In his address he referred to Harold Macmillan's 1960 "Wind of 
Change" speech in the South African Parliament where Macmillan 
warned against the West engaging in policies that would estrange the 
Africans and make them join the Eastern bloc. Sobhuza maintained 
that the intentions of the Eastern bloc would be evil while they 
claimed to be helping Africans. He put it thus: 
"To drive my point home let me make an 
illustration of what happens among the Swazi. 
When a man has to reprimand his wife, often 
there wi 11 be found an ill-in tent i oned man who 
wi 11 come to the wife and say : 'How sorry I 
feel for you because your husband always scolds 
you and treats you badly and I would do 
something better for you'. Such a man is a bad 
man. And we feel that such a man in the 
political world is Russia and others like her."25 
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The Swazi Monarch had a good reason to resent Soviet and 
Eastern Europe socialism. In that blend of socialism 9 the Monarchy 
has no place. Indeed!! the Czar of Russia was deposed during the 
1917 Revolution which was initiated by socialists. 
Despite Swaziland•s membership to the Non-Aligned Movement!! the 
country has never established diplomatic relations with Communist 
States. No Eastern bloc country has had an embassy in Swaziland. 
Neither has Swaziland sent ambassadors to the Eastern bloc. 
Instead!! Swaziland has allowed Taiwan to open an embassy in the 
country. To make sure that Swazis have as little contact as 
possible with the ideas of the Eastern bloc, a law was passed in 
August 19689 less than a month before Independence 9 which outlawed 
the ownership of9 the trading in and circulation of Marxist, 
Leninistg Maoist and other literature or documents considered to be 
communist, in Swaziland. 
The extent to which the Swazi State is conservative is further 
displayed in the decision to continue diplomatic relations with 
Israel in 1973 when all African States (except Malawi and Lesotho) 
decided to sever diplomatic relations with Israel. This was a 
reaction to Israel•s occupation 9 during the 1973 Yom Kippur War9 of 
the Egyptian territory on the Western side of the Suez Canal, thus 
invading African soil. 
This strong conservative nature of the Swazi State and the fact 
that real power, Constitution or no Constitution 9 lay with Sobhuza 
largely determined the British Government response to the repeal of 
the Constitution. According to Mr. Simon Sishayi Nxumalo 9 who was 
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Minister for Industry 9 Mines and Tourism at the time9 the immed·iate 
reaction of the British Government was to express their reservation 
about the wisdom of the move to make such drastic political 
changes. 26 But the Tory Government reservation did not amount to 
change of policy. The then British High Commissioner to Swaziland 
wrote that "after a few days to let the dirt settle I sought9 and 
obtained. instructions to tell the Swaziland Government that Her 
Majesty's Government proposed • business as usua 1' . "27 Mr. Nxuma 1 o 
elaborated. during the interview, that the British did not have 
grounds to be scepti ca 1 s i nee the decision to repea 1 the 
Constitution and to hand over the powers to Sobhuza had been done by 
the Swaziland Parliament. According to him the procedure was 
democratic and the British themselves respect parliamentary 
democracy. 
There are problems with Nxumalo's contention that the repeal of 
the Constitution was done democratically and that therefore the 
British Government did not have reason to be concerned. Firstly. 
the Constitution specified that if it were to be changed there would 
have to be a decision by the joint sitting of the House of Assembly 
and the Senate, this decision to be referred to the electorate as a 
referendum. and then finally to the King for assent. But the 
electorate in this case were by-passed. Not that the Swazi 
authorities were not aware of the necessary procedure. Sobhuza 
displayed this awareness in 1969 when addressing Chiefs at Lobamba 
Royal Residence. He said "The Government in Mbabane does not have 
such powers to change the Constitution on their own. It is only the 
nation which has such powers."28 The parliamentary democracy to 
which Nxumalo referred applies in Britain where Parliament is 
supreme. In the case of Swaziland, the Constitution had been 
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consciously and del·iberately made supreme which meant that 
Parliament could not legislate ultra vires the Constitution. The 
last Queen's Commissioner to Swaziland explained this constitutional 
arrangement in the following words: "In Britain we do not have a 
written constitution. Hence there is no judicial review, But in 
the former colonies we had to give a written constitution and 
safeguards9 so that nobody could upset anything even if they felt 
like doing so." 29 He went on to explain that even though the 
British Parliament can enact as it likes 9 it would not upset the 
basic British lifestyle and political system, 
So the British Government believed that their independent 
colonies should be given a constitutional arrangement where 
Parliament was not supreme, They felt the constitutions should be 
supreme. Whether or not these independence constitutions lasted is 
an irrelevant issue : the belief was that they were ideal for those 
circumstances. So Nxumalo's argument of parliamentary democracy is 
unconvincing, unless he can prove that the British Government had 
changed their mind about the supremacy of the Constitution in 
Swaziland at the time the Swazi Parliament took the decision to 
repeal the Constitution ultra virously. The real reason why the 
Tory Government did not react negatively when Swaziland repealed the 
Constitution was that they did not foresee any radical changes. In 
addition 9 British Governments were used to constitutional changes by 
their former colonies in Africa or Asia. 
The South African Government reaction was also largely 
influenced by the conservative nature of the Swazi aristocracy. The 
silencing of the opposition parties, especially the NNLC9 meant the 
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continued domination of SvJazi politics by the traditionalists who 
had been friendly with South Africa since Independence in 1968. 
(The detailed study of Swaziland = South African relations in the 
context of the Southern African geo=politics is undertaken in 
chapter 7 below). Although Swaziland did not establish diplomatic 
relations with South Africa they did have dialogue with her. For 
instance~ in 1971 the Swaziland Prime Minister 9 Prince Makhosini 9 
led a delegation to Cape Town to talk with the South African 
Government on matters of mutual interest. The issues ranged from 
economic cooperation to social and political cooperation. 30 
By banning 11 Communist 11 literature in 1968 Swaziland had made a 
good impression with the South African Government who had also 
banned communist literature. By not establishing diplomatic 
relations with Communist countries~ Swaziland displayed a foreign 
policy similar to that of South Africa who had closed the USSR 
Embassy in the 1950 1 s. The Swazi Monarch had used VanWyk de Kries9 
a Broederbonder 9 as one of his advisers prior to Independence. In 
July 1962 Mr. B.J. Vorster 9 then South African Minister of Justice~ 
visited Swaziland and was given permission to hunt at Ehlane Game 
Reserve - this was a royal prerogative. Lastly~ the control of the 
Swazi politics by the oligarchy (through INM) through the Tinkhundla 
sys tern was in 1 i ne with what South Africa was promoting in the 
homelands. 
Understandably 9 the South African Government reaction was that 
the traditional system of rule in Swaziland was the best democracy9 
that the Libandla (SNL) was open to all Swazi men or their 
traditional representatives and that the King gave effect to the 
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consensus of the Libandla. South Africa welcomed the move to repeal 
the Independence Constitution. 31 To the Swazi authorities it was a 
blessing to have South Africa_ welcome the constitutional changes~ 
seeing that South Africa is a regional pm-1er - economically and 
militarily. 
There was a strong feeling amongst the Swazi and South African 
people that not only did South Africa welcome the changes, but that 
the Government also helped Swaziland establish the country's first 
modern army - the Swaziland Umbutfo Defence Force. The January-June 
1973 issue of International Defence and Air Funds for Southern 
Africa (IDYAF) carried an article which linked the creation of the 
Umbutfo Defence Force with South Africa. It said that South Africa 
had been consulted prior to the disclosure that an army was to be 
established. There was, as there sti 11 is, secrecy about 
Swaziland-South Africa military cooperation. The only country that 
was, and still is, openly helping Swaziland with the formation of 
the Defence Force was Israel. Israel did the training of the new 
army. In fact, she was already involved in the training of the 
young men who were in the National Youth Service called Gcina. This 
was a voluntary service and training was mainly in agricultural 
skills, but lessons were also offered in social discipline and 
physical fitness. The majority of the first military personnel in 
the Umbutfo Defence Force came from Gcina. 
The Royal Constitutional Commission and its Report 
A few months after the repeal of the Independence Constitution 
the Swazi Monarch issued a Gazette establishing the Royal 
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Constitutional Commission "to inquire into fundamental pr·inciples of 
Swazi history and culture~ as well as the modern principle of 
constitutional and international law with which they needed to be 
harmonised. 1132 Sobhuza announced the formation of the Commission in 
his speech on the 5th Anniversary of Swaziland•s Independence. He 
urged the Swazi people to co-operate with the Commission which had 
been given a great task of studying a future suitable Constitution. 
He implored: 11 I trust that you will co-operate fully with this 
Commission bearing in mind that the constitution needed is one which 
will safeguard our interests and guarantee freedom 9 justice, peace, 
order~ good government and the happiness and welfare of the entire 
nation. 1133 
The commission was given the mandate to solicit views inside 
and outside Swaziland. In Swaziland people were invited to write to 
the Commission suggesting the nature of the constitution they would 
like to see operating. The Commission also travelled to the 
Tinkhundla to listen to people•s views and take oral evidence. It 
started taking evidence in October 1973.34 The Commission reported 
that by January 1974 it had received 150 memoranda and had 
interviewed 100 witnesses. 
Outside Swaziland the Commission visited several countries 
amongst which were Kenya, Malawi~ Tanzania~ Zambia~ Britain, Denmark 
and Switzerland. It has not been possible to establish what sort of 
views the Commission received from these various consultants~ 
because its Report was not made public. It was submitted to Sobhuza 
who probably showed it to his closest advisers only. Several 
attempts have been made to establish who the Commission met in 
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Britain but without much success. The Centra 1 office of 
Information~ London~ admitted having arranged a meeting of the 
Commission Delegation with some British personnel whom they could 
not name because their file had been destroyed. Mr. Arthur Khoza 9 
Secretary to the Commission 9 informed the Research Assistants in 
Swaziland that the Delegation met the Lord Chancellor and his staff. 
Historical records revealed that the Lord Chancellor at the time 
(date of meeting being 13 May 1974) was Elwyn-Jones. An attempt to 
secure help from Lord Elwyn-Jones was fruitless. He wrote 9 inter 
alia, that 11 1 greatly regret ... that I have no recollection 
whatsoever of having any part in the Swaziland Royal Constitution 
Commission, or its delegation. I am so sorry that I cannot be of 
assistance to you. 1135 
Without any access to the Commission's Report and without any 
discussion with the British consultants, it is difficult to 
establish what input the British consultants had on the new 
Constitution (discussed in the next section). However, the nature 
of the new Constitution will probably suggest how much British 
constitutionalism may have been incorporated. Also some Swazi 
politicians interviewed threw some light. Mr. S.S. Nxumalo, who was 
Minister of Industry, Mines and Tourism at the time the Commission 
was at work and who was privileged to read the Report, said that as 
far as the views of the foreign consultants were concerned very 
little consideration was given and this could be detected from the 
"present political system of Swaziland which is similar to none in 
the whole world. 1136 Mr. Arthur Khoza who was Secretary to the 
C . . d . '1 . 37 omm1ss1on expresse a s1m1 ar v1ew. 
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There might have been very little consideration for the foreign 
consultants' views by the Swazi authorities~ but what is of 
significance is that the Commission visited Britains just over a 
year after having repealed a British designed Constitution. The 
visit by itself shows a conscious desire to maintain warm relations 
with Britain. The desire to maintain warm relations with Britain 
emanated from the fact that ( i) Britain was~ together with South 
Africas the closest economic ally (economic links between Swaziland 
and Britain are discussed in chapters 4 and 5) and (ii) Britain was 
the only world power with a renowned Monarchy, although a 
constitutional one, which still exhibited signs of perpetual 
survival. If the Monarchy system in Swaziland was to survive, it 
had to rna i nta in warm re 1 at ions, and even es tab 1 ish new ones where 
they did not exist, with other Monarchies. 
There is no evidence that South Africa was consulted in this 
constitution-making task. The Swaziland authorities would not 
openly consult South Africa due to the apartheid constitution a 1 
set-up in South Africa and its cultural boycott by the Organization 
of African Unity (OAU) and other international bodies where 
Swaziland is a member. Moreover, the move to repeal the 
Independence Constitution in April 1973 had been compared by many 
peoples to the Bantustan constitutional structures, particularly the 
Transkei, where the chiefly element were given a majority over the 
elected representation. So if there were any consultations between 
the Swazi authorities or Commission and the South African State, 
these were secretly done. 
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The 1978 Constitution and _a_ New_ Pol_i_t_ical Di~ensation 
The repeal of the Independence Constitution had been a result 
of the Monarch's refusal to share power with modern government 
institutions and the fear by the traditionalists, including those in 
modern government 9 that they might lose their majority in Parliament 
sooner or later. It was logical therefore that the new Constitution 
would have no provisions which would require Sobhuza to share power 
and none that would allow opposition parties. 
In this section it is argued that the new Constitution complied 
with the above logical expectations; that this Constitution caused 
political alienation amongst many Swazis; that Sobhuza's domination 
of Swazi politics, coupled with no political participation by the 
masses, resulted in a power vacuum after his death because there 
were no political structures which guaranteed continuity when the 
Lion (Ngwenyama) roared no more. In short the power struggles of 
the 1980's and the court prosecutions that ensued were struggles to 
fill this vacuum. Finally the contention is that Sobhuza's sole and 
"splendid" rule over Swaziland did not affect the warm relations 
with Britain 9 while his rule was greatly welcome by South Africa. 
As mentioned above the Report of the Royal Constitutional 
Commission 9 presented to the King in July 19759 was never 
publicised. Four months later the Monarch appointed a 
Constitutional Advisory Committee to read the Report and make 
definite recommendations for the real Constitution. This 
Committee's recommendations, also not made public, were presented in 
July 1976. After the submission of the Committee's recommendation 
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Sobhuza appointed yet another committee to come up with an electoral 
system 11 Which does not involve campaigning. 1138 According to Mr. 
Mndeni S. Shaba 1 a 1 a~ Chairman of this committee, Sobhuza informed 
him that Swazis had indicated that they wanted a parliament but did 
not like political parties or political hustings. He (Shabalala) 
and his committee had therefore to find ways of forming a Parliament 
which did not involve political parties and political campaigns. 
This committee did come up with an electoral system which has been 
used 3 times since 1978. Since there is no written constitution, a 
description of the electoral process as provided by Shabalala during 
interview in May 1987 and the provisions of The Establishment of the 
Parliament of Swaziland Order, 1978 will serve as a basis for 
analysis of the new political dispensation in Swaziland since 1978. 
The Shabalala Committee, later known as the Elections 
Committee, consisted of 7 members : Mr. M.S. Shabalala (Chairman), 
Prince Gabheni (Sobhuza's most trusted son who later became the 
mentor of Crown Prince Makhosetive), Mr. Richard Velaphi Dlamimi 
(founder member of INM ~ former Deputy Speaker of the House of 
Assembly, later Minister of Foreign Affairs and a personal friend of 
Pik Botha), Chief Mfanawenkhosi Maseko (a senior police officer and 
formerly Sobhuza's bodyguard), Mr. Ndleleni Gwebu (Governor of 
Lobamba Royal Residence), Colonel Mangomeni Nzimandza (Chief of 
Staff of Umbutfo Defence Force) and Mabalizandla Nhlabatsi (a 
prominent member of the SNC and a former MP). It appears that all 
the members but Prince Gabheni had not seen the Constitutional 
Reports. Prince Gabheni had participated in the previous 
Constitutional Advisory Committee. 
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Having been given the mandate to establish Parliament 9 the 
Shabalala Committee figured out the appropriate way of conducting 
elections without political parties and without campaigning was 
through the Tinkhundla system - the traditional meeting places for 
discussions9 settlement of disputes or criminal trials. It should 
be noted that the INM had always used the Tinkhundla for the 
selection of their candidates for the general elections prior to and 
after Independence. I he Committee de 1 i nea ted 40 Tin khund 1 a 
(constituencies} all over the country. Each Inkhundla was to have 
I ndvuna (head/chairman) who was to be appointed by the Ngwenyama. 
Elections on the basis of an Inkhundla were to return members of an 
Electoral College who in turn would elect Members of Parliament. 
The elections at an Inkhundla are open9 i.e. there is queuing behind 
a candidate of one's choice. The candidate sits next to a 
particular gate of an enclosure for every one to see him. As the 
people move through the gate of their candidate. counting takes 
place. 
The immediate question which comes to mind is : where do these 
candidates come from because there are no parties or campaigning? 
Each chief sends a representative to the Inkhundla under which his 
chiefdom falls. These chiefs' representatives form an Inkhundla 
Council or Bucopho Benkhundla. It is this Inkhundla Council which 
nominates the candidates. The Council has to give 8 names of 
candidates to the Head of the Inkhundla and inform him on the order 
of preference to the candidates. The Head of Inkhundla submits the 
8 names to Shabalala 9 Indvuna Yeti Nkhundla9 who passes the names to 
the King. The King will approve 4 names as candidates. either in 
accordance with the recommendation of the Inkhundla Council or using 
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his own discretion~ i.e. he can pick the bottom name to be among the 
4 candidates. From these 4 candidates each Inkhundla elects 2 
members of the Electoral College using the open voting system. This 
election in the 40 Tinkhundla will return 80 members of the 
Electoral College. 
The Electoral College will be called to meet the Elections 
Committee to be briefed about electoral procedure. This College is 
no longer allowed to mix with the public until their election task 
is over. The College nominates as many names as possible and 
debates over them. They finally settle for 60 candidates to the 
Parliamentary elections. These candidates must have been nominated 
and seconded by at least 5 persons after the debate. The nominees 
are not told before their nominations. They are only told after 
they have become candidates. These candidates will be told about 
their candidacy by the Chief Electoral officer who is gazetted. The 
60 are i dent i fi ed to the Elector a 1 College by the Chief Elector a 1 
officer and the Elections Committee. 
The actual election of the 40 MPs out of the 60 candidates is 
supervised by the Chief Electoral Officer and Elections Committee. 
It is done by secret ballot. Each one of the 80 members of the 
Electoral College has 40 votes. In short it is a one man 40 votes 
system. The El ectora 1 officer makes sure that any member who has 
a 1 ready voted does not mix with those who have not. When the 
College has finished voting they return to their respective 
Tinkhundla where they form a Regional Council (more is said about 
this body below in this chapter). It has a lifetime similar to that 
of the Parliament in case a bye-election becomes necessary. The 
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King nominates 10 MPs to bring the total number of MPs to 50. The 
Elections Committee nominates the Speaker of the House of Assembly 
whom the King appoints. The House then proceeds to elect 10 
senators from anywhere in the country using a secret ballot. The 
King adds another 10 senators. The Parliament of Swaziland is then 
constituted by the 70 MPs. 
Using his own discretion the King appoints the Prime Minister 
from the 70 MPs. The Prime Minister recommends the Cabinet from the 
MPs and the King appoints them. The 11 modern 11 Government of 
Swaziland is thus constituted. 
The Ti nkhundl a system a 1 so introduced Regional Administration 
in the country. The Regional Administrator was to be head of the 
Region - there are 4 Regions (or Districts) in the country. 
According to Shabalala the Regional Administrator is supposed to 
have taken over all the duties of the District Commissioner. But 
the Regional Administrator reports to Shabalala as Indvuna Yeti 
Nkhundla~ and not to the Ministry of Local Administration (now 
Ministry of the Interior). (The problems and confusion arising from 
these structural changes are discussed below where a general 
assessment of the Tinkhundla system is undertaken). The Regional 
Administrator has a Regional Council - a mini Parliament made up by 
members of the Electoral College in that Region. 
Problems of the New Political Dispensation 
Problems of the new Constitution and the new political 
dispensation - the Tinkhundla system - are legion. However~ this 
work will focus on the following : (a) the fact that the 1978 
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Constitution is not written has left many unanswered questionss (b) 
the non-existence of political parties coupled with the ban on 
political campaigningg (c) the open voting system in the election of 
the Electoral Collegeg (d) lack of ballot papers in Tinkhundla 
elections 9 (e) the creation of the Regional Office and the Councils 
and (f) keeping the Electoral College for as long as the life span 
of the Parliament. 
There is no evidence to suggest that the decision by the Swazi 
authorities not to write the l978.Constitution was influenced by 
British constitutionalism. But they did refer to the unwritten 
constitution of Britain when they referred to the supremacy of the 
British Parliament which could legislate as they wished 9 i.e. 
without any constitutional provisions restricting them in the same 
way as the Independence Constitution provisions did to the Swaziland 
Parliament and the Monarch. The gist of the problem with the 
unwritten constitution of Swaziland lies in the fact that there is 
no explanation on the relationship of the 3 main organs of 
government (i) the legislature, (ii) the executive and (iii) the 
judiciary. It is imperative to recall that on that historic 
afternoon of the 12th April 1973, when Sobhuza repealed the 
Independence Constitution, he said 11 •.. I have assumed supreme power 
in the Kingdom of Swaziland and that all Legislative, Executive and 
Judicial power is vested in myself ... 1139 When he informed the 
Shabalala Committee that the findings of the Royal Constitutional 
Commission were that the Swazis wanted Parliament, he did not 
expatiate upon the nature of power-sharing between those organs. 
For instance, it was not clear whether the 1973 Decree which 
established the Tribunal Court to preside over cases of citizenship 
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still had power over ordinary courts in deciding on cit-izenship 
issues. It was not clear whether the Judi c·i ary had power to review 
acts of Parliament. It was not explained whether the Cabinet was 
answerable to Parliament or to the Monarch. Neither did he publicly 
renounce his assumption of legislative~ executive and judicial power 
when the new Constitution and new Parliament came into being. In 
effect the Declaration of a State of Emergency and Decrees issued on 
12 April 1973 are still legally enforceable. Hence the 60 
Day~detention without trial continues today. 
The lack of clarity about the functions of these 3 main 
institutions of the Government was not necessarily a serious 
handicap to the functioning of the Government. The fact that 
Sobhuza could legislate by Orders alongside Parliamentary enactments 
did not cause much disruption within Government. Sobhuza had to 
agree to all Parliamentary legislation. So nothing could be done 
without him. In fact there was a feeling in some quarters that 
Swaziland did not even need a written Constitution 11 as long as 
Sobhuza is with us 11 • 40 Sobhuza was capable of controlling the 
distribution of the powers/functions amongst these organs although 
the Attorney-General 9 Mr. Douglas Lukhele 9 did mention the potential 
conflict resulting from this dual legislative system. 41 In short 
the political system of Swaziland relied on the person9 Sobhuza II9 
to fill a major constitutional gap in the modern Government of 
Swaziland. But the demise of the not-so-immortal Sobhuza in August 
1982 proved to be costly to the political system of Swaziland - as 
the discussion of the power struggles below in this chapter will 
show. 
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The second problem the Tinkhundla system carries on its back is 
the non-existence of political parties and the ban on political 
campaigning. It was mentioned in chapter 2 that the Swazi Monarch 
did not like political parties at all. He wanted the British 
Government to hand over the country to him. He 1 oved to think of 
himself as the only one capable of coming to the rescue of Swaziland 
if the country was to escape the numerous political troubles being 
experienced by the newly independent African States in the north. 
B.A. Ma-rwick~ who was the Queen's Commissioner in 1958-1964, 
observed that Sobhuza's self portrayal was that of Charles de 
Gaulle's role in the troubled France after World War II. 42 In fact, 
Sobhuza's admiration of de Gaulle was revealed in a meeting of some 
members of SNC, some representatives of the White settler community 
and Co 1 oni a 1 Government representatives he 1 d on 23 Apri 1 1960. In 
this meeting Sobhuza addressed the meeting on what he felt should be 
the direction for Swaziland's future. Speaking on the concept of 
democracy as understood in the West, he said it was irreconcilable 
with the Swazi way of life which he considered democratic. He said: 
"I don't see how we can try to adopt European 
ways of doing things which we don't know. Yes 
it is quite true that we should copy those good 
practices that the Europeans have, but when we 
come to consider what is this democracy of which 
they speak you ultimately get lost in the idea 
..• Let us regard this as a practice, as a 
European practice, because to speak of 
democracy, I don't think wou 1 d be the correct 
word, because democracy is not there •.. I think 
it would be better democracy if people went into 
it in the same way as de Gaulle took up his 
position in France. He was called by the people 
to come to their rescue as they were in 
difficulty •.. He came with that mandate. There's 
nothing that he has promised the people that he 
would achieve for them. Actually I appreciate 
it was the people that suggested that he would 
be appointed. I thought that was a good 
format. "43 
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Indeed on 12 April 1973 the Swazi Parliament called on Sobhuza to 
come to the 11 rescue" of Swaziland. 
The Tinkhundla system was based on the philosophy that 
political parties which went around the country making promises to 
people were not genuine. They were there to get into power for the 
purpose of serving their own~ and their clienteles• interests. 
Hence there was no resurrection of political parties in 1978, and 
there was the ban on campaigning - the philosophy being that the 
genuine leader (be they members of the Electoral College or MPs) 
would get the people•s mandate without having to ask for votes or 
make any promise. One old Swazi saying goes: 11 To be entrusted with 
a position of great responsibility is tantamount to being killed 11 
(Kubekwa Kubulawa). Therefore who, in their right senses, would go 
around campaigning to be killed 11 • On the basis of this philosophy, 
we are persuaded to believe the people who go around campaigning do 
not really want to represent the interests of the nation, but want 
to use political positions to further their interests. 
The non-existence of political parties, coupled with no 
campaigns, has had criticism from the educated section of the 
population. The argument is that political organizations are a 
platform whereby people diagnose the problems of the country, 
advance and articulate their views and offer solutions to adopt. 
Also it is from political organisations that individuals emerge as 
potential leaders. During the hustings political parties and 
individuals address the people and people are given an opportunity 
to make their judgement about the suitability of candidates. In the 
no political parties-no campaigning situation the electorate are not 
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given a chance to choose their candidates. Instead~ it is the 
chieftaincy and the Monarchy that choose candidates. The people who 
criticise the Tinkhundla system are mostly those who hold ~!estern 
views of a system of Government. They are former leaders and 
supporters of the banned NNLC~ SPP~ etc. Hence a few~ including Dr. 
Zwane~ were detained after the announcement of the Tinkhundla 
elections in 1978. It was obvious that chiefs would not choose 
people, as their representatives at Tinkhundla, who showed sympathy 
with opposition parties 1 ike NNLC or SPP. The doomed fate of the 
modern political parties, especially the NNLC, was sealed by the 
Tinkhundla electoral law which excluded any person who had been or 
was detained under the 60-Day detention order from eligibility for 
election. 
The open voting system in the election of the Electoral College 
was anathema to many people. They did not think that their choice 
should be a matter for public exposure, they felt that secret 
ballots was appropriate if people were to exercise their right 
without fear or favour. It is not a good electoral process to 
require person A to openly display his choice of candidate B as 
opposed to candidate C, especially if candidate Cis A•s boss. 
Hence many people, mainly civil servants, teachers, professionals, 
stay away from the Tinkhundla elections. The Swazi oligarchy cannot 
justify this voting by profile on the basis of Swazi law and custom 
because the traditional system was not based on voting. It was at 
all times based on acclamation and consensus - this has been stated 
above in this chapter. 
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This open voting is done without any ba 11 ot papers. This 
causes many doubts about the authenticity of the results. If any 
results were to be challenged, there would be no ballot papers to 
fall back to; the nation has to rely on some civil servants who did 
the on~the-spot counting of human faces passing through a gate. 
This anomaly has been pointed out in Kenya in February 1988. Kenya 
is the only country which has adopted an open voting system for 
candidates to Parliament and, under certain conditions9 the actual 
election of MPs themselves. Whether or not Kenya was influenced by 
the Swaziland experience is not clear, but their first open voting 
system (February 1988) has brought an outcry in the country. In one 
of the queries about the authenticity of the no ballot system 
results one Kenyan observed that: 
11 Figures for Tinderet, where a lot of canvassing 
was done by a clique that came to be known as 
•power brokers•, indicate that Kosgey thoroughly 
trounced his rival, Sego. In fact, the figures 
gathered by the c 1 ergy from po 11 i ng station to 
polling station indicate that Kosgey got about 
2/3 of the votes cast. Yet the final figure 
that was given by the DC (District Commissioner) 
was not only inflated in favour of Sego, it did 
not even indicate anyth-ing regarding what 
transpired in the polls. The figures were 
imaginary. 1144 
There is nothing to suggest that 11 DCs 11 in Swaziland are immune 
from producing imaginary figures. Attempts to rig the election of 
10 Senators were made in the November 1987 elections. In this 
election, three MPs nominated and elected the 10 Senators, 5 of whom 
came from the 7-member Elections Committee (formerly referred to as 
Shabalala Committee) which supervises and oversees the elections. 
By the time other MPs raised their hands to nominate candidates of 
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their choiceg the clerks chairing the meeting informed them that the 
nominations and elections were closed. However 9 the election of the 
10 Senators were invalidated on the grounds that they had been done 
prior to the appointment of the Speaker (who is appointed by the 
King) 45 who must chair the MPs meeting to elect the 10 Senators. 46 
This was an attempt to give jobs to friends in the 5 Elections 
Committee members and their friends - just like in the case of Kenya 
the DC gave a job to a pal and the Government's favoured candidate. 
The establishment of the Regional Administrator's portfolio and 
the Regional Council resulted in a duplication of functions and 
confusion. Prior to Tinkhundla system Swaziland was divided into 4 
districts and the District Commissioners were head of district 
administrations. The DCs were civil servants who reported to the 
Ministry of Local Administration (now Ministry of the Interior). 
The administration at district level was coordinated by a body 
called District Team which met regularly under the chairmanship of 
the DC. Other members were representatives of all ministries 
operating at district level, e.g. health officers, veterinary 
officers, welfare officers, education officers, etc. 
When the Tinkhundla system was introduced the post of Regional 
Administrators and Regional Councils were announced. The Regional 
Administrators were supposed to be po 1 iti ca 1 appointees but would 
take over all the duties done by District Commissioners. They would 
not report to the Ministry of the Interior but would report to the 
Office of Tinkhundla Headquarters. The Indvuna Yetinkhundla would 
then channel issues to various Cabinet Ministries, or to the Prime 
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Minister or to the King. 47 The Regional Administrators worked with 
Regional Councils (constituted by members of the Electoral College) 
who operated as a mini Parliament. The basic confusion was whether 
the Ministry of the Interior would be abolished. If not what would 
be its role? There was no clear explanation of how the Regional 
Administrator~ a political appointee~ would work with the local 
civil servants who had previously been linked to the District 
Commissioner. 
Although the Regional Administration was announced at the time 
Tinkhundla system was established in 1978~ the actual announcement 
of the appointment of the Regional Administrators was made in 1982, 
after the death of Sobhuza but the announcer~ Mr. M.S. Shaba 1 a 1 a 
(Indvuna Yetinkhundla} said the appointment had been done by 
Sobhuza. The delay was largely due to the confusion mentioned 
above. Although announced in 1982 the Administrators did not take 
office until after the sacking of Prime Minister, Prince Mabandla~ 
in March 1983 by the Supreme Council of State - Liqoqo. (More is 
said about Mabandla's sacking below in this chapter). Prince 
Mabandla, a former NNLC sympathiser~ was appointed as Prime Minister 
in 1979 after Colonel Maphevu Dlamini's death. It was well-known 
that Mabandla had no love for Tinkhundla system, just as he did not 
entertain the idea of the land deal with South Africa (discussed in 
detail in chapter 7). Word went around in the country that he would 
not let the Regional Administration system take off. When asked in 
an interview why the Regional Administration had not been working 
for so long, Shabalala avoided the question and started talking 
about different issues. 48 
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The keeping of the Electoral College as Regional Councils is 
costly to the Treasury. The taxpayer has to pay 70 MPs plus 80 
Electoral College members whose duty is not clear. Since 1978 the 
Regional Councils have not functioned as Regional Parliaments. Why 
burden the Treasury then? 
The Regional Councils and the Tinkhundla Administration as a 
whole have not found unqualified support from the Chiefs. The 
chieftaincy sees it as a system likely to take away their powers and 
functions. For instance9 if Regional Councils would make decisions 
to be communicated to the Indvuna Yetihkhundla, who in turn takes 
these to the King, it would mean Chiefs would lose their prerogative 
to communicate directly to the Monarch. In the previous parallel 
system of rule~ Chiefs had direct access to the King. If they felt 
they did not want to talk to the DC~ they would not heed his call to 
the De's office. The Regional Council system, although situated 
within the traditional, and therefore chieftainship structure, was 
threatening to steal the limelight from the Chiefs. In short, 
Regional Councils are a challenge to the Chiefs' traditional 
authority and their prerogative to communicate directly to the 
Monarch. The Chiefs are more concerned because neither the Regional 
Council members nor the Indvuna Yeti Nkhundla are chiefs by birth. 
But they are elected and appointed "politicians". The ambivalence 
of the Chiefs towards the Regional Council system cannot be 
overlooked by the Swazi Monarchy because its power base is rooted in 
the chieftaincy institution. 
With all these complicated problems it would be romantic to 
hope that Tinkhundla system will ever be fully operational. Sobhuza 
is dead and it is too early to establish whether the new authorities 
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are intent on continuing wHh this problematic novel const-itution 
although the 1987 elections were conducted under the auspices of 
Ti nkhundl a o Indeed 9 S 0 So Nxuma 1 o rna i nta i ned that when the system 
was introduced Sobhuza made it clear that it was on a trial basis 9 
that some politicians now wanted to push it too far even though it 
appeared the system had problems. 49 
Reaction of Britain and South Africa to the New System 
There is no indication that the introduction of the Tinkhundla 
system has had any effect on the Swazi-British relations. The 
system was intended to consolidate conservatism, it was not a move 
to the left. On the basis of the vow by the Swazi State to maintain 
capitalism, private enterprise, as the foundation of the mode of 
production, the Tinkhundla system could not adversely affect the 
relations between the 2 States. After all, Britain was used to 
seeing its former Colonies changing the inherited Independence 
constitutions, thus affecting the whole political system. In the 
case of Swaziland9 there was no threat to nationalise private 
property. Instead the Swazi State guaranteed the right to private 
property and it created conditions for capital accumulation, namely 
by discouraging trade unionism (discussed in the next chapter) and 
offering tax incentives to investors. 
Granted, the size of Swazi 1 and and its doc i 1 i ty on 
international issues have meant that Swaziland features least on the 
British political agenda. But incidents do occur which show 
political interaction continue unabated. For instance, the Swazi 
Monarchy invites the British Monarch in all important ceremonies in 
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Swaziland. In 1981 Queen Elizabeth was invited to Sobhuza•s Diamond 
Jubilee. 50 The programme for the Coronation of King Mswati III in 
April 1986 was prepared with the help of the British personnel and 
King Mswati attended school at Sherborne, Dorset from 1982 to 1986. 
Sobhuza II was invited to Prince Charles• Wedding and he was 
represented by Prince Gabheni. Britain continues to issue visas on 
behalf of the Swaziland Government where the latter have no 
diplomatic missions or consulates - a service Britain provides to 
many Commonwealth countries who do not have diplomatic missions in 
t . t . 51 cer a1 n coun n es. In other \'Jords, the British policy of 1973 
i.e. 11 business as usual 11 , pronounced when the Independence 
Constitution was repealed, continued after the introduction of the 
new political dispensation in Swaziland. 
On the other hand, the South African Government we 1 corned the 
Tinkhundla system because it consolidated the control of the Swazi 
State by the traditional element in the country. The NNLC was not 
appreciated by the South African State because it had Pan-Africanist 
slogans and the Nkrumahist ideology to a large extent. The 
traditionalists• domination of Swazi politics meant that South 
Africa had a friendly neighbour who was also anti communist. The 
introduction of the Tinkhundla system in 1978 was timely as far as 
South Africa was concerned. This was the period when the ANC 
started to intensify its guerrilla attacks following the 1976 South 
African schools uprising and the killings that followed. Moreover, 
the minority Governments of Angola and Mozambique had been defeated 
in 1975 and Leabua Jonathan•s Government in Lesotho was changing its 
policy - it had started inviting the Eastern bloc countries to 
establish diplomatic missions in Lesotho and the Lesotho Government 
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was publicly denouncing and attacking the apartheid policy. So the 
South African State was becoming more and more isolated regionally. 
Hence the traditional conservative Government of Swaziland» as 
consolidated in the Tinkhundla system» was welcome (The detailed 
analysis of the Southern African region is undertaken in Chapter 7. 
The foregoing was mentioned just to enhance the point that the 
introduction of Tinkhundla system was welcomed by South Africa). 
The Cons~guences of Sobhuza•s 11 Splendid 11 Rule 
As early as the beginning of the 1950 1 s Brian A. Marwick, then 
District Commissioner (he later became Her Majestry•s Commissioner) 
in Swaziland, made an historic observation about Sobhuza•s 
domination of decision-making on matters which should have involved 
Liqoqo and Libandla (SNC). He wrote : 
11 This (domination) was liable not only to 
destroy the initative of members of the Iqoqo 
and I band 1 a» but it a 1 so prevented them from 
obtaining that training and experience in 
handling national business in modern times which 
was - their right -and -duty, Also -if- -so- -much 
re 1 i ance was p 1 aced in one man in defiance of 
the Swazi constitution, would not chaos develop 
if he were suddenly removed by death or 
i ncapacity? 11 52 
This domination continued after independence and was extended to 
modern government. The contention made here is that the Lion • s 
(Ngwenyama•s) domination of Swazi politics denied Swazi people the 
necessary experience they needed to ensure continuity of political 
stability when the Lion roared no more; it is argued that Sobhuza•s 
Tinkhundla system alienated many Swazi people from political 
participation, thus denying them political education which is 
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necessary for a nation if it is to progress and stand on its own; 
that this lack of political culture~ except the personality cult of 
Sobhuza9 resulted in a power vacuum when the Monarch died in August 
1982 and that the political struggles which ensued were struggles to 
fill the power vacuum that had been created by Sobhuza•s death. 
The general feeling amongst Sobhuza•s supporters and advisers 
was that as long as Sobhuza lived Swazilanct•s problems would always 
be solved amicably. He was figuratively referred to as 11 The Mouth 
that Speaks No lies 11 (Umlomo Ongathethi Manga) - meaning literally 
that he never tells lies 9 the deeper meaning was that he never 
commits a mistake. In other words he was infallible. The praise 
singer used this phrase quite often when saying Sobhuza•s praises. 
This attitude of his supporters made them hardly question Sobhuza's 
decisions and policies; it made them hardly bother to take 
initiative to do things independently of Sobhuza. Hence Sobhuza•s 
domination of Swazi politics and the lack of training and experience 
to the future inheritors of political power. 
On the other hand, the leaders of opposition parties were 
silenced with effect from 12 April 1973. The banning of political 
parties and 11 political 11 activity resulted in the official absence of 
opposition views. It resulted in lack of political education to the 
masses. There is no platform to criticise the Government 
activities 9 or to point out their mistakes. If any opposition 
voice out their criticisms they are detained without trial. These 
conditions have resulted largely in the politics of silence and 
apathy in the country. 
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The Tinkhundla system did not allow opposition. Political 
parties and campaigning for votes were not allowed under the system. 
The voting by queuing alienated many people9 especially the 
educatedg from participation in the Tinkhundla elections. Although 
the percentage of the electorate who participated in the 1987 
elections was not given to the preSS 9 11 The Times of Swaziland 11 (7 
November 1987) pointed out that few people voted and that the Chief 
Electoral Officer admitted this fact. We should remember that there 
are no ballot papers to prove the authenticity of the figures which 
may be released. This low turnup, even in rural areas where chiefs 
order their followers to go to the polls, was said to be due to lack 
of transport to the polling stations and flooded rivers. Be that as 
it may, the other fact is that the majority of rural illiterate 
people hardly understand the whole concept of voting. When 
political activity was still legal, political parties and campaigns 
acted as agents for politicisation and educating the masses. Since 
the closure of that chapter in 1973 it had been back to political 
ignorance inasfar as modern politics is concerned. They were taken 
back to traditional politics, i.e. politics through the chieftaincy. 
Because Chiefs are born but not elected, it became difficult to 
comprehend the concept of elections. Therefore, the Chiefs had to 
order their followers to go to the polling stations. The people did 
not necessarily go out of their own volition. The contention is 
that many illiterate people who participate in the Tinkhundla 
elections are doing so blindly, they do not fully understand the 
whole concept. The Tinkhundla system is responsible for the 
political bankruptcy of many Swazis. 
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The lack of mass political partic·ipation in the country was 
bound to have negative consequences at some stage. Future political 
stability could not be guaranteed by one man~ Sobhuza 9 who was just 
like any other human bcing 9 not immortal. His domination of both 
modern government and the traditional system which had no clearly 
defined powers and functions did not guarantee future pol itica 1 
stabi 1 ity. Hence the power struggles that ensued after Sobhuza 's 
demise. To give substance to the contention that the parallel 
system and the domination of Swazi politics by Sobhuza resulted in 
the power struggles9 it is imperative to undertake a brief history 
and analysis of the political events in Swaziland since August 1982. 
The analysis will focus on the following major events : (a) the 
ousting of Prime Minister 9 Prince Mabandla and dethroning of Queen 
Regent Dzeliwe by the Supreme Council of State (Liqoqo)9 (b) the 
struggle between Liqoqo and some Cabinet Ministers 9 (c) the internal 
struggles within Liqoqo resulting in the expulsion of the Authorised 
Person (who was Chairman of Liqoqo and the Regent's senior adviser) 
and (d) the ascendance to the throne of King Mswati III and the 
subsequent prosecutions of some former members of Liqoqo9 some 
Princes and Princesses (including the former Prime Minister9 Prince 
Bhekimpi~ who succeeded Prince Mabandla) and a few dignitaries 
associated with Liqoqo. The struggles that ensued were struggles to 
fill the power vacuum, they were not based on forces of modernity 
against traditionalism. 
Sobhuza II, the long reigning Swazi Monarch (having been 
enthroned in 1921) died on 23 August 1982. By Swazi 1 aw and custom 
the reigning Queen (indlovukati) Dzeliwe became the Queen Regent, 
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the Head of State9 vJith most of the powers accorded to the King. 
Queen Dzeliwe immediately took this responsibility without any 
squabbles. 
It was soon revealed that before his death K·ing Sobhuza had 
issued a decree formal ising the advisory roles of L iqoqo to the 
Queen Regent. Up to this time L iqoqo as a body had not been 
formerly gazetted and this was in line with Sobhuza•s policy of 
keeping out of modern practices any matters pertaining to Swazi law 
and custom. Perhaps at this time he foresaw some problems if he 
were to die without having formalised the role of Liqoqo. The 
decree defined L i qoqo as the Supreme Council of State with the 
function of advising the King or Queen Regent on all matters of 
state concern. The Liqoqo was to have a chairman who9 in the event 
of the Monarch becoming incapacitated and unable to fulfil his 
functions, would become the Authorised Person vested with the powers 
to sign and assent to all laws in the country. In short 9 the 
Authorised Person would become the Acting Head of State. 
In pursuance of this decree the Liqoqo was established by the 
Swazi oligarchy and it was composed of 15 members. Hardly 6 months 
after Sobhuza•s death there was already an open conflict between 
Liqoqo and the Prime Minister, Prince Mabandla. The hostility 
between Mabandla and the traditionalists can be traced back to the 
1960 1 s when Mabandla used to be an NNLC sympathiser. When Sobhuza 
appointed him PM in 1979 many INM leaders were unhappy and a 
substantial number of the Cabinet Ministers he inherited were 
hostile to him. This hostility was aggravated by the work of the 
Commission of Inquiry into Corruption (in Government circles) 
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Mabandla set up soon after his appo·intment, Some of the Cabinet 
iViinisters were subpoenaed to appear before the Commission. When 
some of them refused to attend, they were coerced into attending (It 
is alleged that Mr. Polycarp Dlannini, then Minister of Justiceg and 
a founder member of INM 9 was handcuffed and forced into the 
Commission's office). The Ministers filed an objection to the 
manner Mabandla's Commission was conducting its business. Sobhuza 
took his time to respondg he was probably giving Mabandla enough 
time to shake up the old establishment. 
Things changed when the Commission began to venture into Tibiyo 
Taka Ngwane Fund. Tibiyo is discussed in detail in chapter 49 but 
for the purposes of this section it will suffice to mention that the 
Fund belongs to the Royal Family, it runs their businesses and 
derives its money primarily from mineral royalties. There is an 
unclear relationship between Tibiyo and the Swazi Government -
sometimes the Government is ordered by the Monarchy to guarantee 
loans to Tibiyo or even bail it out in cases of financial 
difficulties. Hence Mabandla extended the terms of reference of his 
Commission to Tibiyo 9 Mr. S.S. Nxumalo 9 then Managing Director of 
Tibiyo and Sobhuza's Roving Ambassador, formerly Cabinet Minister in 
1968-1978, informed Sobhuza that Mabandla was daring into Tibiyo 
(demanding its files), a Royal prerogative affair. Nxumalo 
persuaded Sobhuza to stop the Commission, the Monarch then disbanded 
the Commission. By the time of Sobhuza's death Prince Mabandla had 
not had a chance of choosing or recommending a Cabinet of his 
choice. But he did get on well with some Ministers, e.g. his deputy 
Senator Ben Nsibandze and Dr. V.S. Leibbrandt, Minister of Works, 
Power and Communications. Mabandla was very popular with the civil 
servants. 
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The most imminent conflict lay in the failure of the decree 
which established Liqoqo to define its relation with the Cabinet. 
L iqoqo was adviser to the Monarch. So was the Cabinet (as the 
discussion above has shown). As long as Sobhuza was around 9 there 
probably would not have been any problems. He was capable of 
controlling both bodies. But now that he was gone 9 there was no one 
to play a unifying role. It is not clear what triggered the open 
conflict but it was reported that Prince Mfanasibili and Chief 
Mtanawenkhosi Maseko9 both members of Liqoqo9 told Queen Regent 
Dzeliwe in February 1983 that Mabandla was planning a coup d'etat 
with the help of the police. This allegation was never proven. 
What trans pi red was that at the time of the coup report 9 Mabandl a 
had succeeded in persuading Dzeliwe to send Polycarp Dlamini 
(Minister of Justice, and a staunch member of INM) abroad as 
ambassador. This was no doubt an attempt by Mabandla to get rid of 
the hostile elements within the Cabinet. The coup allegation was 
therefore seen as an attempt by the traditionalists to protect 
Dlamini and smear Mabandla to instigate his removal. The Liqoqo was 
also not happy that both Mabandla and Regent Dzeliwe had by-passed 
them in reaching the decision to demote and transfer Dlamini. 
In March 1983 Mfanasibili and Maseko were arrested and charged 
with sedition. The charge was related to the alleged coup attempt. 
During their internment the L i qoqo ca 11 ed a meeting of Chiefs to 
mobilise them against the 11 modern 11 element as depicted by Mabandla 
(But the contention in this thesis is that the struggles were not 
necessarily between the forces of traditionalism and those of 
modernity 9 it was a struggle to fill in the power vacuum). The 
Liqoqo asked the Queen Regent to sign a decree sacking Mabandla. 
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Dzeliwe initially refused but she was eventually coerced into 
signing the decree, The accusation against Mabandla was that he was 
plotting to usurp power from Lobamba (seat of the Monarchy and 
traditionalism) to take it to Mbabane (seat of modern Government), 
In March 1983 Mabandla was dismissed and Prince Bhekimpi ~ a staunch 
traditionalist~ was appointed as Prime Minister. However~ the Queen 
Regent seems to have trusted Mabandla9 she did not sign the sacking 
document willingly. The trust could have emanated from the fact 
that Mabandla was appointed by Sobhuza; old Dzeliwe did not then 
want to revoke Sobhuza•s appointments~ she was not yet ready to say 
Sobhuza had been wrong, 
After the sacking of Mabandla the struggle for State control 
continued between Liqoqo and Dzeliwe. When Liqoqo realised that 
Dzeliwe would be a brake to their intended changes, they drafted a 
decree which in effect authorised the Authorised Person of Liqoqo, 
Prince Sozisa, to have power, to assent to some decrees and 
legislation, This meant Dzeliwe would not be the only authority to 
validate laws, and this was not in line with the Swazi constitution, 
the Authorised Person could only sign on behalf of the Regent when 
she was incapacitated, but as things stood at the time Dzeliwe was 
not incapacitated. 
Mr. Arthur Khoza, Sobhuza•s long serving interpreter and 
Permanent Secretary in the Ministry of Agriculture was summoned by 
Dzelive to explain the implications of Liqoqo•s draft decree. Khoza 
explained and advised her not to sign it, Dzeliwe•s reaction was to 
announce the dismissal of the entire Liqoqo, Polycarp Dlamini 
(Minister of Justice) and Patrick Makanza (Attorney-General, and a 
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Tanzanian national employed on contract by the S~11azi Government). 
Dzeliwe•s announcement did not have an effect as Liqoqo countered it 
by announcing her deposition. After Liqoqo•s announcement there was 
a more serious rift within the Royal Family and oligarchy. Some 
opposed Dzeliwe•s dethronement9 while others supported Liqoqo. 
Prince Gabheni~ Sobhuza•s most trusted son during his lifetime and 
Crown Prince Makhosetive•s mentor~ opposed the deposition. The 
Gabheni faction and the deposed Dzeliwe tried to call a Swazi Nation 
meeting to Lobamba which the Liqoqo faction thwarted by announcing 
over the radio that the meeting was illegal, that it was called by 
contenders to the throne, that Sobhuza • s own sons shou 1 d refrain 
from participation in the present misunderstandings and that anybody 
who attended the meeting would be arrested. Gabheni was physically 
prevented by security forces from entering the Swaziland Radio and 
Television studio where he wanted to make an announcement to counter 
the Liqoqo•s announcement to depose the Regent. He was later 
expelled from Liqoqo (He had been one of the sons of Sobhuza to be 
included in Liqoqo). 
In the meantime Dzeliwe made an application to the High Court 
to contest her deposition. An affidavit signed by a number of 
chiefs, led by Chief Dambuza Lukhele, was filed in the High Court in 
support of Dzeliwe•s application. The Liqoqo reacted by issuing a 
decree - Decree No. 1 of 1983 - signed by the Authorised Person 
which ordered the High Court to dissociate itself from the matter of 
the removal of the Regent on the grounds that this was a matter for 
Swazi law and custom and therefore the High Court had no 
jurisdiction over the matter. In the morning of the day when the 
Court hearing was due, the Regent•s lawyer, Mr. Douglas Lukhele and 
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Arthur Khoza were arrested by the police under the instructions of 
Liqoqo. When the Court convened the Chief Justice 9 Justice Nathan 
announced that he accepted the instructions of the decree and his 
Court would not adjudicate over the matter. 
Liqoqo proceeded to appoint Inkhosikati Ntombi 9 the Crown 
Prince's Mother9 as Regent. This appointment bewildered many Swazis 
because they viewed it as unconstitutional. The constitutional 
convention was that the Crown Prince's mother only becomes Queen 
when her son is crowned. It is only after her son's death, as King 9 
that she can become Queen Regent. Hence Ntombi 's appointment as 
Regent was interpreted by some Swazis as an attempt to sabotage the 
ascendancy of Makhosetive to the throne. 
It was at this stage that the students at the University of 
Swaziland and the Institute of Health Sciences took to the streets 
to demonstrate9 demanding the re-instatement of Dzeliwe and the 
release of the detained Lukhele and Khoza. Their message was that 
Dzeliwe's deposition was unconstitutional and could only be 
interpreted as a coup. However 9 not many Swazis were involved in 
these power struggles. It was mainly the Royal Family and the 
oligarchy of Princes9 senior chiefs and Cabinet Ministers who were 
involved. The masses in general suffered as witnessed by police and 
army road~blocks 9 body searches and from the growing tension that 
was building up in the country. Some foreign investors panicked and 
started transferring funds to the homelands in South Africa. Liqoqo 
tried hard to assure the investors that all was well. But investors 
were not easily convinced. This was due to the fact that the unrest 
did not stop. Liqoqo stepped up the detention strategy. For 
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instance~ Princes Sulumlomo and Thunduluka were detained under the 
same order which included Prince Gabheni. But the police were not 
prepared to touch Gabheni. As a result he remained outside prison 
for the rest of the period of the power struggles although he was 
the strongest opponent of Liqoqo. The arrests continued and by the 
end of 1983 about 20 people were serving under the 60··day detention 
order. In 1984 top pol'ice officers Anthony Dlamini and Sotsha 
Dlamini (who was appointed Prime Minister by King Mswati III in 
1986) were sacked. 
In 1983 elections were conducted under the Tinkhundla system. 
Except for 3 names all the Cabinet Ministers were new faces. This 
was obviously calculated by Liqoqo to get their own men and remove 
the oid stock which might have absorbed Mabandla's policies. In the 
same year (1983) Liqoqo pushed the notorious Sedition and Subversive 
Activities (amendment) Bill to Parliament. In essence the bill 
provided for the establishment of a tribunal to hear cases of 
sedition and subversive nature; the accused before the tribunal 
might not be represented by a lawyer; and the maximum sentence was 
20 years or a fine of E20~000 9 or both (Ironically the perpetrators 
of this law, viz. Mfanasibili, Maseko, Bhekimpi were sentenced to 15 
years, together with 4 others in March 1988 under the same law. The 
details of the case are provided below). The intention was to use 
the Act against their opponents but they hardly succeeded in 
convicting anyone. 
In spite of the fact that Liqoqo tried to get their men in the 
Cabinet, they were not capable of controlling it in toto. There 
were individuals in the Cabinet who did not feel they could be 
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directed by liqoqo. Prominent amongst these was Mr. Simon Sishayi 
Nxumalo ~ a former Cabinet Minister from the time of Independence up 
to 1979~ Sobhuza's Roving Ambassador from 1979 till Sobhuza's death 
in 1982, the mastermind of Tibiyo businesses since 1968 and its 
Managing Director by the time he was taken out of Tibiyo by Liqoqo 
in February 1984 after having been given the portfolio of Minister 
of Finance in Government. Nxumalo had held Cabinet posts while at 
the same time he managed Tibiyo businesses. He liked political 
appointments but his most important power base was the running of 
Tibiyo. He did not like his removal from this capital base for 
power. On the other side, Liqoqo's strategy to remove him was for 
the purpose of getting control of this most important domestic 
capital. So Nxumalo was intent to hit back at Liqoqo- some of its 
members were his old political rivals, anyway. As Minister of 
Finance Nxumalo publicly attacked corruption in public offices; for 
instance, he attributed the collapse of the Swaziland Chemical 
Industries (SCI) company, liquidated in 1984, to the corruption on 
the part of one of its directors who was Swazi, but now holding a 
high political position. It was inferred that this accusation was 
directed to Dr. George Msibi, one of the powerful members of Liqoqo, 
who had been the only Swazi on the Board of Directors of SCI. 
When Nxumalo was busy attacking corruption, Prince Mfanasibili, 
by this time he had earned himself the code name of "L iqoqo 
strongman", revealed that he had confronted a "Gang of Four" at the 
Regent's Royal Residence at Phondo who were attempting to wrest 
executive power from the Monarch. This revelation was followed by 
the decision by Liqoqo to give Prince Dumisa, a former NNLC leader 
and veteran opponent of the traditionalists who had lived an exile 
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life since 1967~ an option of either going to self .. exile or.ce more 
or of serving 60··day detentions. Dumisa chose the former and was 
escorted by the security po 1 ice to Ma tsapha Airport to fly back to 
Britain where he lives. But there was no proof of the coup 
attempts. (Mfanasibili 1 s alleged coup attempts have never been 
proven). 
The power struggles continued between L iqoqo and the Nxumal o 
faction. The Nxumalo faction, which incidentally included Prince 
Dumisa and Princess Mnengwase (Sobhuza•s sister and the only woman 
member of Liqoqo)~ prevailed temporarily in the face of Regent 
Ntonbi. She agreed to a proposal to announce the removal of Prince 
Mfanasibili and Dr. George Msibi from Liqoqo. The Press was 
summoned at Lobamba and the Governor of Lobamba, Mr. Vusumuzi 
Bhembe, flanked by Mr. Titus Ms i bi, Commissioner of Po 1 ice, and 
Colonel Mangomeni Ndzimandze, Army Chief, announced the decision to 
sack the 2 Liqoqo men. But within a few hours the Regent denied it. 
The explanation for this situation by informed sources was that the 
Mfanasibili faction had learned about the Regent•s decision 
promptly; they rushed to her and convinced her, either by persuasion 
or coercion, that she should reverse the decision. The 11 Times of 
Swaziland (5 June 1984) carried the Regent•s message which said it 
was a misunderstanding to say she had sacked the Liqoqo men. 
On 8 June 1984, 11 The Times 11 carried the news of the dismissal 
of S.S. Nxumalo, Richard Velaphi Dlanini {Minister of Foreign 
Affairs) Titus Msibi and Mangomeni Ndzimandze from their posts. The 
reason given was that the 4 had forced the Queen Regent Ntombi to 
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dismiss the 2 Liqoqo gurus. If she refused, so it was alleged, the 
4 had said the Regent would face a bloody revolution. During the 
press announcement to sack the 4 9 one L i qoqo member 9 Mr. Abednego 
Kuseni Hlophe, boasted : 11 lf you try to undo Liqoqo, Liqoqo will 
undo you 11 • 
Even after the sackings Nxumalo continued his attack on 
corruption. He revealed a customs fraud by a company where 
Mfanasibili was one of the shareholders. This company illegally 
avoided payment of import duties. The fraud infuriated the other 
members of the Southern Africa Customs Union (SACU - South Africa 9 
Botswana and Lesotho). South Africa demanded a full explanation. 
Nxumalo went ahead to reveal that some Liqoqo members were receiving 
double salaries. Dr. Msibi denied the allegations and threatened 
that 11 heads will roll 11 • He and Robert Mabila 9 Liqoqo Secretary, 
made counter charges in the form of fraud against Nxumalo. 
By this time L iqoqo itself was sharply divided into various 
factions. In August 1984 9 a letter was despatched to the Authorised 
Person, Prince Sozisa9 which suspended him from Liqoqo and banned 
him from entering the Royal Residences at Lobamba and Phondo (home 
of the Queen Regent). Charges against the Authorised Person were 
that (a) he had issued instructions to the armed forces in June 1984 
to overthrow legally constituted authority, (b) he had attempted to 
usurp power of signature from Queen Regent Ntombi and (c) he had 
signed a letter saying Ntombi 1 s appointment as Regent was illegal. 
As usual the allegations were never proved; but the significance of 
the expulsion of the Authorised Person is that it shows, once more, 
that the power struggles were not necessarily the struggle between 
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forces of modernity and those of traditionalism. Neither was the 
struggle signifying the royal faction vis~a~vis the commoner 
faction. The struggle was that of filling the power vacuum left by 
Sobhuza. The constitutional set up was incapable of sustaining a 
smooth political continuity. The constitutional arrangement was 
flawed. It had been so during Sobhuza•s rule; the only difference 
was that he had been in a position to fill this constitutional 
handicap due to his authoritarian populism and his skilful ability 
to communicate to the people. 
The division within Liqoqo itself was conspicuous by the 
disappearance in public addresses of most of the members. Out of 
the now ±12 members, about only 5 maintained a constant appearance. 
These were strongman Mfanasibili, Dr. George Msibi, Chief 
Mfanawenkhosi Maseko, Prince Tsekwane (not so prominent) and Mr. 
A.K. Hleophe (but he later retreated). These worked closely with 
Prime Minister Prince Bhekimpi and Mr. Mhambi, Mnisi, Foreign 
Minister who replaced R.V. Dlamini in June 1984. Mnisi was 
Sobhuza•s liaison officer. Within the Liqoqo, power was wielded by 
the triumvirate of Mfanasibili - Msibi - Maseko. 
Arrests of opponents continued unabated and the list included 
the sacked S.S. Nxumalo (former Minister of Finance), T. Msibi 
(former Commissioner of Police), Edgar Hillary (former Deputy Police 
Commissioner), Colonel Mangomeni Ndzimandze (former Army Chief), 
Major Barnabas Dlamini (former Army Chief of Logistics). They were 
charged under the Sedition and Subversive Activies (amendment) Act 
1983. When they appeared in Court they were granted bail, but as 
140 
soon as they came out of the courtroom 9 they were picked up and 
detained under the 60-day detention order. They were in a no win 
situation. 
The arrests and detentions included some princes (includ·ing 
Sobhuza•s sonsL their relatives and their wives (including 
Gabheni's wife). But the role of Liqoqog or rather the triumvirates 
was gradually facing a growing opposition from the Royal Family and 
the oligarchy. Some of the princes and princesses who had supported 
Liqoqo when they sacked Prince Mabandla (P.M.) and Queen Regent 
Dzeliwes had changed their minds by the end of 1984. Prince Gabheni 
maintained his constant contact with Crown Prince Makhosetive in 
Britain. On his occasional visits to Swaziland9 Makhosetive 
consulted with the deposed Dzeliwe and word went around that he 
regarded her as the rightful Queen Regent 9 not his mothers Ntombi. 
The triumvirate decided to withdraw Gabheni • s passport to prevent 
him from travelling to Britain. But as long as he was outside 
prison, Gabheni represented a force of opposition, he was an 
inspiration to the members of the Royal Family to resist Liqoqo. 
Early in 1985 Sobhuza•s widows registered their opposition to the 
rule of Liqoqo with the Prime Minister 9 Prince Bhekimpi. They 
marched to the Houses of Parliament to see him. In Swaziland that 
gathering was illegal 9 but the widows told Bhekimpi he could arrest 
them if he wanted to - they were prepared for it. 
The escalating power struggles precipitated the decision by the 
Royal establishment to install Crown Prince Makhosetive as soon as 
possible. By the second half of 1985 it had been decided to crown 
him early in 1986. The decision to crown Makhosetive was made by 
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the Gabheni faction with the support of the forces opposed to the 
Mfanasibili faction. This showed that the Gabheni faction had 
already gained an upper hand in the power struggles. In any case, 
the Mfanasibili faction could not openly oppose the coronation for 
fear of antagonising even those who still supported them within the 
Royal Family, amongst the Chiefs and the oligarchy. (It was, of 
course, widely rumoured amongst many ·in the country that the 
Mfanasibili faction intended to (i) turn the country into a Republic 
with Mfanasibili as President and (ii) that ultimately Mfanasibili 
would declare the country an Empire and crown himself an Emperor -
the same style former Emperor Bokassa of Central Africa crowned 
himself in the 1960s). After having decided to instal Makhosetive 
the Gabheni faction, under pressure from Makhosetive, decided to 
oust Mfanasibili and George Msibi from Liqoqo, and Majaji Simelane, 
the Police Commissioner appointed by Liqoqo after having removed 
Titus Msibi in June 1984. These 3 gentlemen were dismissed in 
October 1985 and the Gabheni facti on sent Prime Minister Prince 
Bhekimpi, who was appointed by the Liqoqo, to announce this. When 
people heard the news there was jubilation and dancing in the 
streets of Mbabane. In December 1985 the detainees by Liqoqo were 
released. Prince Mfanasibili and Majaji Simelane were soon arrested 
and charged with perjury. They were later convicted. Mfanasibili 
was sentenced to 7 years imprisonment and Simelane received 5 years. 
Dr. Msibi disappeared from Swaziland while he was being 
investigated. 
Makhosetive was crowned in April 1986 as King Mswati III. In a 
move to purge the Swazi Administration of the elements who had 
earned themselves a bad name during the power struggles, a decision 
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was made to sack some more personnel at the top. Liqoqo was 
dissolved and the Prime Minister9 Prince Bhekimpi 9 was sacked in 
October 1986. It was alleged that Bhekimpi9 was frustrating young 
Mswati's Commission which was conducting an inquiry into the 
activities of the former Liqoqo. He had also ordered the police to 
release Dr. George Msibi and Mr. Robert Mabila's passports which had 
been confiscated under Mswati's orders. Hence Msibi managed to 
disappear from Swaziland easily. The dismissal of Bhekimpi was a 
humiliating experience as it was done during the meeting of the 
Ministers of Agriculture of the Southern African Development 
Coordination (SADCC) countries in Mbabane. The Ministers were later 
invited to the Royal Residence at Ludzidzini to get an explanation. 
The former Assistant Commissioner of Police who had been sacked by 
Liqoqo and Bhekimpi9 Mr. Sotsha Dlamini was appointed Prime 
Minister. 
In mid 1987 11 princes and dignatories were arrested and 
charged9 together with Prince Mfanasibili who was already serving 7 
years for perjury, with high treason ( 2 charges) under the 1983 
Sedition and Subversives (Amendment) Act. The 12 are: Prince 
Mfanasibili (former Liqoqo strongman), Prince Phiwokwakhe 
(Sobhuza's son and former Health Minister in the 1983-1987 
Government), Prince Bhekimpi (former P.M. 1983-1986) Princess Tfobhi 
(Sobhuza's daughter), Chief Mfanawe-nkhosi Maseko (former Liqoqo 
member, previously Sobhuza • s bodyguard with rank of Superintendent 
of Police, and Deputy lndvuna Yetinkhundla), Councillor Khalalempi 
Mndzebele (former Governor of Mahlanya Royal Residence), Princess 
Mnengwase (Sobhuza's sister and the only woman member of the defunct 
Liqoqo), Robert Mabila (Secretary of the defunct Liqoqo), Prince 
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Mahlaba (Sobhuza's son)~ Prince Dabede (WWII veteran and one of the 
senior princes in the royal establishment)~ Chief Masenjana 
Nsibandze (member of the defunct Liqoqo) and Prince Lusekwane (one 
of the senior princes). Only 2 {Prince Mahlaba and Phiwol<wakhe) 
were acquitted when the case t:Jas finalised in March 1988. Seven 
were each sentenced to 15 years imprisonment for the deposition of 
Queen Regent Dzeliwe in 1983~ and the remaining 3 were sentenced to 
8 years9 5 years and 3 years. Prince Mfanasibili was accused No. 1 
in this case. He got 15 years to add to the 7 years for perjury. 
The trial was conducted by a tribunal chaired by Chief Justice, 
Justice Nicholas Hannah (a British subject brought to Swaziland 
under the Aid Programme}. The accused were not represented by legal 
practitioners in the Tribunal's court - this was the Monarchy's 
desire as provided by the Sedition and Subversives Act of 1983 
designed by Liqoqo. The Act had been passed by some of the present 
victims to settle a score with their opponents. Unfortunately for 
them the Act was now being used against them. 
On 7 July 1988 King Mswati signed an Order of Release of all 
the convicts of the treason charge in exercise of his prerogative of 
mercy. All but one of the convicts were released on 12 July 1988. 
Former Liqoqo strongman, Prince Mfanasibili9 was the only one who 
was returned to custody. He had to go back to finish the 7 years 
for perjury which is not related to the treason trial although it is 
connected with the power struggles. 
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Implications of the Power Struggles with Regard to ReJ_ati_~i!S with 
Britain and South Africa 
The struggles to fill the power vacuum in Swaziland resulted in 
a certain degree of instability. This instability was a concern for 
businesses that had interests in the country. Because some British 
companies (e.g. Lonrho~ Courtaulds~ Tate & Lyle) and the 
Commonwealth Development Corporation (CDC) have substantial 
investments in Swaziland 9 the British Government was concerned about 
the consequences of the power struggles. According to one British 
Government official 9 53 Britain followed the events very closely 
because the political instability was not conducive to economic 
development. The British Government was not happy with the 
deposition of the Queen Regent Dzeliwe and they were relieved when 
the new King9 Mswati III, was installed. However~ the British 
Government did not want to interfere in the internal affairs of 
Swaziland. 
The British Government concern was political instability which 
would affect the economic interests. The violation of human rights 
(the series of detentions without trial) did not become an issue. 
However, the USA Government and the European Communities (through 
the Italian Ambassador) expressed concern of the detentions without 
trial. In Britain the concern about the violation of human rights 
was mentioned by Amnesty· International and Inter-Parliamentary 
Union. The failure by the Tory Government to express concern over 
the violation of human rights in Swaziland can be compared with 
their policy towards the Kenyan Government. For instance while the 
USA, Swedish and Norwegian Governments expressed concern about 
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detent·ions without trial in Kenya9 Mrs. Margaret Thatcher praised 
Moi •s Government. One British newspaper put it thus : 11 She is 
reported to have assured President Moi that she feels Kenya•s human 
rights record is good~ and that she had faith in the President•s 
assurance that any abuses will be corrected. 1154 
Britain•s non-interference policy seems to have been tarnished 
by the behaviour of their High Commissioner to Swaziland~ Mr. 
Desmond Kerr. During the power struggles Kerr met quite often with 
the then Prime Ministers Prince Mabandla. It is not clear what they 
discussed but when Mabandla was dismissed 9 Liqoqo felt Kerr should 
go as well. They put pressure on the British Government to withdraw 
55 him. He was subsequently replaced. The Swazi authorities• 
feeling was that Kerr was becoming too much involved in the internal 
affairs. An attempt to get Kerr to tell about his departure in 
Swaziland was futile. In his letter of 29 January 1987 he wrote : 
11 I appreciate the importance of your area of research but I am 
afraid that I feel inhibited from discussing these matters freely 
with you because of the need to honour the trust which many people 
placed in me when they spoke to me in confidence. This applies 
particularly to the period after the death of His Majesty King 
Sobhuza which is of especial interest to you ..... 56 The foregoing 
appears to indicate that Kerr did have confidential talks with some 
faction in the power struggles. So the accusation of getting 11 too 
much involved in the internal affairs 11 was not unfounded. But there 
is no evidence to suggest that his involvement affected the 
relations, at State level, between the 2 countries. 
146 
The South African Government was concerned about the 
credibility of the traditional authorities rule which it was 
promoting in the Bantustans. The South African regime had praised 
and approved of Sobhuza's assumption of absolute power in April 
1973. However~ the power struggles of the 1980's rendered the 
credibility of such system of rule doubtful. The struggles showed 
the unsuitability of traditional institutions in 20th century 
societies in Southern Africa. 
But the South African Government did not come out in favour of 
any faction (at least initially) because each one of them wanted to 
be closer to South Africa so that their security could be 
guaranteed. An exception to playing closeness to South Africa was 
Mabandla who was ousted before the struggles became intense. He, 
however, shocked everybody in Swaziland when he left Swaziland to 
live an exile life in South Africa. (Mabandla's policy towards South 
Africa is discussed in detail in chapter 7). The subsequent faction 
displayed overt gestures to win South Africa's favour. For 
instance, the Mfanasibili faction actively arrested and deported ANC 
cadres and their supporters, and also went to the extent of opening 
a "Trade Mission" for South Africa in 1984. On the other hand, the 
Nxumalo faction maintained its close relations with South Africa. 
R.V. Dlamini, then Foreign Minister (dismissed together with 
Nxumalo) was Pik Botha's personal friend and together had been at 
the forefront of the land deal negotiations (Details of the 
relations of post-Sobhuza Swaziland and South Africa are discussed 
in chapter 7). After Sobhuza, South Africa was not sure if it would 
be prudent to hand over Kangwane homeland and the Ngwavuma area to 
Swaziland. South Africa was not certain whether the post-Sobhuza 
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Swazi State would guarantee the degree of security that Sobhuza 
would have done if these chunks of 'land were handed over. lhe power 
struggles confirmed their fears and a few weeks after R.V. Dlamini 
(Pi!< Botha•s personal friend) and S.S. Nxumalo (the darling of big 
business in Swaziland = he had attracted foreign investment when he 
was Minister of Industry9 Mines and Tourism and also boss of Tibiyo) 
were dismissed 9 the South African Government dropped the land deal 
issue and told the Swazi Government that if they wanted those lands 
they should talk to the Kagwane and Kwazulu authorities. The Swazi 
State did not want to stoop that low. 
The South African State became even more concerned when the 
power struggles continued after the installation of King Mswati III. 
A few weeks after the arrest of 11 of the 12 treason tria 1 is ts in 
1987, Pik Botha flew into the country. Word went around that he had 
come as an arbiter to try to persuade the protagonists to solve 
' their problems peacefully. The South African Government had become 
used to working with the Mfanasibili faction. This faction had done 
all they could to wipe out the ANC in Swaziland, it had invited 
South Africa to establish a 11 Trade Mission 11 in the country and Prime 
Minister Bhekimpi had told the Annual Conference of SADCC Council of 
Ministers in January 1985 that there was nothing wrong with 
Swaziland•s policy towards South Africa. Prince Bhekimpi was one of 
the 11 arrested and Mfanasibili was already serving 7 years for 
perjury. 
The South African State had real cause for concern. When the 
South African 11 Trade Mission 11 invited the Swazi Cabinet to the 
celebrations of Republic Day in June 1987, not a single Cabinet 
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Minister turned up. There was a feeling that the new Swazi 
Government was changing the policy towards South Africa. A Gemini 
News Service Swazi correspondent wrote in 1986 that "A British 
diplomatic source here suggested that there were indications that 
the authorities were aware that South Africa 1 s minority government 
was not permanent 9 and that as a result Swaziland was relaxing its 
tough line against the ANC. There have been suggestions that 
Swaziland would like to give the ANC similar status as is accorded 
in Lesothog Mozambique or other countries in Southern Africa." 57 
Later the same correspondent wrote : "A change of attitude to South 
Africa is taking place in Swaziland and missions are expected to be 
despatched to black Africa soon to explain the new policy. Swazis 
have been unhappy at the way their country has recently appeared to 
condone apartheid and even been responsible for the deaths of ANC 
members. Now the new King has changed prime ministers and ... is 
also changing the policies."57 The South African apartheid regime 
was concerned about the seemingly reversal of policy by Swaziland. 
Hence Pik Botha•s visits to try to use a "carrot" to keep Swaziland 
as a client state. If Swaziland did not respond favourable to the 
"carrot", then a "stick" was to be the next alternative (details of 
the South African policy of using "carrot and stick" are provided in 
Chapter 7). 
Summary and Conclusion 
The work presented in this chapter has shown the continuing 
parallel rule in Swaziland as a legacy of the colonial period. The 
main difference between the colonial period and the 
post-independence system of parallel rule was that the Swazi 
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Monarchy was the Head of both the modern (Western) type of 
Government and the traditional system9 whereas during the colonial 
period the former system of Government was headed by the British 
High Commissioner to South Africa9 and later Her Majesty's 
Comissioner 9 while the latter was headed by the Swazi Monarch. 
The argument advanced was that the repeal of the Independence 
Constitution and the subsequent types of rule 9 i.e. Sobhuza•s rule 
by decree and the Tinkhundla based Parliament~ not only entrenched 
parallel rule but also tilted the balance between modern and 
traditional institutions in favour of the latter. The submission 
was that the Tinkhundla system alienated many Swazis, especially the 
educated from participating in the body politic of the country. 
Further, it was submitted that the domination of Sobhuza•s Swaziland 
politics meant that when he died there was no constitutional 
structure to guarantee political stability and continuity; that the 
power struggles that ensued were neither class struggles nor 
struggles between forces of modernity and traditionalism. Rather 
they were struggles to fi 11 the power vacuum created by Sobhuza • s 
death. 
It was observed that due to their economic interests the 
British Government was concerned about the political instability but 
did not interfere in the internal affairs of Swaziland. South 
Africa was naturally disturbed by the power struggles within the 
State with whom they were very friendly and with whom they share 
borders. They too did not interfere in favour of any of the 
contending factions because none of them appeared to be hostile to 
her, at least until the coronation of King Mswati III. This policy 
of the contending factions towards S. Africa confirms the argument 
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that the struggles were not ideological~ they were not a result of 
d·i fferi ng world views; but they were struggles which emanated from 
the bankruptcy of the Swazi political culture which epitomised the 
personality cult of Sobhuza. This brings us to the question of 
where Swaziland is moving~ politically~ after the coron~tion of King 
Mswati III. 
The argument presented above is that the Tinkhundla system and 
the domination of Swazi politics by the Monarchy are not compatible 
with 20th century Swazi society. Sobhuza had managed to maintain 
political stability due to his authoritarian populism in the 
country. He had earned popularity over a long period while dealing 
with the British Colonial Government. He was a living authority of 
the political history of colonial and post-colonial Swaziland. 
Now~ is it logical to expect an 18 year old (at the time of 
Coronation in April 1986) King to fill the power vacuum created by 
the death of his 83 year old (in 1982 when he died) father? Seeing 
that the constitutional structure of Swaziland, as discussed above~ 
is very weak and has so many loop-holes, it seems logical to 
conclude that there is a remote possibility that the young Monarch 
will satisfy this mammoth constitutional task. Writing about 
problems of small states and their need for foreign assistance, a 
study group under the auspices of the David Davies Memorial 
Institute of International Studies observed that: 
11 apart from military and diplomatic 
measures, it becomes apparent that the best 
guarantee against subversion of micro-states, 
from without or within, is the firm 
establishment of democracy and its buttressing 
by economic developmeht. 11 58 
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The study group was cautious about prescribing a particular type of 
democracy for these micro=states but they did indicate the yardstick 
which can be used to determine whether a micro-state has a system 
which is likely to enhance stability. They wrote: 
"Although we do not advance any specific 
political system9 we believe that a state is 
more likely to remain politically stable under a 
system where there is : first~ freedom of speech 
and assembly 9 including some means of voicing 
criticisms of the government 9 whether at public 
meetings 9 or through the media; secondly9 some 
form of democratic process enabling political 
leadership to be changed by peaceful means; 
thirdly 9 respect for human rights ..• "58 
The Tinkhundla system lacks some of these qualities 9 e.g. people are 
not allowed to choose candidates9 there is no freedom of speech and 
assembly 9 no freedom to criticise the Government and there still 
exists detention without trial. There is no indication yet that the 
Swazi State intends to decentralise power from the Monarchy. It 
seems they still believe that kings rule by divine right. This view 
is reflected in the statement read by Mswati's agent9 Mr. Zonke 
Khumalo 9 when he announced the pardon of the 10 ~treason tria 1 
convicts. He is quoted as having said "You must also know that 
Kings~ are God's people and no ordinary human hand should interfere 
with them without seeking God's advice."59 
The first submission in this conclusion is that whilst the 
investments 9 mainly South African and British, have maintained a 
high standard of economic growth in Swaziland, political performance 
has not matched this growth. The replacement of the British 
sponsored Independence Constitution by the Tinkhundla system was not 
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a move to a superior political system suitable to 20th century 
Swaziland. The Independence Constitution might not have been an 
ideal political instrument for Swaziland. But the Tinkhundla system 
was not a better substitute. 
The second submission is that sooner or later the Tinkhundla 
system and the domination of Swazi politics by the Monarchy will 
crumble. The Swazi State may contain the opposition forces within 
the country for some time9 but as political changes continue to take 
place in the Southern Africa region9 i.e. minority regimes being 
defeated 9 the Swazi Monarchy becomes more and more vulnerable. 
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CHAPTER 4 
British Investments in Swaziland : 
Their Socio~Economic and Political Effect 
Introduction 
11 But apart from military and diplomatic measure~ 
it becomes apparent that the best guarantee 
against subversion of micro-states~ from 
without or within is the firm establishment of 
democracy and its buttressing by economic 
development. 11 1 
In the previous chapter it was argued that the Swaziland 
political system is fledgling; that it is not irrational to expect 
it to undergo a transformation. The above quotation suggests the 
importance of economic development of a micro-state 9 amongst other 
measures 9 if it is to sustain stability. The authors feel that 
economic development is necessary to reinforce a properly designed 
political system which goes a long way to satisfy the aspirations of 
the citizens. 
This chapter examines the role played by British investments in 
Swaziland since Independence (investments prior to 1968 were 
discussed in Chapter 2 to lay the background). More often than not9 
British firms are in partnership with other companies who are 
predominantly South African and Swazi. Wherever this partnership 
occurs mention will be made and an analysis done. 
Due to the importance of British investments in Swaziland9 it 
is argued in this chapter that observable socio-economic and 
political effects can be drawn from their study. An examination of 
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these effects is undertaken to determine whether or not they 
(investments) support the polHical system 11 against subvers·ion .•. 
from without or within .•• 112 
The General Investment Policy of the Swazi State 
Since Independence Swaziland has advocated a capitalist road to 
development. The strategy is to let private enterprise flourish 
with the minimum State intervention. Speaking in a ceremony to open 
officially a new factory late in 1987 g King Mswati III reiterated 
this long standing policy of Swaziland. He said: 
11 1 would like to assure all present and 
prospective investors that Swaziland will 
continue to pursue its policy of a free market 
economy in which private ownership and the right 
to make profits on your investment are 
completely guaranteed. We believe that private 
investment must play an important role in our 
national development process. We are convinced 
that Swaziland needs a steady flow of foreign 
capital into the country to help establish 
industrial projects ... in order to expand our 
national economy and to create job opportunities 
for our young citizens. 11 3 
The Swazi State has devised several strategies to attract foreign 
capita 1. The main strategy currently used is the tax incentives. 
Tax incentives come in various formsg including generous allowances 
in calculating taxable income plus a 5 year holiday for new 
manufacturers, an initial allowance for industrial buildings used in 
manufacturing an allowance for costs incurred in erection of houses 
for employees, training (of Swazi citizens) allowances, losses may 
be carried forward indefinitely and set off against income in later 
years~ etc. 
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Another incentive avai"lable to Swaziland firms is the tariff 
protection the State can impose against imports. It can only impose 
this tariff after consultation with the other members of the 
Southern African Customs Union (SACU)~ namely~ Botswana~ Lesotho and 
South Africag the third incentive the country uses is the 11 good 
record" of industrial relations in Swaziland. (However~ th·i s 
allegation is tested below where mention is made of several 
industrial disputes within a few years.) The Swazi authorities 
always portray a good image of a Swazi worker who does not resort to 
strike action, but is docile so that disputes are solved peacefully 
with the employer. In the occasion referred to above9 the young 
Swazi Monarch alleged that "The existence of cordial industrial 
re 1 a ti ons is an important factor in the success of our efforts to 
attr·act foreign capital investment into Swazi1and."4 
Because of 2 basic reasons Swaziland has been compelled to 
adopt strategies for attracting foreign capital. The first one is 
that the country lacks enough domestic capital (including 
technology) to tap and fully utilise the natural resources in order 
to realise "economic growth 9 social justice, self-reliance and 
stability" as its goals. 5 The second reason is that the size of 
Swaziland (a population of less than .7 million (700,000)) does not 
attract big business. The smallness of the country means very 
little economy of scale. This fait accompli is being aggravated by 
the fact that she is submerged between 2 big neighbours - viz. 
Mozambique and South Africa - with the latter being an economic 
giant not only over Swaziland but over the whole Southern African 
region. In view of these basic reasons Swaziland adopted a strategy 
of creating incentives for foreign investments. 
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British Investments 
I An Introduction 
The intention of this chapter is to examine major British 
investments in Swaziland and the socio-economic and political effect 
they have had, domestically and internationally, over the years 
since Independence. The organisation of the work is, first, to give 
a brief description of the extent of investments9 and then to 
examine the effect of these. 
The presumption from which the discussion is founded is that 
due to the extent of British investments in Swaziland9 one can draw 
an observable impact they have had on the nature of Swazi politics 
and economy, and on the latters• relationship with South Africa. 
The British investments examined here are those directly related to 
economic growth, from private investments and the Commonwealth 
Development Corporation (CDC). Although a British Government 
agency, CDC will be treated as a source for investment capita 1 
because they invest in profitable projects, in many cases in 
partnership with private capital. Moreover, CDC has a duty to 
operate commercially in order to pay its way. 6 In addition to CDC 
the following 6 British firms will be discussed : (i) Turner and 
Newall Ltd. 9 (ii) Lonrho, (iii) Tate & Lyle 9 (iv) Courtaulds Ltdq 
(v) Barclays Bank International and (vi) Standard Chartered Bank. 
This is not necessarily an exhaustive list of British firms in 
Swaziland; rather they represent what is by Swazi standards 
substantive individual company investment. For convenience sake the 
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discussion format adopted is based on the nature of economic 
activity performed by these firms rather than follow·ing a company 
profi 1 e format. 
Three points which were raised in Chapter 2 when discussing the 
colonial economy need be reiterated here. They are: 
(a) that large scale British capital investments started in the 
post~War period9 
(b) that these investments stimulated other potential investors 
(mainly from South Africa) to come to Swaziland 9 and 
(c) that despite huge South African investments that ensued, 
British capital still dominated the Swaziland economy at 
Independence in 1968. 
The 5 sectors of the economy where these 6 British firms are 
conspicuous are (i) mining 9 (ii) forestry 9 (iii) the sugar industry, 
(iv) the citrus fruit industry and (v) commercial finance. 
II A Brief Description of the Investments 
(a) The Mining Sector 
The 2 areas of mining in which British capital has been 
significantly involved are Havelock Asbestos Mine and Ngwenya Iron 
Ore Mine. The Havelock Asbestos Mine was opened by Turner and 
Newall in the 1930's. The mine soon became one of the world's 5 
largest asbestos mines and Swaziland's biggest private sector single 
employer, providing 2340 jobs by the 1940's. It also became 
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Government's main source of revenue accounting for about 70 per cent 
of total receipts in the 1940's. 7 The mines importance as an 
overriding source of revenue in the country was curtailed by the 
establishment of agricultural and forestry based industries which 
were started in the 1940's and 1950's. But it still remained one of 
the important sources of revenue for both Government and vJOrkers 
after Independence. For instance9 the export value of asbestos in 
1968 and 1975 was R6,007 ,100* and E*9,269,200 respectively. These 
figures represented 39.2 per cent and 42.8 per cent of the tota 1 
export value of minerals and 15.3 per cent and 7 per cent, 
respectively, of the total value of all exports of the country. In 
1968 the 15.3 per cent value of asbestos was the third largest after 
sugar and iron ore. In 1975 the 7 per cent value was the fourth 
largest after sugar unbleached woodpulp and iron ore earnings. 8 
In 1974 the Havelock Asbestos Mine Ltd. changed its character 
when Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund** acquired 40 per cent shares. The 
* R stands for the South African rand/s which was the sole legal 
tender in Swaziland until 1974 
E stands for Emalangeni (singular- Lilangeni) a Swazi 
currency introduced in 1974 and circulates alongside rands. 
Rl = El 
** Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund was established in 1968 from a Swazi 
royal bank account which had been created out of a certain 
percentage of mineral royalties, which the Colonial Government 
gave to the Swazi Monarch. The Fund has embarked, over years 
since 1968, on establishing large agricultural projects and 
buying shares from big businesses in Swaziland. Tibiyo is 
depicted by the Royal Family as the 11 Fund for the Swazi 
Nation 11 • But contrary to this depiction the Fund is the 
property of the Royal Family, it is not accountable to 
Swaziland Government. The Fund is presently the largest base 
for domestic capital accumulation. 
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company was no longer 100 per cent British owned but was shared in 
the 3:2 ratio of British to Swazi capital. 
For 2 reasons the productivity of the mine started to decline 
in the 1980's after having reached a peak of El9~535 9 100 export 
earnings value in 1983 when it represented 90.2 per cent of total 
mineral earnings and 6 per cent of total exports earnings of the 
country.8 As a result of asbestoisis the market started shrinking; 
asbestos was no longer in high demand in the world market and prices 
dropped causing loss of incentive to mine asbestos. The second 
reason was internal operational problems of the mine. A local paper 
provided the following piece of information : "Asbestos production 
declined for the fifth consecutive year~ by eight per cent from 
25~130 tonnes in 1985 to 23~093 tonnes last year. The decline in 
production is attri butab 1 e to a fa 11 in fibre content of the mined 
ore. Other factors include lease negotiations and the greater depth 
of the mine."9 The paper pointed out that studies were going on to 
identify new ore zones for more profitable production. 
The latest development in the Mine was the withdrawal of Turner 
& New a 11 in the 1 atter half of the 1980 • s. By this time Turner & 
Newall had sold some of its shares to Credo International Asbestos~ 
so that at the time of withdrawal Havelock Asbestos Mine was owned 
as follows : Tibiyo - 40 per cent, Credo - 40 per cent and Turner & 
Newa 11 - 20 per cent. When Turner & New a 11 withdrew they handed 
their shareholding to the "Swazi Nation" as represented by Tibiyo 
without any compensation. 10 Tibiyo were not in a position to fill 
the gap created by the departure of Turner & Newall. So the 
Swaziland Government is presently looking for new investors to fill 
----- -- ----- -------------- - -
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the gap. In the meantime Government has contracted Msauli Asbestos 
Be perk of South Africa to manage the company. At the same time 
Government has guaranteed the company (i.e. Havelock Asbestos Mine) 
a loan of ElO million to keep it going until new investors are 
found. Havelock Asbestos Mine•s liquidity problem has been revealed 
by the lay-off of some of its employees. But the company hopes that 
new ore zones will be found and that new investors will be found. 
The withdrawal of Turner & Newall from Havelock did not mean 
total retreat from Swaziland. They now own Beral Swaznand (PTY) 
Ltd. since 1986. Beral•s prime concern is in manufacturing of 
friction materials for the automotive industry~ viz. heavy-duty brak 
linings for trucks9 buses, motor cars and light-duty motor vehicles. 
Beral represents a considerable part of the Swaziland 
high-technology manufacturing industry. The company was previously 
owned jointly by the Swaziland Government, the West German 
Government and Beral Bremsbelage of West Germany. 
The mining of iron ore at Ngwenya which began in 1964 was made 
possible by a combination of British, South African and Swaziland 
capital. The Swaziland Iron Ore Development Company (SIODC) was 
formed by a combination of capital from Guest9 Keen & Nettlefolds 
(British), Anglo-American (S.A.) and Swaziland Government. 
Anglo-American was the major shareholder and controlled SIODC. 
Yawata and Fugi Iron and Steel Groups of Japan signed a contract to 
purchase the ore. SIODC did the mining but the railway to transport 
the ore from Ngwenya to Lourenco Marques (now Maputo) for shipment 
was financed with loans from CDC (about £4 million) Anglo~American 
(about £1 million) and the South African Mutual Assurance Society 
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(about £4 million). Roberts Construction~ Murray & Stewart 9 and 
Rand Earthworks were all South African firms who constructed the 
railway. 
The importance of the mine continued until the late 1970 1 5 when 
it became no longer profitable to mine the quality of the ore that 
remained. In 1980 the mine ceased operation. For 10 years 
(1966-1975) iron ore was the highest mineral export value. For 
instance~ its export value in 1968 and 1975 was R9~023 9 l00 and 
E11,9439700 respectively. (Compare with R6,007 ,100 and E9 9269 9 200 
for asbestos for the corresponding years.) These figures 
represented 59.5 per cent and 55.2 per cent of the total export 
value of minerals. When the mine closed down in 1980 several 
hundred employees lost jobs and Government had to forego revenue. 
Swaziland was then left with a ho 1 e in the ground and a half 
decommissioned railway. 
(b) The Forestry Industry 
In the late 1940 1 s CDC planted eucalyptus and pine trees for 
commercial purposes in western Swaziland. At the same time 
Anglo-American Corporation established Peak Timbers Ltd. and planted 
timber forests in the north. The combined size of the forestry 
industry in Swaziland gave it the second largest commercial forestry 
acreage in the world with a total area of over 100,000 hectares. 
In the 1950 1 s CDC came together with Courtaulds Ltd. (British) 
to form Usuthu Pulp Company which bui 1t the Usuthu pulp mill to 
process timber into unbleached kraft woodpulp for brown paper and 
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Cdrdboard, Usuthu Pulp also produced mining timber mainly for the 
South African market. Production at Usuthu Pulp Mill started in 
1961. By 1986 Usuthu Pulp Co. was Swaziland's largest single 
company employer and a major export earner . 11 The company boasts 
for 70 million trees in a plantation area of 65 9000 hectares. CDC 
went ahead and founded the Shiselweni Forestry Co. Ltd. in 1968. 
This firm is a wholly-owned subsidiary of CDC and it owns 99091 
hectares of eucalyptus and pine trees. It produces eucalyptus oil 
and timber. 
The ex tent to which the fares try indus try is important to 
Swaziland is revealed by its export earnings. In 1968 9 at 
Independence9 the combined value of wood 9 wood products and 
unbleached pulp was R7,269,000 and this represented 18.5 per cent of 
the total value of exports. In 1975 the figure stood at El8 99ll,OOO 
and this was 14.3 per cent of the total value of exports. Even in 
the 1980's the forestry industry is still an indispensible sector of 
the economy. Its export value in 1984 was E8994769800 (26.9 per 
cent of the total value of exports). This percentage ( 26.9) was 
only surpassed by that of the sugar industry earnings which towered 
at 42.4 per cent of the total export value. 
Unfortunately, with the data at hand it is not possible to 
distinguish the export-earnings attributable to British based firms 
(CDC and Courtaulds) and the South African One (Peak Timbers Ltd.). 
However, looking at the forestry acreage and nature of processing 
(i.e. unbleached pulp) by CDC and Courtaulds it is safe to presume 
that the British capital is the major contributor to export earnings 
in this sector. 
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(c) The Citrus Fruit Sector 
CDC started citrus fruit projects in the 1950•s when the 
Swaziland Irrigation Scheme (SIS) company was formed. SIS also 
started cattle ranching, rice and sugar plantations. The sugar 
industry became the most attractive so that it became the main 
activity although oranges and grapefruit are still grown. 
The fruit industry in Swaziland is one of the most lucrative 
industries of the 198o•s. It has grown since Independence. For 
instance, the export va 1 ue of citrus fruit and canned fruit has 
risen from R2,449,300 in 1968 to E8,048,800 in 1975 and E38,876,600 
in 1984. These figures represent 6.2, 6.0 and 11.7 per cent, 
respectively, of the total export value. 
However, the British capital is not dominant in this sector. 
Most of the plantations are owned by South African based estates and 
White Swazi land titleholders. The only fruit processing factory, 
the Swazi Fruit Canners (PTY) (formerly Libby Swaziland) is owned by 
the South African Zululand Fruit Producers since 1984 when they 
bought 89.54 per cent of the shares from the British based 
subsidiary of Nestle. The other shareholders are the Swaziland 
Government (8.4 per cent) and CDC (2.06 per cent) since 1969 the 
products of the cannery are the most profitable in the fruit 
industry. Hence the growing importance of this sector for the 
Swaziland economy. But British capital participate as junior 
partners in this lucrative industry. Moreover, in 1982 SIS sold 50 
per cent of their shares to Tibuyo Fund. Nevertheless, due to the 
growing importance of the fruit industry is it imperative to mention 
British capital participation in it. 
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(d) The Commercial Finance Sector 
Barclays Bank and Standard Chartered Bank are 2 British 
commercial banks which have dominated the finance sector in 
Swaziland for a long time. Prior to 1965 they/were the only 
commercial banks operating in the country. 
Prior to the inauguration of the Central Bank of Swaziland 
(then known as the Swaziland Monetary Authority) in 1974, Barclays 
Bank acted as the Swaziland Government banker. However, the 
importance of Barclays, together with Standard, has remained because 
of their long experience. Many businessmen operating in Swaziland 
keep their accounts with these banks in Swaziland rather than as in 
the past in South African branches. 
The 2 banks have been moving in step with the changes in 
monetary arrangements between Mbabane and Pretoria. A recent 
example is a response to the decision by the 2 countries to delink 
the Lilangeni from the Rand as from 1 April 1986, which meant 
Swaziland no longer had an obligation to hold a specified Rand 
backing against Emalangeni currency in circulation in the country. 
The corresponding move by Barel ays and Standard was to improve 
foreign exchange services. In the case of Standard Bank they took 
on lease the Reuter's International Monetary Service facility. 
Barclays established Swaziland Foreign Exchange Centre (SWAFEX) 
which also uses Reuter's facility. These moves in effect mean that 
these banks can act as agents for monetary transfers between 
Swaziland and other countries. For instance, the Midland Bank plc 
(British) uses Bare lays Bank as their agent for monetary transfers 
between Britain and Swaziland. 
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The Swaziland Government now has 40 per cent shares in both 
Barclays and Standard. The chairmen of the boards of directors are 
Government appointees. 
By far the most important sector of Swazn and economy is sugar. 
Since Independence it has always been the largest contributor to 
foreign exchange earnings for the country. In 1968 its export value 
was 23 per cent of the total value of exports; in 1975 it surged to 
54.2 per cent and in 1984 the figure stood at 42.4 per cent. The 
sugar industry is the largest private sector employer with a figure 
of 16,000 employees and their families getting health and schooling 
facilities from the industry. In fact Swaziland is the second 
largest sugar producer on mainland Africa (after South Africa). 
The industry•s largest estates are owned or managed by 3 
British firms, namely, Lonrho, CDC and Tate & Lyle. The oldest 
estate is Ubombo Ranches Ltd. which was established in 1949 as an 
irrigated crop and cattle ranching enterprise. It was established 
by the united effort of Dr. H.J. van Eck (South African), Mr. G. 
Loyd (a British Conservative Party M.P.) and Mr. R.P.W. Adeane. The 
planting of sugar cane began in 1957 and the following year a sugar 
mill was operative. In 1968 Lonrho took over the whole of Ubombo 
Ranches Ltd. They were the sole owners until the mide 197o•s when 
Tibiyo Fund purchased 40 per cent of the shares. But Lonrho manages 
the enterprise. 
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There are several individual sugar estates such as Big Bend 
Sugar Estate (owned by the Todd family ~ Carl Todd was leader of the 
White settler community in the 195o•s and 1960 1 s) and Crookes 
Plantations which sell their sugar to the Ubombo Ranches for 
milling. Recently Tibiyo have established Sivunga Estate whose 
sugar cane is sold at Ubombo Ranches. 
In 1950 CDC bought over 100 ~000 acres of 1 and in the north 
eastern part of Swaziland. It then set up a company called 
Swaziland Irrigation Scheme (SIS) which experimented with sugar 
cane~ citrus fruit, potatoes, rice, etc. Sugar cane became their 
main interest. So by 1958 CDC and Sir John Hullet & Sons (South 
African) formed a company called Mhlume Sugar Company (MSC). In 
this company Sir John Hullet & Sons held 60 per cent of the shares 
and CDC had the remainder. MSC acquired 13,000 acres from CDC and 
planted sugar cane. The company also built a sugar mill to process 
the sugar cane. The first crushing season was in 1960. In 1966 CDC 
bought out Hullet & Sons. thus becoming the sole owner of SIS and 
MSC. However~ in 1977 Tibiyo Fund became an ownership partner of 
MSC when they bought 50 per cent shares. In 1982 they acquired 50 
per cent shares at SIS. 
The MSC mi 11 became a purchaser for sugar cane from estates 
which later emerged around the area. One such estate is Tambankulu 
Estate owned by a South African magnate~ who also runs a citrus 
estate and cattle ranching enterprise. The most important and 
problematic individual suppliers to the MSC mill is the Swazi 
farmers of the Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF). More wi 11 be said 
about VIF when examining the socio-economic and political effects of 
British investments. 
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CDC has a wide range of investments in Swaziland. In the 
forestry industry they have shares in the Usuthu Pulp Co. Ltd. and 
they are the sole owners of Shiselweni Forestry Co. Ltd. They have 
shares in the Swaziland Fruit Canners (Pty) Ltd.~ in Neopac 
(Swaziland) - a South Africa controlled firm. Their other interests 
are in the National Textile Corporation of Swaziland Ltd. (a company 
controlled by a South African tycoon~ Natie Kirsh~ who has wide 
range of business interests in Swazi land)~ in the Royal Swazi land 
Sugar Corporation Ltd. (RSSC) - popularly known as Simunye - which 
has 9 shareholders. CDC also has 14 per cent shares in the Langa 
National Brickworks (Pty) Ltd. - a company established in the 1980 1 s 
with the help of London Brick Engineering Ltd.~ but Tibiyo has a 
majority shareholding (46 per cent). On their SIS land CDC 
established Mananga Agricultural Management Centre in 1972. The 
Centre offers post experience management courses for 
agriculturalists and others concerned with natural resources 
projects in developing countries. The intake is from all over the 
world but most of the participants come from Southern Africa. 
The third large estate of the sugar industry in the country is 
the Royal Swaziland Sugar Corporation Ltd. (RSSC), popularly known 
as Simunye (meaning that 11 We are one 11 or 11 We are united 11 )~ which was 
established in the late 1970 1 s. The following are the shareholders 
: (1) Government of Swaziland (32.4 per cent), (2) Tibiyo (32.4 per 
cent), (3) Federal Government of Nigeria (10 per cent), (4) Tate & 
Lyle (8.7 per cent), (5) DEG- German Finance Co. for Investments in 
Developing Countries (5 per cent), (6) Coca-Cola Export Corporation 
(4.2 per cent), (7) Mitsui and Co. Ltd. (3.8 per cent), (8) CDC (2.5 
per cent) and (9) International Finance Corporation (1 per cent). 
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To help establish Simunye the Swaziland Government and several firms 
advanced 1 oans to the company. The Swazi 1 and Government provided 
E29 million~ Tibiyo - E20 million~ CDC - E3 million~ DEG - E2.1 
million~ International Finance Corporation = E7 million 9 European 
Investment Bank ElO million~ Industrial Development 
Corporation/Credit Guarantee Insurance Co. (South African) - E20.5 
million and Barclays Bank/ECGC (British) - E6.6 million. Because 
RSSC was established by the combination of many different national 
funds King Sobhuza named it Simunye. Simunye is a classical example 
of Swaziland•s move towards diversification of dependence rather 
than the limited dependence on British and South African capital. 
Tate & Lyle Engineering is a dominant partner at Simunye in 
that they conducted the feasibility study of the project and they 
are presently managing the Corporation, which gives them greater 
involvement than their shareholding suggests. 
Simunye grows and processes their own sugar cane. The idea of 
RSSC came when the sugar boom was at its peak in the early 1970 1 s. 
The Swaziland Government foresaw a chance of riding on '1king sugar" 
to realise optimum economic growth. But in the late 197o•s and in 
the 1980 1 s the sugar prices at global level have suffered 
stagnation. Big markets like the U.S.A. have developed high 
fructose corn sugar (isoglucose) from maize and may not need 
imported sugar in the near future. The European Communities• (EC) 
Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) has resulted in huge surplus of 
sugar in the EC. This surplus is being dumped in the world market 
which leads to the suppression and even decline of world sugar 
prices. 
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Both U.S. and Britain are important markets for Swazi sugar. 
As with the U.S.9 the British market for imported sugar is 
shrinking. For instance9 Tate & Lyle9 the only refiner of cane 
sugar in Britain9 closed their refinery in Liverpool in 1981. If 
the US and British sugar markets continue to shrink 9 Swaziland's 3 
sugar mills may soon become white elephants. 
Apart from providing management for Simunye 9 Tate & Lyle 
Engineering has conducted feasibility studies for irrigation schemes 
under the Usuthu and Ngwavuma Rivers. The studies are aimed at 
placing Swazi peasants so that they can be engaged in profitable 
agriculture. The recommendations were compiled in a document called 
Reconnaissance Study : Usuthu and Ngwavuma River Bas ins 9 and were 
submitted to the Swaziland Government and Tibiyo at the end of 1982. 
The basic recommendation are that smallhold areas be delineated 
whereby families will be placed and supplied with irrigation water 
by a constituted Authority. The main crops recommended are cotton 9 
maize and vegetables9 during the summer season. The winter crops 
should be wheat, dried beans and vegetables. 12 
No action has been taken by the Government or Tibiyo on this 
project and no reason has been given for the impasse. 
Tate & Lyle have been involved in many other projects in 
Swaziland as consultants and project managers. They have been 
consultants of Mpaka Brickworks, and project managers of 
Hotel/Casino construction, Swaziland National Textile Plant9 various 
office, factory and block of flats buildings. Tate & Lyle 
Engineering feel they have a long future in Swaziland, as the 
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manager (Mbabane) K. Hopkins' correspondence indicates: "L~e have 
progressed with SIJ'Jazi 1 and over the past ten years and it is our 
sincere wish that we continue to help develop this wonderful 
country. Therefore, we see our Swazi 1 and office as being 
13 permanent.'' In their work of consultation and project management~ 
Tate & Lyle Engineering draw the expertise and manpmver from the 
International Tate & Lyle Group. So most of the highly qualified 
personnel are not part of the team based in their Office in Mbabane. 
The Office in Mbabane has only 1 Briton who is the Manager, 5 Swazis 
(an Architect/Construction Supervisor 9 a Secretary, and Office 
Clerk/Driver9 a Receptionist and a Messenger) and 1 Swazi Resident 
(?) 14 who is the Engineer. From the foregoing 9 Tate & Lyle can be 
seen as a non-resident multinational in Swaziland, not in the sense 
that firms like CDC and Lonrho can be categorised. 
The VIF Scheme 
The Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF) scheme was inaugurated in 
1962 by CDC. CDC had wanted to involve some Swazi peasants in some 
of CDC's projects. Hence the establishment of VIF as an outgrowers 
scheme in CDC's sugar industry. The first 30 Swazi settlers were 
placed in 1963 on CDC land. 
Placement, Terms of Contract and Organisation of VIF 
CDC set aside land in delineated plots of several acres (today 
the range is 8 to 16 acres) to be occupied by Swazi families. 
Candidates were to be Swazi men of good health and character. They 
must have shown high enthusiasm in farming at their places of abode. 
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The man should preferably be married so that he could live with the 
family to help him with labour on the plot. CDC preferred Swazis 
who were not well-off and non-professionals - the rationale behind 
this being that the well-off and professionals could look after 
themselves. 
The actual selection of individuals involved the cooperation of 
the chief under whom he resided. The recommendation of th Chief 
went to the District Commissioner and the Swazi National Council 
(SNC). The DC sent the list~ after screening, to the headquarters 
in Mbabane. Both the Ministry of Agriculture and SNC made the final 
recommendations to CDC who made the final choice. Later there was 
also a number of vacancies ( 2 or 3) to be fi 11 ed by the Swazi 
Monarch's selection. 
The basic terms of the contract and the organization of the 
scheme were as follows: 
(i) CDC owned the land and the settlers were tenants; 
(ii) on at least 70 per cent of the land~ the outgrower 
farmers had to plant sugar cane. On the remaining land 
they grow crops like potatoes, cotton, vegetables, fruits; 
(iii) All the sugar cane grown on the land must be sold to MSC -
a wholly owned subsidiary of CDC; 
(iv) the leasehold might not be assigned to another person 
without the prior consent of VIF management; 
(v) the leasehold was for an initial period of 20 years and 
was renewable; 
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(vi) farmers had to adopt certain standards of agricultural 
practice; if any farmer failed to live up to this 
standardg CDC (VIF management) could evict him; and 
(vii) VIF management was provided by CDC. This management 
provided certain services to the farmers, viz. land 
clearing and preparationg ploughing and planting 9 weeding 9 
cane cuttingg insecticide 9 water supplies and haulage to 
the MSC mill. The initial arrangement was that VIF would 
deduct all expenses incurred at the end of the harvesting 
seasong except those related to land clearing and 
preparation which would be recovered over several years. 
If farmers needed the above enumerated services in 
subsequent years VIF would accept their application and 
deduct the expenses at the end of the season. 
The scheme operated under this arrangement until 1982 when CDC 
handed over the scheme to the "Swazi Nation" while they (CDC) 
remained managers under contract. By the time CDC withdrew there 
were 263 settlers. The initial plan was to place 415 farmers by 
1978. 
Prior to the hand-over to the "Swazi Nation 11 VIF already had 
problems, but when the transfer was being implemented the problems 
became complex and acute, so much so that 14 farmers were evicted in 
1986 and another 2 in 1987. It is to this socio-political 
implications of VIF that the discussion now focusses. 
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The Social Problems of VIF 
The socio-political dimension of the scheme reflect interaction 
between the farmers and CDC, the farmers and the Swazi State~ and 
the Swazi State and CDC. This tripartite interaction will be 
discussed simultaneously because it usually occurs at the same time 
and is therefore inseparable. 
Although considered a success by both CDC and the Swazi 
State, 15 VIF has had some social and political problems for years. 
Some of these "problems" may be imaginary, i.e. they are just in the 
minds of the parties concerned, but as long as the parties think. 
they exist 9 then the imaginary problems are bound to affect the 
operation of the scheme. 
CDC feel the scheme could have been more successful if the 
farmers were more organized. They say the indication of an 
unorganized farming community is the failure by farmers to form a 
cooperative to help them in marketing of cotton9 potatoes, 
vegetab 1 es, rna i ze and fruit products. Due to 1 ac k of cooperation 
the farmers 1 costs of transport to buyers is high and the farmers 
place the blame on CDC when they do not reach a break~even point. 16 
The feeling among CDC management is that some farmers, especially 
the poor ones, are 1 azy. These farmers a 1 so b 1 arne CDC for their 
poverty. CDC management also regretted the fact that some farmers 
repatriate their income to extended families where they originally 
came from 9 instead of ploughing the money into the farms for 
improvements or more profits. Management 1 s view was that these 
problems were largely responsible for CDC 1 s inability to recover all 
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the in·i·Ual capital for land cleadng and preparation. Lastly CDC 
felt that the Swazi State•s occasional intervention is sometimes 
irrational, for instance, when they stop an eviction process, or 
when they reinstate the evicted farmers. 
On the other hand, the farmers problems with VIF are (i) that 
they pay VIF for the haulage of sugar cane as per weight of the cane 
whereas the farmer• s cane sugar is bought, at the mill, at a per 
sucrose tonnage; this means, the farmers reckon, they pay even for 
the waste that is not going into the sucrose; (ii) the farmers feel 
that the yearly increment of haulage charges is not fair because 
this might not be the case with the sucrose price as this price is 
largely determined by the world market; (iii) they feel that the 
handling charge of fertilizers, insecticide9 hand tools, etc. at 17 
per cent is too high; (iv) the system of deducting all advances of 
the season at once, i.e. at the end of the harvest season, is not 
fair since it sometimes leaves farmers without working capital; (v) 
they complain that some plots are too small (range is from 8 to 16 
acres) and that some plots are not on good arable land; and (vi) 
they think it is unfair to charge them a flat charge rate for costs 
of water distribution system on top of the charge for quantity used; 
they feel that the charge for the distribution system should be 
commensurate with the quantity used. 
Against this background of problems based on contractual and 
operational terms lie the major political ones. As has been stated 
above VIF was established during the colonial period. It was seen 
by the farmers as a colonial establishment for colonial 
exploitation. So when Independence came they expected some changes 
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~ even if VIF was not taken over by a Swazi institution 9 they 
expected the terms of the contract to improve. This attitude 
towards VIF was made worse by the fact that they are on a leashold ·· 
a new phenomenon to the Swazi way of 1 ife. At Independence the 
farmers expected this leasehold to cease. A summary of the attitude 
of the VIF farmers is found in the former general manager 1 s report 
where he wrote9 inter alia9 that: 
11 The legal complexities associated with the 
1 easing of freeho 1 d 1 and to sma 11-ho 1 ders have 
already been considered and mention has been 
made of the shortcomings in the present 1 ega 1 
provisions for controlling settlers ... it no 
longer seems sensible to leave the regulation 
and control of land settlement and farming 
practice in private hands without the support of 
government statutory regulations and authority. 
Also the leasing of land, although progressive 
and entirely beneficial in modern terms, is 
still regarded with mistrust by the majority of 
settlers because the provisions of the leases 
are beyond their experience and the private 
landlord principle is strongly associated with 
colonial exploitation. 11 17 
This feeling of colonial exploitation was implicit in the interview 
the author of this Thesis had with some of the evicted farmers. 18 
They alleged that CDC owed them some money and that this should have 
been paid to them before CDC withdrew in 1982. When asked how CDC 
came to owe them this money (E33 million was the figure quoted), 
they retorted that how can one work for more than 20 years on a 
leasehold like VIF and then at the end he is told that he has not 
saved a single cent. 
Therefore both CDC and the farmers were 1 i vi ng on different 
planes : the former feeling that some farmers were not working hard 
enough to make the scheme a success, whereas the latter felt VIF was 
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exploiting them. It was felt by VIF management that due to the 
farmers attitude 9 the farmers, once estab 1 i shed strove to escape 
from domination of CDC 9 which they saw as the continuation of the 
political struggle for independence. In view of these political 
problems, Mr. Tuckett suggested that 11 the transfer of full control 
over VIF to a central statutory government authority is the right 
step.ul9 
The process of transfer ended in 1982 when CDC withdrew from 
VIF. There are a few Other developments in the operation of CDC at 
SIS and MSC which need mentioning because they are directly 
connected with VIF. At MSC Tibiyo Fund acquired 50 per cent shares 
in 1977 with a loan of E6.25 million from CDC. When VIF transfer 
negotiations were conducted, Swazi rulers offered to buy 50 per cent 
shares at SIS. They also negotiated for the transfer of land 
ownership from CDC to Swaziland. CDC agreed to both proposals, so 
that when they withdrew from VIF9 CDC land (SIS, VIF and MSC) 
belonged to the 11 Swazi Nation 11 and Tibiyo had 50 per cent shares in 
both SIS (at a loan of £10.5 million from CDC) and MSC. 
The decision was made by the Swazi authorities to turn VIF land 
into a Swazi Nation Land (SNL).* A committee was to be set up to 
* There are basically 2 types of 1 and tenure in Swaz i1 and. ( i ) 
There is SNL tenure whereby the land is held by the Monarch in 
trust for the Swazi Nation. On this land families are 
allocated land for home building and ploughing. Grazing is 
done communally. No family has a title deed over the land. 
(ii) There is private ownership of land whereby individuals 
have title deed. This dates back to the period of land 
concessions (discussed in Chapter 2). The majority of private 
owners are White Swazis and absentee landlords (either British 
or South Africans). 
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oversee the operation of the scheme while CDC was requested to 
provide management for 5 years. Tibiyo Fund personnel were highly 
involved in these negotiations. When the decisions were 
communicated to the farmers 9 the latter objected to the land 
becoming SNL The political implications of VIF falling under SNL 
were that the scheme would be controlled by Chiefs or a Chief. 
There was fear that Chiefs would use this land control power to 
exercise leverage on the farmers; there was also the feeling that 
SNL tenure was not viable for commercial farming. For instance, how 
can one commit his capital for land improvement when he had no 
security over the land? Some farmers thought they should be given 
title deed over the land while others (and these were the ones who 
could not foresee the Swazi State giving them title deed) felt the 
land should revert to the Swaziland Government and the scheme would 
be in better hands with the Ministry of Agriculture than with the 
so-called Swazi Nation. 
Another major complaint by some farmers, (most of them were 
those settled in the 1960 1 s) was that CDC should not withdraw before 
settling their debt with the farmers. The debt was quoted to be E33 
million, although it was not made clear how CDC accumulated this 
debt. CDC denies that she owes farmers any money. 
When the farmers objected to the scheme being turned into SNL, 
Sobhuza decided to suspend the decision with the intention of 
reviewing it. It was during this period of suspension that the 
Monarch died. As has been stated in Chapter 3, after Sobhuza•s 
death there was a prolonged period of instability due to the power 
struggles. The Mfanasibili faction of Liqoqo decided that Tibiyo 
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Fund should control the scheme. They then decided to form a Tibiyo 
corporation by the name of Swaziland National Agricultural 
Corporation (PTY) Ltd. (SNADC) to run the scheme. They used threats 
to get farmers sign a new contract with SNADC~ while at the same 
time maintaining that the land would revert to SNL tenure. The 
majority of farmers signed the new leasehold. Others refused. 
Amongst those who refused there were farmers who had their original 
20 year lease expired. These were eventually evicted in 1986 
following a court order issued after CDC management had instituted a 
court action. The evicted farmers stayed on an open veld for more 
than a year awaiting final ruling by the Swazi Monarch to whom they 
had appealed. In October 1987 they were reinstated. No doubt this 
decision angered CDC management who had said they do not want the 
Swazi State to intervene on beha 1f of the evicted farmers. The 
latest news is that their dispute with CDC management is 
t . . 20 con 1nu1ng. Once again~ the farmers are refusing to pay 
management for the services offered because they still claim CDC 
owes them money. The General Manager of Tibiyo is quoted as having 
said 11 We have failed to solve this. We just don't know what to do 
- 21 
about these farmers. 11 
The gist of the matter is that the Swazi authorities are trying 
to get control over the farmers who have managed to be highly 
independent of the Swazi traditional institutuions. When the 
farmers join VIF they escape from the control of chiefs, they become 
economically detached from SNL. Hence the Swazi authorities 
decision to revert VIF to SNL tenure and their use of Tibiyo Fund -
a Royal economic power base - to control the scheme. The Monarchy 
did not even want the Ministry of Agriculture to run the scheme. 
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Socio-Political Effects of British Investments 
The discussion in this section will centre on the effects of 
British investments9 together with their partners 9 on (i) the 
socio~political system of S\IJaziland and (ii) Swaziland's economic 
relations with South Africa. In the examination of both (i) and 
(ii) the following points will be raised: 
1. the effects of VIF scheme and the attitude of VIF farmers 
towards the Swazi leadership; 
2. the changes employment has made to Swazi workers' political 
outlook; 
3. investments as a source for Government revenue and how the 
existence of Tibiyo is a hindrance to this process; and 
4. an analysis will be undertaken to establish whether or not 
British investments have been enhancing closer Swaziland-South 
Africa economic relations and with what political consequences. 
One British scholar observed the consequences of an emergent 
Swazi capitalist class in the following words: 
"The growth of Swazi i nvo 1 vement in the modern 
sector must create a new class of managers and 
capitalists. Where these are not drawn from9 
and identified with the traditional leadership, 
they will constitute a threat to the traditional 
system, yet if they are drawn from the 
traditional elite 9 the distance between them and 
the common people will tend to increase, and the 
old relationship of mutual trust may 
disappear."22 
The Swazi State fear of the farmers' attitude towards the Swazi 
leadership is not unfounded. In 1972, the Mphumalanga constituency9 
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where VIF is~ voted for 3 NNLC candidates. One of the 3 NNLC MP's~ 
Mr. Thomas Bhekindlela Ngwenya9 was a VIF farmer. So the farmers 9 
together with employees of SIS, MSC and VIFg displayed support for 
modern political parties. In other words 9 the effects of British 
investments~ together with other modern investmentsg are to 
undermine the political leadership of the Swazi traditional elite. 
Workers permanently employed in modern industries are semi~detached 
from the chieftainship institutions. In Swaziland almost every 
peasant homestead has at least one of their members who earns a 
livelihood, and supports his familyg from paid employment in modern 
industries. 
The extent to which the forces of modernity are challenging the 
legitimacy of Swazi tradtional institutions are relfected in various 
occurrences. The workers' strikes of the 1970's and 1980's indicate 
this. The Swazi Monarch and rulers are against industrial strikes. 
They have labelled strikes as "un-Swazi". This is what they have 
been telling workers since the early 1960's. Hence the Swazi 
State's decision to discourage formation of trades unions in the 
country. (They were eventua 11 y forced to 1 et them mushroom in the 
1980's due to a series of strikes.) The Swazi Monarch also provides 
his representative - Ndabazabantu - in major industries for the 
purpose of solving disputes among workers and between workers and 
management. However, during the 1963 Havelock Mine strike the 
workers called for the dismissal of Ndabazabantu and this was a 
challenge from the commoners the Swazi Monarch had never experienced 
before. 
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Between 1977 and 1983 there were about 8 serious industria 1 
disputes/strikes. When the Ndabazantu~ Indlana ye Nkhundla and 
Labour officials intervened in some of the disputes~ they were 
either told off or threatened with violence. Hence the 
establishment of the industrial institutions (including the 
Industrial Court) in 1980 to settle industrial disputes or to 
provide machinery for negotiat·ion between employers and employees. 
The giving in of the Swazi rulers to the modern industrial 
machinery is a sign of the erosion of the Swazi Monarch•s power to 
control workers. The illusion that he could shout instructions at 
workers from Lobamba Royal Residence had been shattered. The 
general submission made here is that while British investments~ as 
well as other investments, provide a sound economic base for 
Swaziland~ the Swazi people engaged in this modern economic activity 
have become partially disengaged from the traditional political 
economy institutions. They have displayed this by voting NNLC in 
1972. These investments act as a catalyst, albeit indirectly and 
probably unconsciously or even unwillingly, for the undermining of 
traditional government in the country. 
The investments are also a source of revenue for modern 
government in Mbabane. The sugar, forestry and fruit industries are 
very important sources of foreign exchange, as has been stated 
above. Not only has British investments been an important source of 
revenue, they have a 1 so offered shares to the Swazi Roy a 1 Family 
Fund - the Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund. In Havelock Asbestos Mine, 
Tibiyo bought 40 per cent shares from Turner & Newa 11, at Ubombo 
Ranches they bought 40 per cent of the shares from Lonrho, 50 per 
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cent was acquired at MSC and another 50 per cent purchased at SIS. 
In these major industries of Swaziland the Swazi Royal Family is in 
partnership-with British capital. (N.B. -Turner & Newall withdrew 
from Havelock in mid-80 1 s). In this partnership British firms 
manage the enterprises. 
The partnership between foreign investments and Tibiyo is 
resented by some Swaziland Government officials~ especially the 
technocrats. In fact they are critical about the status of Tibiyo 
in general because the Fund is exempt from paying tax. So when the 
Fund buys shares in the major industries the Government loses some 
revenue. And when the Fund establishes projects using some of the 
important resources of the country~ Government is denied that 
revenue which would normally accrue to it if some other cpaital had 
been involved. The Government is also denied revenue from mineral 
taxation in that this accrues to Tibiyo. 
Tibiyo have also been criticised by Government technocrats for 
impinging upon budgetary allocations by requiring the Government to 
finance operating losses, often without prior appropriation or 
notification to Cabinet or Parliament. In the Fourth National 
Development Plan not less than 4 critical references are made to 
Tibiyo Fund and parastatals. In one such reference the technocrats 
observed that: 
11 parastatals and the National Trust Funds 
have tax exemption status as they fall outside 
the Companies Act. Over the Plan period there 
has been a substantial growth in the number of 
parastatals and Tibiyo Taka Ngwane Fund has been 
involved in a substantial expansion programme. 
In many incidences these expansions have been at 
the expense of the private sector and therefore, 
at the expense of actual and potential 
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government revenue , , , Mi nera 1 tax~ wh·i ch is a 
conventional source of government revenue in 
most countries, ·is the property of the Swazi 
Nation (Tibiyo) and therefore, is not part of 
the Government's fiscal measures nor of 
government revenue. "23 
It is unusual to hear civil servants criticise the property of the 
Monarch in Swaziland. But the frustration of technocrats by Tibiyo's 
unaccounted for monopoly of resources and unplanned demands to be 
bailed out by Government, and the malfunctioning of some parastatals 
must have made it irresistible for them to write in this way. Also 
the period of commissioning of the Development Plan, i.e. it was 
prepared at the beginning of the 1980's after former Prime Minister, 
Prince Mabandla has subpoenaed Tibiyo files, meant that they had 
permission to be as objective, and therefore critical, as possible. 
The central argument here is that while foreign capital enjoy 
the climate of the conservative Swazi State and invite the Royal 
Family to partnership, many officials of the Swaziland Government in 
Mbabane regard this alliance as not particularly holy because this 
means -Government has to forego -revenue that waul d have accrued to it 
if Tibiyo were not involved. The Swazi Monarch might have foreseen 
this potential conflict when he decided to involve some Government 
Ministers in Tibiyo. For instance, Mr. S.S. Nxumalo was given the 
responsibility of running Tibiyo when he was Cabinet Minister. 
Prime Ministers were eventually appointed Chairmen of Board of 
Directors of the Fund (this include Prince Mabandla who was regarded 
as hostile to traditionalism). The strategy was, presumably, to 
bridge the rift. 
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British ·investments have had 2 seemingly contradictory effects 
in as far as the domination of Swaziland•s economy by South African 
capital is concerned. We observed in Chapter 2 how the CDC 
investments stimulated other firms - both British and South African 
~ to come to Swaziland. South Afr·ican capital prospered in the 
forestry9 citrus fruit and sugar industries and later started new 
manufacturing industries (.e.g. cotton ginning 9 meat processing 9 
maize milling9 etc.) prior to Independence. However 9 at 
Independence British investments were still the largest foreign 
investment. But in as far as this British investment was a 
stimulant to South African capital 9 it acted as an agent for 
bringing closer economic relations between Mbabane and Pretoria. 
Conversely 9 another line of argument can be advanced. It can be 
argued that the continued existence of British investment in 
Swaziland operates as a check-mate against South African capital•s 
total domination of the Swaziland economy. No doubt 9 South African 
capital has increased substantially in Swaziland after 1968 (more 
detailed discussion is in Chapter 6) to surpass that of Britain - in 
fact South African capital has expanded since the late 196o•s in the 
whole Southern African region. But the existence of British 
capital 9 as well as other foreign capitals, deny it (South African 
capital) the single domination of Swaziland•s economy and the 
political price Mbabane would have to pay e.g. blackmail. The 
non-South African investments in Swaziland have prevented the 
relegation of the economic status of Swaziland 5 and the resultant 
political control, to that of the South African homelands. 
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The contents of this chapter have shown the extent of British 
investments in Swaziland after 1968. In the major industrial 
sectors - sugar~ forestry~ fruit9 mining and commercial finance = 
British Capital have played a key role although the South African 
capital have successfully challenged it in mining and fruit 
industries. It was argued that British capital 9 as well as other 
foreign capitals9 have provided a base for economic growth for 
Swaziland. One conclusion that can be drawn from this continued 
British investments is that there are closer economic relations 
between the 2 countries than is the case with po-litical links. 
Chapter 3 revealed how the Independence Constitution was repealed 
and a new political system introduced, although this did not mean 
that there was total departure from the inherited institutions. The 
policies of the Swazi rulers have9 on the whole 9 not contradicted 
the interests of British firms. Hence continued investments. 
It was argued in this Chapter that while British investments 
have buttressed political and social reproduction in Swaziland, they 
have a 1 so acted as a base for forces of opposition to the Swazi 
traditional rulers. For instance9 the Mphumalanga voters supported 
NNLC in the 1972 general elections. The display of NNLC support 
triggered the repeal of the Independence Constitution and the 
subsequent political changes discussed in the previous chapter. So 
far the rulers have succeeded in keeping in check these opposition 
forces. 
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More than 2 decades ago one academic observed~ with respect to 
the power of the traditional rulers in Swaziland9 that 
"The fragmentary nature of the nationalist 
opposition to the dominant conservative chiefly 
element9 allied with a majority of the white 
group~ has inevitably complicated Swaziland•s 
constitutional progress nationalist 
prospects may improve as the territory makes 
economic progress and tribal inhibitions break 
down under the pressure of an industrial 
environment. 11 24 
While the traditional power base is still strong, there is evidence 
of its erosion. As yet it would not be prudent to predict a date 
for major political changes 9 but there is no doubt that opposition 
forces to rule by the traditional elite are being manufactured daily 
in industries and classrooms. 
The observation made with regard to Swazi 1 and-South African 
relations was that first of all the British capital stimulated 
investments from South Africa9 and» secondly» that the continued 
investments from Britain have protected Swaziland from being 
relegated to the economic status of South Africa • s hamel ands whose 
only major 11 foreign 11 source of investment is South Africa. This 
strong British-Swaziland economic link is confirmed by trade between 
the 2 countries 9 which is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 5 
Trade Between Swaziland and Britain 
Introduction 
In the previous chapter it was noted that Swaziland's strong 
economic links with Britain was confirmed by the volume of trade 
between the two countries. The volume of trade stimulated by 
British investments (which began in the late 1940's) in new products 
such as sugar, citrus fruit, timber, pulp, etc. meant Swaziland 
needed new markets in addition to the traditional South African 
market which was serving mainly the interests of the White settler 
community in commodities like tobacco, cotton and live animals. 
Prior to the 1950's South Africa was almost the sole source of 
Swaziland imports as well. 
In this chapter it is argued that Britain remains a major 
destination of Swaziland exports even after about 2 decades of 
Independence; that this link was marginally disturbed by Britain's 
joining the European Communities (EC) in 1973. However, South 
Africa remains the only major source of Swaziland imports. It is 
further maintained that the continued British investments, and other 
sources of capital investments, resulted in Swaziland aggressively 
seeking to utilise the South African market within the Southern 
African Customs Union (SACU) context, and that, reciprocally, South 
African firms have located in Swaziland within the SACU regime so 
that they could gain access to other market not normally available 
to Pretoria (at least not under the same concessions as the 
Swaziland products), namely the EC market. It is strongly contended 
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that Swaziland 1 s economic stability depends to a large extent on the 
availabi.lity of markets for her products. This argument concurs 
with the assertion that 
11 Micro-states in the process of development tend 
to be very much more dependent on international 
trade than larger ones. The scope for creating 
an internal market of a size large enough to 
benef·i t from economies of sea 1 e is obviously 
limited. Costs would be higher if they 
attempted to be self=sufficient and meet 
domestic requirements internally; they 
therefore need to export to achieve scale 
economies. 11 1 
In examining the above themes the discussion will focus on: 
(i) trade between Swaziland and Britain after Independence but 
prior to British membership of EC; 
(ii) Britain 1 s joining the EC9 the emergence of the Lome 
Conventions and their effects on trade between Britain and 
Swaziland; 
(iii) a comparison of Swaziland 1 S trade figures with Britain and 
South Africa will permeate the discussion; 
(iv) South Africa 1 s use of Swaziland as a base in order to have 
access to outside markets 9 with particular reference to EC 
and its facilities; and 
(v) South Africa 1 s sabotage of some Swaziland industries. 
Trade before British Membership to EC 
At Independence Britain bought 29.3% of Swaziland 1 s exports and 
in 1973 9 when Britain joined the EC, Britain took 23.6% of the 
exports. (Figures for exports for the period 1968-1984 are provided 
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in Table 2). lhese percentages register the importance of the 
British Market to Swaziland products. The main product sold to 
Britain during this period were cane sugar (semi=processed by CDC 
and Lonrho in Swaziland)~ asbestos ore (produced by Turner & 
Newa 11) 9 frozen and canned meat (processed by the Swaz·j 1 and Meat 
Commission = a South African owned firmL and citrus and canned 
fruit (produced by CDC9 individually owned estates and Libby 
Swaziland = a subsidiary of the British branch of Nestle). On the 
other hand 9 the South African market took 16.4% of Swaziland's 
exports in 1968 and 25.6% in 1973 - more than 23.6% share. This was 
the first time since Independence that South Africa bought goods 
worth more than the British market absorbed. However 9 the South 
African percentage dropped to 14.5% in 1974 while the British figure 
was 21.3%. The British market percentage remained higher than the 
South African one up to 1980 when the South African percentage rose 
to 29.6% 9 beating the British which stood at 20.2%. Since 1980 the 
South African market takes goods valued higher than those that go to 
the British market. 
An important point to observe is that the combined British and 
South African markets are crucial for Swaziland. Since 1968 the 2 
markets have been taking Swazi exports valued more than 40% of the 
total value - the exception was 1974 when the 2 absorbed only 35.8% 
of the total value. In 1968 the 2 markets absorbed 45.7%, in 1973 
the figure was 40.0% and in 1984 they took goods valued at 55.2% of 
the total value of exports. 
In contrast Britain is much less important in terms of goods it 
supplies to Swaziland. The percentage share of British goods in the 
Swaziland market was so insignificant that it was not shown by 
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Swaziland official records~ viz. the Swaziland Government Annua 1 
Statistical Bulletins. Instead the British figures were included in 
the "Other Countries" column until 1981 (see Table 3). The degree 
of significance of the British market as source of Swaziland imports 
can be seen by examining the figures of Swaziland imports from South 
Africa. For the 15 years after Independence (1968·-1984/5~ excluding 
1971 and 1976) the average percentage supply of South African goods 
is 91.0% of the total value of imports. The percentage has been 
below 90% in only 3 years - 1981 ~ 1982/83 and 1983/84. In 1968 
South Africa's supplies were valued at 91.2%, in 1973 the figure was 
92.1% and in 1977 it reached a record of 95.9%. 
These figures show a disturbing dependence on the South African 
market for imports. While this is not the case with exports, the 
import supply makes Swaziland vulnerable to changes that may obtain 
in the South African market. The sanctions debate is going on and 
if they were to be comprehensively applied Swaziland would suffer 
before she re-adjusted her trade pattern. For instance, 100% of 
Swaziland's fuel comes from South Africa, although most of 
Pretoria's oil is imported. 
Despite the establishment of the Southern African Co-ordination 
Conference (SAOCC) in 1980 (one of its objectives being to lessen 
dependence of its member-states on South Africa) and inspite of the 
creation of the Preferential Trade Area for Eastern and Southern 
Africa (PTA) in June 1982, Swaziland still depends on South Africa 
for more than 80% of her imports. Swazi 1 and is a member of both 
SAOCC and PTA. This trade pattern may continue in the foreseeable 
future for several reasons. The first is that none of the SAOCC and 
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PTA member-states can replace the South African market 9 viz. the 
supply of capital goods such as industrial machinery 9 spare parts 
thereof and foodstuffs. Zimbabwe•s manufacturing industries cannot 
satisfy the SADCC and PTA requirements~ neither can her agricultural 
sector satisfy the needs of these markets. (Zimbabwe is the only 
country in the 2 groupings which normally produces excess grain that 
can be exported). Secondly 9 it is not easy to change from 
traditional markets. South Africa has been the major source of 
imports for the Swaziland Governments and firms since the turn of 
the century. The third point is that there is a belief within the 
Mbabane Government circles that South Africa is their best option 
for imports; they feel that even countries like Hong Kong 9 Taiwan 
or South Korea cannot be the best option since the freight charges 
would render the goods more expensive than in the neighbour•s 
market9 and that it would take longer to get the goods to Swaziland 
- this may be at the expense of production in a case of spare parts 
for industrial machinery that has broken down. 2 Howeverg this does 
not mean that there is consensus on this trade policy. Some 
officials moot the view that more diversification is necessary 
~ -
because sanctions on South Africa cannot be ruled out. 3 But the 
official Government policy has been opposition to comprehensive 
economic sanctions and Pretoria (this point is discussed in detail 
in Chapter 7). 
The dominance of South Africa as supplier of Swaziland import 
needs overs had ow the importance of any other su pp 1 i er 9 inc 1 udi ng 
Britain. For instance in 1982/83 the U.S.A. was the second largest 
supplier (6.5% of total value) and Britain ranked third9 with only 
3.2%. In 1983/84 the U.S.A. percentage was 7.0% while the British 
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was 2.3% and finally in 1984/85 Britain moved to second position 
with 2.1% wh"ile the U.S.A. took third place scoring 0.26% of the 
total import value. The main imports from Britain have been 
machinery for making or finishing cellulose pulp~ paper or 
paperboard; medicinal and pharmaceutical products; machinery for 
various industries; and iron and steel. 
Trade Under the Lome Conventions 
In January 1972 Britain, together with Denmark~ Ireland and 
Norway (the latter withdrew in September the same year), signed the 
Treaty of Accession and in January 1973 the 3 joined the European 
Communities (EC) whose membership was increased from 6 (Belgium, 
France, Italy, Luxembourg, the Netherlands and West Germany) to 9. 
Britain•s membership of the EC meant there would be significant 
structural changes in her economic relations with other countries. 
These changes would be clearly marked in the trade relations within 
the Commonwea 1 th ~ which had trade preference arrangements 
including the Commonwealth Sugar Agreement (CSA) established in 
1951. The special links Britain had with her empire were congruous 
with the French links with her empire and for colonies~ for which 
she made special arrangements in the Yaounde Conventions when the EC 
was inaugurated in 1958. 
While the view of Westminster was, at the time they decided to 
join the EC~ that their major interests lay within the EC rather 
than outside it 9 there were concerns about the fate of the least 
developed countries of the Commonwealth; there was also the concern 
for the interests of British firms which had capital investments in 
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these countries and whose products were processed and sold in 
Britain. Hence they negotiated for a special arrangemernt 5 with 
particular reference to trade, for the poor countries of the 
Commonwealth. The position taken by Britain was supported by 
France. In addition to these imperial concerns there was the 
co~ordinated call for the New International Economic Order (NIEO) 
which started in the 1960's whereby the Group of 77 met and decided 
to channel NIEO through the United Nations. By 1972 the United 
Nations Conference on Trade and Development (UNCTAD) had met at 
least 3 times to deliberate on the problems of the under~developed 
countries. The gist of NIEO is the call for better terms of trade 
for the under-developed regions of the world. 
The Lome Conventions' existence can be seen against this 
historical background. The first Lome Convention, signed on 28 
February 1975, brought 46 (now 66) African, Caribben and Pacific 
(ACP) countries together in a special relationship with 9 European 
countries. The Lome Conventions cover areas of co-operation, 
namely, trade, agriculture, industry, finance, technical 
co-operation, the establishment of commodities earnings 
stabilisation system (commonly known as STABEX) and the promotion of 
the mining system (SYSMIN) in the ACP. 
Since the focus of this chapter is on trade the other areas are 
generally not discussed 5 unless they impinge or influence trade. 
The central argument here is that despite the existence of the 
EC-ACP agreements, trade between Swaziland and Britain has not been 
significantly altered. In other words, Britain has remained the 
traditional market for Swazi exports, albeit within the larger EC 
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market; that there is no tangible evidence to suggest that EC 
market has significantly opened up for Swazi exports by virtue of 
having been influenced by the Lome regimes. 
The main objective of trade co=operation is spelt out in 
Article 129 of the ACP··EEC Convention~ signed at Lome. The 
provision of the Article read: 
"In the field of trade co~operation 9 the object 
of this Convention is to promote trade between 
the ACP States and the Community 9 taking account 
of their respective levels of development 9 and 
also between the ACP States themselves. 
In the pursuit of this objective 9 particular 
regard shall be had to securing effective 
additional advantages for the ACP States• trade 
with the Community and to improving the 
conditions of access for their products to the 
market in order to accelerate the growth of 
their exports to the Community and to ensure a 
better balance in the trade of the Contracting 
Parties."4 
In pursuit of this objective the EC States agreed to import products 
from ACP free of customs duties and charges having equivalent 
effect. However9 this agreement was qualified by the proviso on the 
products falling within the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) of the 
EC. In order to maintain security of supplies, amongst other 
things 9 the EC established the CAP which had the effect of creating 
a unified market for agricultural products by setting a common price 
for these products. A preference sys tern for these products was 
created and they were protected from outside competition by 
subjecting imports to levies in order to ensure that these imports 
did not undercut EC prices. A system of support to the farmers was 
made available through the Agricultural Guarantee and Guidance Fund 
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(FEOGA) which~ inter alia~ is used to purchase surplus products of 
the EC farmers. 
Some of the important Swazi products sold in Britain fall under 
the CAP regime. These are cane sugar and beef products. It has 
already been stated that sugar and beef are some of the 1 eadi ng 
foreign exchange earners in the British market. The fact that the 
EC market was already saturated with (beet) sugar and beef meant 
there was no natura 1 rna rket for these products. The so 1 uti on was to 
design quota allocations applicable to ACP States. The quota system 
operates on guaranteed prices and duty free entry into the EC. 
A major commodity which operates under the quota system is cane 
sugar. Severai ACP States' economies are highiy dependent on cane 
sugar. For instance in 1974-1976 sugar accounted 83% of Mauritius 
export earnings~ 61.3% in the case of Fiji~ 43.3% for Guyana and 
41.3% in Swaziland's case5 (it was 42.4% in 1984). When the first 
lome Convention was signed the Sugar Protocol was promulgated which 
allocated quotas to the main ACP producers -viz. Mauritius, Fiji, 
Guyana~ Jamaica, Swaziland~ Barbados, Tanzania, Belize and others. 
This also meant that 11 quantities delivered by the ACP provide 
European refiners with a guarantee that they can continue with their 
activities. 116 The largest refiner of cane sugar in Europe is Tate & 
lyle in Britain where most of ACP sugar finds its way. All 
Swaziland's cane sugar quota in the EC goes to Britain since there 
is no natural market for it in the other member-states• markets. 
There is no evidence to suggest that EC-ACP Conventions have 
opened up new markets for Swazi products. Within the EC market 
sugar and beef still find their market only in Britain. Granted~ 
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there are several commodities which Swaziland sells to West Germany~ 
France~ Belgium~ Denmark9 Italy~ the Netherlands~ Greece and 
Ireland. These are asbestos~ citrus fruit9 canned fruit and 
unbleached wood pulp. But these products were being sold in these 
countries prior to the creation of the Lome regimes. So it can be 
argued that the existence of the EC market for Swazi commodities was 
not necessarily created by Lome. An important point to note is that 
the main exchange earner - sugar ~ is regulated under the quota 
system. The central argument is that due to EC policies 9 especially 
CAP9 there is no natural market for the most important foreign 
exchange earner in the EC. Therefore Britain remains the 
traditional market for many of Swaziland's agricultural products 9 
under the quota system of the Lome Conventions. In other words 
trade promotion has not been realised. Even at global level 
Swaziland has tended to maintain the same trading partners since 
Independence. At Independence she was trading with ± 50 states and 
this was the position in 1984. The only thing that has changed is a 
slight diversification of her products to her traditional markets. 
There has also been an increase in the traditional products9 e.g. 
sugar and canned fruit. 
The British sugar market is not totally safe. The EC has a 
surplus of sugar which it exports at a subsidised price9 thus 
contributing to depressing the price at global level. The sugar 
surplus in EC means a shrinking market for cane sugar. Tate & Lyle 
had to close down their cane sugar refinery at Liverpool in 1981 
because it had become uncompetitive. In spite of the closure of the 
Liverpool refinery~ Tate & Lyle still found it uncompetitive to 
refine cane sugar and has indicated that they seriously consider 
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closing their refineries at Silverton on the Thames and at Greenock 
in Scotland~ which would mean a loss of more than 2g000 jobs. They 
complained about the EC processing cost margins which discriminate 
against cane sugar. They recommended that 11 the Government should by 
negotiation with the other member states of the Community make every 
endeavour to ensure that the cane refining margin is increased and 
put on a basis that allows Tate & Lyle to compete effectively with 
the sugar refined from beeto 117 The final outcome was a subsidy by 
the EC Commission to Tate & Lyle for the year 1 July 1988 to 30 June 
1989 which could be worth more than £3 million.8 This huge subsidy 
tells the story of an unsafe market for cane sugar in the EC. The 
fact that now the EC market can hardly absorb the ACP sugar quota is 
confirmed by Ec•s re-exporting of 1 million tonnes of Lome sugar 
ever year. The existing Sugar Protocol provides for about 1.3 
million tonnes per year as quota for the ACP. 
Swaziland as a Base for South African Firms 
It has already been stated that the capital investments by 
British firms in the late 1940 1 s and throughout the 195o•s 
stimulated South African firms to invest in Swaziland. It was 
further pointed out that the investments for various commodities -
sugar, citrus fruit, timberg minerals (asbestos, iron ore and coal), 
beef, etc. - led to the diversification of the export market for 
Swaziland. Previously South Africa had been the sole market for 2 
of Swaziland•s major export products, viz. cotton and live animals. 
The only other major export was asbestos and was the only one which 
was sold in several countries outside SACU. It was further stated 
that South African investments in Swaziland now surpass British -
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this is practically seen in its dominance of the mining sector~ the 
fruit industry, the cotton industry, the retail sector, the beef 
industry, tourist industry and several manufacturing and commercial 
industries in the country. This dominance of South African capital 
in the Swaziland economy, which is ·largely export-oriented, means 
that South African companies have access to markets which would not 
be normally available to them due to the boycott of South African 
goods by some countries, mainly African States. For instance, 
Gencor has a cantrall ing interest in the mining of coal at Mpaka. 
Kenya is the major buyer of Swaziland coal, but she would not 
purchase coal from South Africa, at least not openly. 
South African firms based in Swaziland also have access to the 
EC market. In general under the Lome Conventions, Swaziland goods 
enter the EC duty free. Citrus fruit, canned fruit and beef are 
controlled by South African companies and enter duty free in the EC 
market - in the case of beef, under the quota allocation. The fruit 
industry in Swaziland is 90% controlled by Anglo-American 
subsidiaries and the meat processing firm was wholly owned by the 
Swaziland Meat Commission (a South African finn) up to the 1970 1 S 
when Tibiyo acquired 50% shares. Out of the total value of 
E38,876,600 citrus and canned fruit exported, E35,525,500 worthy of 
fruit was sold in the EC in 1984. In the same year Swaziland 
exported frozen and canned meat to the world market valued at 
E3,274,700. Unfortunately, the Swaziland statistics (Swaziland 
Annual Statistical Bulletin) do not show the EC share, they only 
indicate the British share which is valued at E756,500. Another 
example of a break-through for a South African firm into the EC is 
Swazi Pine which produces furniture. Swazi Pine specialises in the 
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production of dining room tables and chairs~ kitchen units~ beds~ 
refectory tables9 breakfast nooks9 cupboards~ box benches and room 
dividers9 most of which are exported. In 1985 the value of 
furniture and parts thereof exported to Britain was £869 9 000. 9 
Under the Lome Conventions South African firms based in 
Swaziland have benefitted from commodities earning stabilisation 
system (STABEX), Under STABEX certain products of ACP states 
receive compensation for loss of earnings if the State concerned was 
not directly responsible for the loss of earnings. For instance, if 
Swaziland's timber earnings were substantially lower than the 
average earnings for the past 4 years due to unpredictable fire 
hazards or to a fall in prices, STABEX would pay compensation. This 
STABEX arrangement applies generally to selected products sold in 
the EC and ACP markets. Swaziland products covered by STABEX are 
timber and hides. 
However, a special arrangement was made for 13 ACP countries to 
bring some products under STABEX even though they are sold outside 
EC-ACP markets. Swaziland was one of the 13 and the product 
concerned is cotton. The only cotton ginnery in Swaziland, the 
Swaziland Cotona Cotton Ginnery 9 is South African owned, Since the 
firm can claim loss of earnings from STABEX, South African 
purchasers can depress prices without inflicting damage on their 
brother in Swaziland. Swaziland has in the past claimed for loss of 
earnings. So "South Africa manipulates and the EEC compensates."10 
Therefore 9 SACU has been advantageous to the South African 
firms in that they can locate in any member-state and use markets 
and facilities not normally available to them in South Africa. This 
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advantage is now being considered~ and has been taken 9 by some 
Western transnational corporations who move their regional 
headquarters from the Rand to one of the 3 SACU members in order to 
stave off boycotts of their products? as the call for disinvestment 
intensifies. For instance 9 in the latter half of the 1980's Coca 
Cola (U.S.A.) decided to move her regional headquarters from South 
Africa to Swaziland in order to supply all African States south of 
the Equator without a South African stigma. 
The SACU advantages for South Africa are theoretically equally 
available to Botswana 9 Lesotho and Swaziland (BLS) 9 i.e. the free 
movement of capita 1 and benefits from the 1 arger South African 
market for their products. In real life this is not the case, 
especially where BLS goods tend to compete effectively with South 
African products. The asymmetry is revealed by trade statistics 
which show that more than 85% of BLS imports come from South African 
while less than 25% of their exports go there. 11 
Swaziland is the only BLS State which has used SACU for her 
exports to make the common market appear a success. But Pretoria 
soon intervened and sabotaged the industries so that it is only a 
partial success. In the 1970's and early 1980's several foreign 
firms set up businesses in Swaziland with the view of selling in the 
Rand market as opened up by SACU. A Taiwanese firm es tab 1 i shed 
Swazi Metalware to sell the ware in South Africa, a Finnish finn 
established Salora in 1976 to assemble TV sets for sale mainly in 
South Africa. The Taiwanese firm was later lured to Bophuthatswana 
by Pretoria's incentives used in pursuit of her decentralization 
policy which is intended to promote bantustanism. In the case of 
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Salora South Africa simply did not open up the market and the Finish 
firm was forced to sell the factory to a South African company which 
turned Salora into Swaziland Television and Radio (STVR). But STVR 
also closed down in 1984. 
Other companies in Swaziland which tried the South African 
market were Swazi Carpets which manufactured rugs in the style of 
Persian carpets ~ the firm closed down in 1983; there is the YKK 
(Japan)~ which makes zip fasteners ~ still operating; the Swazi 
Scene9 which engaged in the production and export of ladies outfits 
- went to one of the bantustans; and the Swaziland Chemical 
Industries (SCI). This mushrooming of manufacturing industries in 
the 1970's and early 1980's raised the share of Swaziland exports to 
South Africa from 20% to 37%. This percentage rise largely explains 
the high percentage intake by South Africa of Swazi exports compared 
with Britain for the period late 1970's up to 1984 (see Table 2). 
For instance 9 in 1983 SCI's fertilizer export sales (all to South 
Africa) had accounted for 13% of Swaziland exports9 making it the 
second after sugar 9 and ahead of canned fruit and wood pulp. 
Ironically within a year SCI went into receivership and was doomed 
to liquidation. 
The fate of SCI was not decided in its boardroom in Mbabane but 
was decided in South Africa. SCI "was put out of business by a 
b. . f 1 t d ., u 12 . 'd com 1nat1on o monopo y9 governmen 9 an ra1 way pressure 1ns1 e 
South Africa. SCI was established in 1975 by Messrs. Hill9 Haln and 
Hanhill of South Africa. Previously they owned Sable Chemical 
Industry in Rhodesia. Ian Smith declared it an essential industry 
during the intensification of sanctions and of armed struggle and 
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his government bought it. These South Africans then established SCI 
and concentrated on produc-ing fertilizers and exp 1 os i ves out of 
imported ammonia from outside SACU. The Swaziland Government 
allowed SCI to get the raw materials duty-free and this meant SCI 
products were cheaper than those produced by S. African firms. 
SCI • s 1 argest market was South Africa. Therefore there was an 
immediate conflict of interests as SCI undercut fertilizer prices in 
the Rand. Pretoria was persuaded to act. 
A combination of measures by Pretoria, its firms and South 
Africa•s parastatals ~ the South African Road Transportation Board 
and the South African Railways - dug SCI 1 s grave. A traditional 
supplier of fertilizer in Swaziland was Farm Chemicals owned by 
Natie Kirsh {a South African magnate) but Farm Chemicals was also 
affiliated to Triomph and Fedmics - 2 South African fertilizer 
giants. When SCI was established Farm Chemicals reduced the price 
of fertilizer in Swaziland and the firm was backed by the 2 Goliaths 
in South Africa, who themselves enjoyed high prices in their country 
because the fertilizer industry was protected there. The result was 
to outprice SCI in Swaziland. But SCI still had the advantage of 
the South African market. In 1978 the South African Road 
Transportation Board refused to transport SCI fertilizer to South 
Africa whereas the South African Railways service was only willing 
to take SCI fertilizer within a specific radius from Matsapha where 
SCI factory was situated. This meant that SCI fertilizer could not 
reach all South African destinations without the firm incurring 
higher transport costs and thus forcing them to increase their 
price. 
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In 1982 Pretoria entered the scene. In that year SASOL started 
producing fertilizer~ thereby increasing the supply of fertilizer in 
South Africa and decreasing the demand. The following year Pretoria 
allowed her companies to import fertilizer inputs from outside SACU 
duty~free so that they could reduce their prices. The final result 
was to outprice SCI in both Swaziland and South Africa. By 1983 SCI 
was in debt and in 1984 it was being liquidated because it had 
accummulated a debt of E35 million. The major creditors were 
Barclays Bank (E22 million)~ Standard Bank (E9 million) and the 
National Industrial Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS) - a 
parastatal (E2 million). The credit advanced to SCI was guaranteed 
by the Swaziland Government which meant that the Government had to 
settle these debts at liquidation of SCI. 
The SCI experience is a classical example of Pretoria•s 
reaction to industries being established in BLS which she views as a 
threat to her own industries. Salora, the Finnish firm discussed 
above was given permission to operate in Swaziland provided 40% of 
the TV production was South African components. The Finnish sold 
Salora to a South African company because it was not profitable as 
Pretoria did not open up the market. The South African company 
closed down the factory in 1984 to reduce TV set competition and the 
company established itself in a bantustan for non-TV production 
activity. In 1971 Pretoria rejected a Japanese offer to Lesotho to 
establish a car assembly plant with the purpose of selling mainly to 
the South African market. 
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South Africa does not want a 11 Hong Kong 11 within its economic 
circumference; this applies especially to Swaziland which has been 
the most aggressive amongst BLS to try and utilise the offers of 
larger SACU market. 
The important point to observe at this stage is that 
Swaziland•s exports into South Africa are deliberately discouraged~ 
and even sabotagedg by Pretoria if the latter thinks they are a 
threat to its industries. SACU is not a guarantor of free market to 
Swaziland produce. On the other hand, South African firms have 
taken advantage of Swaziland•s memberships of SACU and ACP-EC 
Conventions to sell their produce in the ACP-EC countries, and 
abroad~ and to claim compensation from the STABEX regime. 
Summary and Conclusion 
This chapter provided an analysis· of trade between Swaziland 
and Britain and Swaziland and South Africa since 1968. In the whole 
analysis the Swaziland-South Africa trade links coloured the 
discussion. The discussion of trade between Swaziland and Britain 
necessitated the synopsis of British membership to the EC which was 
one of the reasons for the economic agreement between 9 European 
countries and 46 (now 66) African, Caribben and Pacific (ACP) States 
in 1975 forma 1 i sed in the Lome Convention. There has been 2 more 
Lome Conventions. It was argued that the Lome regime hardly 
affected the pattern of trade between Britain and Swaziland in that 
Britain has remained the traditonal market for Swaziland exports; 
that there is no evidence~ primary or circumstantial, which suggests 
that the Lome Conventions have opened up other markets in the EC for 
-- - -- -
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Swaziland produce. The Swaziland commodities presently sold in the 
other members of the EC found their market there before the signing 
of the first Lome Convention. 
A brief examination of the CAP of the EC revealed that there 
was no natural market for some of Swaziland's agricultural produce; 
that this was particularly so in the case of sugar. Hence the lack 
of export diversification within the EC. It was further submitted 
that the British sugar market is not safe, that this is confirmed by 
the fact that Tate & Lyle have had to receive a subsidy from the EC 
Commission to alleviate her cane sugar refinery costs in order to be 
competitive with beet sugar. 
It was interesting to observe that Swaziland trade agreements 
within the Lome Conventions have been beneficial to some South 
African firms who have investments in Swaziland. These firms have 
had access to markets (e.g. Kenya) and facilities (e.g. STABEX) 
which would not be normally available to other South African 
companies operating from inside the country. In this way, SACU is 
beneficial to South African firms. But SACU does not extend 
equivalent blessings to companies operating from BLS, due to the 
fact that Pretoria is not prepared to nurture the births of "Hong 
Kongs" or "Singapores" within the SACU orbit, even though this was 
part of SACU agreements. 
From this study several points can be made pertaining to 
Swaziland's trade relations with Britain and South Africa. The 
first one is that the EC policies, particularly CAP, have a tendency 
to fix rather than promote Swaziland exports to Britain. The best 
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example is the case of cane sugar which competes with beet sugar. 
This tendency to fix trade does not guarantee British Market for 
Swaziland sugar and this is confirmed by Tate & Lyle's closure of 
their ref-inery at Liverpool in 1981 and the subsidy they are now 
receiving rom the EC Commission for the period 1 July 1988-30 June 
1989. 
It can also be observed that the South African attitude towards 
the industrial ising programme of Swaziland hinders the growth of 
exports to the South African market. While both Britain and South 
Africa are Swaziland's leading trading partners (due to history)~ 
there are hic-cups which function as a brake to the growth of 
exports to these countries. 
Having concurred earlier with the view that micro-states need 
to export to achieve scale economies, the submission now~ therefore, 
is that if Swaziland products do not find markets in SACU, EC and 
elsewhere economic stability and, by deduction, political stability 
will be threatened. It is clear that if there are no export markets 
for a micro-state, there wi 11 be no investments; if there are no 
investments, there will be no jobs for the growing population, and 
high unemployment would result into social problems and political 
instability. The contention is that the Swazi State in its present 
form would be threatened. This contention is contrary to the view 
held by Ronald T. Libby13 who says that the weakening of the modern 
sector in Swaziland would be a disadvantage to the opposition 
factions while being manna to the traditional leadership. Libby's 
contention has far-fetched logic because he alleges that the 
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unemployed would leave the urban areas and go back to the ·land 
(there is crowding in the rural areas already) or make an exodus to 
some neighbouring country (a romantic ideal which is not backed by 
any historical evidence). lhe submission in this thesis is that 
mass unemployment in Swaziland, ~~~ithout social security and land to 
fall back to, would cause social and political instability which the 
opposition could capitalise on. 
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CHAPTER 6 
Swaziland's Economic Relations with South Africa 
Introduction 
There is an abundance of literature on the economic links 
between BLS and South Africa. Most of the scholars hold the view 
that BLS are part of the South African Economy or that they are, as 
Jack Halpern put it in the 1960's, South Africa's hostages. 1 In 
view of the existing body of literature in this area 9 this chapter 
does not purport to venture into new avenues, Instead It is a 
summary of views that have been widely documented and debated, which 
show the strong economic links between Swaziland and South Africa. 
The main objective of this chapter is therefore to create a linkage 
between the contents of the preceding chapters, especially the 
argument that South African investments have surpassed British 
investments over the post-Independence era and that Swazi 1 and has 
now more economic links with s. Africa than with Britain, and 
chapter 7 where an analysis of the Southern Africa regional policies 
of Swaziland, Britain and South Africa is undertaken, 
The main areas which reveal close economic links between 
Swaziland and South Africa are: (i) trade, (ii) South African 
investments in Swaziland, (iii) the Southern African Customs Union 
(SACU), (iv) the transport system, (v) tourism, (vi) monetary 
co-operation and (vii) migrant labour. Because trade was discussed 
in detail in chapter 5, the discussion in this chapter will 
concentrate on the other 6 areas. 
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The argument in this chapter is that due to the size of 
Swaziland and its level of industrial development~ economic 
relations between it and Pretoria are asymmetrically in favour of 
the latter. An example of this was made in chapter 5 when 
discussing the attempts by Swaziland to industrialise and export to 
the South African market, In those cases South Africa undermined 
the industrialisation process in Swaziland when Pretoria felt that 
was not in their interest. 
The South African Investments 
It was shown in chapter 19 and reiterated in chapter 49 how the 
South African investments in Swaziland grew since the late 1940's 
after having been stimulated by British investments in the forestry9 
citrus fruit and sugar cane industries. South African investments 
have increased tremendously since Swaziland's Independence. A brief 
identification of some of South Africa's companies which have 
increased their investments will enhance the preceding point. 
However 9 it is not an easy task to identify them because "detailed 
data on investment are harder to come by than on trade and are not 
consistently reliable." 2 
(a) Natie Kirsh 
Kirsh industries are a household business name in Swaziland. 
Natie Kirsh is a South African magnate who was granted a permit to 
be the sole maize miller in the country in the early 1960's. Today 
he features amongst the giant investors in Swaziland9 namely9 CDC9 
Lonrho 9 Anglo-American 9 Tate & Lyle and Sun International. He 
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established the Swaziland Milling in the 1960's and this company 
became the base for his operation. He widened his scope of 
operation when he later joined the retail, wholesale9 finance and 
car sale sectors. In the 1970's Kirsh introduced Metro Cash and 
Carry9 one of the largest wholesalers in the country which supplies 
foodstuffs and a variety of household utensils. He established 
Swaziland Warehouse which controls the supply of agricultural 
machinery, tools9 building materials and hardware. Kirsh also moved 
into the car sale industry when he established Tracar Ltd. which is 
one of the largest motor vehicle suppliers in Swaziland. He then 
formed the Finance Corporation which is a source for car and bus 
loans. 
In the 1980's Kirsh industries initiated the formation of 
Swaziland Kirsh (SWAKI) which is a conglomerate of companies; but 
Kirsh has a controlling interest. Some of the companies that merged 
to form Swaki are Farm Chemicals Ltd (this is the company which 
started the trade battle against SCI discussed in chapter 5), 
Finance Corporation Ltd, Industrial Agencies Ltd, Sugar Sales Ltd, 
Swaziland Investment & Development Corporation Ltd, Swaziland 
Milling, Swaziland Warehouse, Mtimane Forests (Pry) Ltd, Prepack 
Swaziland Ltd, Tracar Ltd, Polyplas Ltd and the National Textile 
Corporation of Swaziland. The diversity of Swak i is reflected in 
the management • s recent comment that 11 In fact, each day, in some 
way, the products and services offered by the Swaki group touch the 
lives of each and every Swazi. 113 
In the latter half of the '80's Swaki moved into partnership 
with the Swaziland Industrial Development Company (SIDC) when some 
220 
shares VI/ere sold to SIDC. SIDC is a Swaziland Government owned 
company which was established in response to criticisms made by 
technocrats against parastatals (including Tibiyo Fund discussed in 
chapter 4}. SIDC took over the assets of the National Industrial 
Development Corporation of Swaziland (NIDCS}g a parastatal which was 
viewed as a 1 i abi 1 i ty to the Swaz i1 and GovernmenL The ide a of 
establishing SIDC was that it would generate income for Government 
because it should invest in profitable projects and abide by rules 
of private sector operation. So when Swaki agreed to go into 
partnership with SIDC Mbabane viewed this as a potential 
break-through. 
(b) Anglo-American Corporation 
The first major investment in Swaziland by Anglo-American was 
in the late 1940's when they formed the Peak Timbers Ltd to invest 
in the forestry industry. Peak Timbers is one of the two largest 
timber companies in the country (the other being Usuthu Pulp Co. 
owned jointly by Courtau 1 ds and CDC} . The rna in products of Peak 
Timber are mining~ timber (exported mainly to South Africa and 
Zambia) 9 wood pulp (marketed mainly in Britain) 9 structural and 
industrial timber (consumed locally and some sold in South Africa) 
and wood preservation plants. The company is also the main supplier 
of wood to a Dutch company 9 Interboard International9 which has a 
chipboard factory in Swaziland. Peak Timbers employs about 1700 
people and by Swazi standards is a major employer. 
Anglo-American was a major shareholder in the Swaziland Iron 
Ore Development Corporation (SIODC) which mined iron ore from 1964 
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to 1980. The othe~ shareholders were Guest~ Keen & Ncttlefolds (UK) 
and the Swaziland Government. Mining ceased in 1980 when it was no 
longer profitable to mine the quality of ore that remained. 
Anglo-American controlled the mining of coal at Mpaka which 
also started in the 1960•s. This interest was sold to Gencor -
another South African firm - in the 198o•s. But the importance of 
Anglo-American in Swaziland was maintained because they control 
about 90% of citrus production. In the 1980 1 s the citrus fruit 
industry has become a major foreign exchange earner in Swaziland. 
In 1984 the Zululand Fruit Producers bought Nestle•s shares 
(89%) at Libby Swaziland (PTY) Ltd and changed the name of the 
company to Swaziland Fruit Canners (PTY) Ltd. Zululand Fruit 
Producers is a subsidiary of Anglo-American and the Swaziland Fruit 
Canners are the only fruit processing firm in Swaziland. Hence 
Anglo-American controls the production of fruit in the country. The 
largest market for the processed fruit is the EC and what is 
interesting to note is that since the South African firm took over 
Libby•s, some pineapples are being shipped from South Africa to be 
processed in their factory in Swaziland. 
(c) Gencor, Trans-Hex and Msauli Asbestor Beperk (in Mining) 
Gencor bought Anglo-American interest in the Mpaka coal mine in 
the 198o•s; Trans-Hex was given the permit to mine diamonds and 
started the operation in 1984; whereas Msauli was contracted by the 
Swaziland Government to manage Havelock Asbestos Mine when, Turner & 
Newall (UK) withdrew in 1986. The withdrawal of Turner & Newall 
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meant the total control of the Swaziland mining ·industry by South 
African firms. Trans~Hex is part of South Africa's Rembrandt Group 
and the diamonds mined in Swaziland are sold through the De Beers 
Central Selling Organization. 
(d) The Swaziland Brewers Ltd. 
This is the sole producer of beers in the country. Prior to 
the purchase by Tibiyo Fund and Andreas B.V. in 19719 the brewery 
was owned by the South Af~ican Brewers (SAB) and operated under the 
name Swaziland Associated Brewers (SAB). Presently Tibiyo has 40% 
of the shares in the company. 
(e) Swaziland Cotona Cotton Ginning 
The gi nnery is owned by a South African firm and the cotton 
seeds and 1 i nts that are produced are so 1 d in South Africa and 
locally. It was mentioned in chapter 5 that South Africa sometimes 
depress prices and the Swaziland Government has to apply for 
compensation from the EC STABEX arrangement. 
(f) Sun International 
This company is controlled by Sol Kerzener of South Africa and 
operates a chain of hotels and casinos in several Southern African 
countries. In Swaziland it owns 4 luxury hotels and the country's 2 
casinos. It is estimated that two-thirds of the visitors (tourists 
and business men) stay in these hotels every year. 
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(g) Barlow Rand 
This South African company bought Swaziland Plantations in 
1984. Swaziland Plantations is the fourth largest forestry firm in 
the country. Also under the control of Barlow Rand is NEOPAC which 
produces packaging materials widely used by the fruit industry. 
The list of South African companies operating in Swaziland is 
long and there is no intention to exhaust it. Suffice it to say 
that S. African investments have grown tremendously since 
Independence and have overtaken British investments. Most of the 
supermarkets and department stores in the urban areas are South 
African owned. 
The Southern African Customs Union (SACU) 
The Customs Union came into existence in 1910 when the Union of 
South Africa was formed. One of the reasons for the 3 High 
Commission Territories of Basutoland, Bechuanaland and Swaziland to 
join SACU was that Britain contemplated transferring them to the 
Union. 
Under the 1910 SACU terms there was a common market of the 
Union and the 3 Territories 9 with a common external tariff 
administered by South Africa. The arrangement was that the 
Territories received 1.31% of the total annual revenue derived from 
customs duties. This percentage share remained unchanged until 
Independence of the 3 Territories who became Botswana 
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(Bechuanaland) ~ Lesotho (Basuto"land) and Swaziland. But there was 
concern among the Territories government officials that the 1.31% 
revenue no 1 onger reflected the true nature of economic activity 
v11ithin SACU. A study by Joseph Hanlon4 revealed that by 1966 
Botswana g Lesotho and SI!Jazil and (BLS) imports accounted for 4% of 
SACU imports and yet they still received 1.31% of customs revenue. 
In view of this discrepancy negotiations were started between 
SACU member-states which culminated in the 1969 Agreement. This 
Agreement changed the previous terms substantially. The contents of 
the Agreement are enumerated below and they reveal that it was more 
comprehensive than the 1910 Agreement. 
Contents 
(a) There was a provision for the free movement of goods within 
SACU. However, this aspect of the agreement was qualified by a 
proviso which stated that if any product was introduced in a member 
state•s market in such a quantity and condition that it would cause 
or threaten serious injury to local producers~ the Government of the 
receiving state has a right to require that a solution be found. 
(b) There was agreed a common external tariff and co-operati"on in 
the application of any import legislation in any country in the 
common customs area. This agreement has proved to be expensive to 
BLS because Pretoria has a range of protected industries. South 
Africa uses import duties to protect the industries which means that 
the corresponding goods from outside SACU will be more expensive 
than the South African ones. Studies have revealed that BLS could 
buy some cheaper goods from outside SACU but for the South African 
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import dutles. Hanlon argues this point and makes reference to a 
. h 5 prev1ous researc ~ 
(c) There is provision for protecting some BLS industries as infant 
industries. In this protection BLS can impose additional tariffs 
for a period not exceeding 8 years. However9 it seems BLS have not 
been in a position effectively to util·ise this opportunity and 
Pretoria is partly to blame. For instance 9 the experience of the 
SCI in Swaziland referred to in chapter 5 confirms the latter 
contention. It was the Farm Chemicals Ltd. (of S. Africa) 9 
supported by Tri omph and Fedmi cs (the two S. African ferti 1 i zer 
giants) which started to manipulate prices in the Swazi market to 
try and push SCI out of business. This was followed by other 
measures {elaborated in chapter 5) to seal the fate of SCI. 
(d) The revenue distribution formula was altered to increase BLS 1 s 
share with an estimated 2.58% and that of Swaziland was 0.95%6. For 
all BLS countries the customs duties are an important source of 
revenue9 although it is debatable whether this revenue actually 
compensates BLS for the economic advantages Pretoria derives from 
having them in SACU. The degree of importance of this revenue was 
underwritten in the Fourth National Development Plan of Swaziland 
where the officials noted: 
11 Receipts from the Southern African Customs 
Union pool have been the largest source of 
income over this period ( 1978/79-1982/83) . . • In 
most years of the Plan9 customs union receipts 
accounted for more than 50 per cent of tot a 1 
revenue and grants. The actual percentages have 
varied from a low of 46.7 per cent in 1981/82 to 
64.6 per cent in 1982/83. The level of receipts 
more than doubled from E54.1 million in 1978/79 
to Ell7.6 million in the last year of the Plan 
( 1982/83) , 11 7 
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The argument that the revenue accruing to BLS from the customs 
is not enough is advanced by both academics (e,g, Hanlon~ 1986~ and 
Lindell~Mills, 1971} and BLS Government Officials. In October 1981 
both BLS and S. African officials agreed on a renegotiated version 
of the customs agreement whereby there would be an increase of 10% 
revenue to BLS~ amongst other things. But Pretoria simply rejected 
the version without giving a reason. (There is speculation to the 
effect that Pretoria has been pestering BLS to include the 
11 independent 11 homelands in any future negotiations of SACU and it 
was presumed that Pretoria•s rejection of the 1981 version was a 
means of applying leverage on BLS to accept the homelands into 
SACU). BLs•s suggestions in this version also included the removal 
of the two-year time lag in payments of the revenue. They felt this 
was unfair because Pretoria keeps the money for 2 years for which 
the latter uses to solve her economic problems. 
(e) It was agreed that there would be freedom of transit of goods 
within SACU, that there waul d be no transport~ rate di scrimi nation 
and that there would be no discrimination on the basis of place of 
register of the transport operator. Perhaps this provision did not 
cover enough grounds because S. Africa favour their operators in 
issuing transport licences. 8 Moreover, the South African Road 
Transportation Board and the South African Railways discriminated 
against SCI when they refused to carry SCI fertilizer to certain 
destinations in the Republic (see chapter 5). 
(f) The sixth point was that if any SACU member state entered into 
a trade agreement with a non-member state, there should be no duty 
concessions offered by the SACU member state without the prior 
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concurrence by the other contracting parties. South Africa was 
therefore obliged to obtain concurrence by BLS before amending her 
trade agreements with Rhodesia and Malawi. Likewise Lesotho and 
Swazi 1 and had to seek Pretoria and Gaborone concurrence when they 
joined the Preferential Trade Agreement of Eastern and South Africa 
(PTA) formed in 1982. 
(g) Finally the Agreement established a Customs Union Commission 
comprising representatives of all the parties concerned. The 
Commission meets at least once a year to deliberate on the issues 
affecting SACU. This body symbolises the fact that SACU is no 
longer an exclusive domain of Pretoria whereby it could take 
decisions unilaterally. 
As stated above the BLS states are not satisfied with the 
existing terms of SACU. Neither are they happy with some of South 
Africa•s decisions which affect the operation of SACU. Sometimes 
So~th Africa unilaterally imposes import duties which have an effect 
of raising prices of goods in BLS as well~ thus raising the cost of 
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living. For instance~ in 1977 Pretoria imposed a 15% import 
surcharge on imports, later reduced the surcharge at intervals until 
it was abolished. They re~imposed it in 1982 at 10%, abolished it 
in 1983 and reimposed it in 1985. This is a clear example of 
economic bullying of BLS by their Big Brother Pretoria. Hanlon has 
observed the effects of this South African game in the following 
words: 
11 All this is without consultation with BLS, and 
has a yo~yo effect on BLS economies. When the 
regional economy is doing badly~ South Africa 
imposes a surcharge~ which immediately makes BLS 
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imports more expensive and thus raises their 
cost.of 1iving9 purely to solve a South African 
economic problem. And the additional revenue 
earned through SACU surcharges stays with South 
Africa for two years~ helping it rather than 
BLS through the financial crisis." 9 
BLS is not convinced that at the moment their interests 1 ie 
outside SACU although they are not satisfied with the terms and 
Pretoria's unpredictable behaviour. There are concerns of the 
administrative costs "if they pulled out of SACU. BLS is not a 
geographical contiguity. So it would be difficult to create their 
own customs union and pool their resources 9 e.g. manpower. 
Moreover9 there are concerns about Pretoria's reaction if they were 
to pull out because South Africa's transport system carry the bulk 
of BLS exports and imports. Even the non-existence of big import 
houses, due to the size of their economies 9 may make it difficult to 
find some big companies prepared to locate in BLS rather than in 
South Africa. 
The Transport System 
Swaziland's transport links with South Africa are very strong. 
More than 85% of the country's imports come from/through South 
Africa and above 70% of the exports go through and to the 
Republic. 10 It was pointed out in chapter 5 that most of Swaziland 
imports come from South. Africa. The transport used to ferry the 
goods from, to and through South Africa is mainly the South African 
Railways and S. African trucks. Pretoria always favour their 
nationals when considering applications for transport licences. 
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Most of the expotts and imports shipped through South Africa go 
through the port of Durban and this link has been strengthened since 
the mid-1970's. Immediately after Mozambique's Independence 
St'IJaziland signed an agreement with South Africa to construct a 
railway line, the south link from Phuzamoya to link with the South 
African one at Golela. The idea was to transport goods from 
Swaziland to Durban via Richards Bay. The reason for making th·is 
link was the Swazi State fear of a Marxist government in Mozambique. 
The only alternative outlet {to the S. African ports) was Maputo. 
The conservative Swazi State did not feel safe with the Marxist 
neighbour and therefore wanted to reduce economic dependence on it. 
Hence the decision to construct the South link although Richards Bay 
is twice the distance to Maputo. 
However, as things turned out, Swaziland did not have to switch 
from Maputo to Richards Bay. The two Governments became friendly 
and since it was cheaper to use Maputo, no changes were made. This 
meant that the running of the South Link was uneconomical. Pretoria 
and Mbabane decided to construct the North Link to connect the South 
Link to the South African railways in the eastern Transvaal. 
Construction started in 1984 and was completed in 1986. The 
completion of this link meant that South Africa was in a position to 
cut short the detour from Durban via Johannesburg to the north and 
eastern Transvaal. They diverted some of the goods from Durban 
through Swaziland to the eastern and northern Transvaa 1. There is 
no evidence yet as to whether the line is paying its way. 
It is interesting to note that Swaziland's decision to create 
the North Link is contrary to one of the objectives of SADCC, 
namely, the intention to lessen dependence on South Africa. 
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Howeverg Swa%iland can argue that they constructed the North Link to 
defray the losses of the South Link which was constructed before the 
inauguration of SADCC. On the other handg this link is in line with 
Pretoria's "Total Strategy" of the late 1970's which includes the 
use of economic incentivesg inter aliag to lure the states ·in the 
Southern African region to close co~operation with it. In building 
this link Pretoria offered a loan to Swaziland. In addition 9 South 
Africa has taken over from Canada the role of providing management 
for the Swaziland Railways. Top managers are now seconded from 
Pretoria and train wagons are also supplied by South Africa. 
Tourism 
The Swazi 1 and Government regards the tourist industry as an 
important sector of the economy and in their post-Independence 
Development Plans they devise strategies to be adopted in order to 
promote it. About two-thirds of the tourists are South African or 
people resident there. For instanceg in 1973 they constituted 61.4% 
of the total number of tourists 9 in 1978 the percentage was 82.9 and 
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in 1984 the figure was 62.3%. 11 The majority of the rest 9 i.e. the 
one-third 9 stay in Swaziland on transit to South Africa. This South 
African connection was underscored by the Swaziland Government 
officials when they wrote: 
"Visits by international tourists consist mainly 
of those on package toursg passing through 
Swaziland en route to 9 or fromg the Kurger 
National Park 9 with overnight stop-overs in 
Mbabane or in the adjacent Ezulwini Valley 
holiday complex. Such tours are usually part of 
the popular Johannesburg-Kruger Park - Durban 
circuit. To date 9 the overnight stop in 
Swaziland has essentially been a matter of 
convenience." 12 
231 
Despite using Swaziland as a stop-over to destinations in South 
Africa, the main tourists attractions into the country are the 
beautiful scenery and the gambling facilities which are not 
available in South Africa. However, the 11 independent 11 homelands 
have opened gambling centres~ for instance, the Sun City of 
Bophuthatswana, which have become a real pleasure periphery. 
Competition from these homelands has contributed to the decline of 
the tourist industry in Swaziland. Statistics indicate that between 
1978 and 1982 the industry in Swaziland experienced an annual 
decline of approximately 7 to 8 per cent. 
Monetary Co-operation 
Prior to 1974 there was no monetary agreement between Pretoria 
and BLS although the 3 countries used South African currency. When 
in 1921 the South African Reserve Bank was established, the South 
African pound became the sole circulating legal tender in SACU. In 
1960 South Africa replaced the pound with the rand and BLS adopted 
this currency. The use of S. African currency continued after BLS 
Independence. It was a strange situation {perhaps reflecting the 
dependence of BLS on S .A.) where three countries used a foreign 
currency as legal tender. BLS did not have control over monetary 
policy. As a result it was impossible to have credit allocations, 
say, to the less competitive sectors of their economies such as 
peasant agriculture. Pretoria made unilateral decisions about the 
exchange adjustments without necessarily paying attention to the 
economic conditions in BLS. Interest rate structures were set by 
South Africa. 
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In 1913 BLS negotiated with Pre tori a on the need to consult 
before they made any monetary policy changes which would affect the 
parti~s concerned~ and also on the need for compensation for the use 
of the rand by the three countries. They requested to have access 
to the South African capital markets and exchange control matters. 
While these negotiations were continuing Swaziland expressed a 
wish to establish a monetary authority to issue currency for local 
circulation. It was agreed that both the rand and the lilangeni 
(emalangeni is plural) should circulate in Swaziland and be 
exchangeable at par. The Swazi currency was to be 100% backed by 
rand holdings and an interest bearing deposit was to be held by the 
South African Reserve Bank. Swaziland issued her first currency in 
1974. 
The negotiations which began in 1973 between South Africa and 
BLS ended with a formal agreement on monetary co-operation between 
South Africa, Lesotho and Swaziland. (Botswana had pulled out, 
indicating that they intended to issue their own currency which 
would be independent of the rand. They eventually issued it - the 
pula - in 1976 to coincide with the celebrations of the lOth 
Independence Anniversary). The agreement between the remaining SACU 
members, concluded in December 1974, created the Rand Monetary Area 
(RMA). The basic terms of the agreement were as follows: 
1. The contracting parties recognised that each party was 
responsible for its own monetary policy and the control of 
financial institutions operating within its area; 
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2. It was agreed that S. Africa was responsible for the management 
of the rand currency and the gold and foreign~exchange reserves 
of the RMA as a whole; 
3. They allowed the issue of local currencies in Lesotho and 
SvJaziland; 
4. There was to be no restriction of movement or transfer of funds 
except those resulting from investment or liquidity 
requirements prescribed for banks and financial institutions; 
5. The agreement guaranteed access by Lesotho and Swaziland to the 
South African capital and monetary markets; 
6. Lesotho and Swaziland were to be compensated for circulating 
and holding the rand; and 
7. The RMA Commission was established to deliberate on monetary 
issues and to meet at least once a year. 
In spite of this Agreement there was still Swazi 
dissatisfaction with the RMA arrangement. South Africa continued to 
make financial changes without proper consultation. For instance~ 
in 19789 South Africa introduced the General Sales Tax (GST) without 
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consulting the other parties. 
reluctantly drawn into GST. 
Lesotho and Swaziland were 
The problem of monetary co-operation has worsened in the 1980's 
as the South African economy declined due largely to the internal 
political conflicts and external pressures on Pretoria to dismantle 
the apartheid system. The weakening of the rand affects Lesotho and 
Swaziland9 but this is not necessarily a reflection of the state of 
the economies of these two countries. Hence Swaziland has embarked 
on a programme of slow de-linking the lilangeni from the rand. 15 In 
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1986 a decision was made to allow a person in Swaziland to ihsist on 
being paid in emalangeni and not in rands9 if he so wished. lhis 
would have an effect of reducing the amount of rands circulating in 
Swaziland. This is a cautious move to de~link lilangeni from the 
rand so that if there was to be any further decline of the rand in 
foreign exchange markets9 lilangeni would be floated independently. 
Migrant labour 
In chapter 2 it was shown how a system of labour migration from 
Swaziland into the gold, coal and platinum mines of the Union 
evolved. The factors which led to this migration were (i) the 
drought and cattle diseases which killed more than half of Swazi 
livestock at the end of the nineteenth century9 (ii) the 1907 Land 
Partition Proclamation which gave two-thirds of the land to the 
White settlers and the British Crown9 (iii) the demands of the Swazi 
Monarch that Swazi male adults should contribute money to the fund 
to buy back the 1 and 9 to pay for the Crown Pri nee's education and 
for fares for several Swazi delegations to London to present cases 
against the manner in which the British Administration was treating 
Swazis; and (iv) the encouragement by the Swazi Monarch that young 
Swazi men should go and work in the mines in return for capitation 
fees which she received for supplying Swazi labour. 
Since the turn of the century many Swazis have worked as 
migrant labourers in the Rand mines and coal mines of Natal. Table 
4 indicates the importance of the South African labour market to 
Swaziland. Out of the 9 years which show percentages only in 3 
years (1973 9 1974 and i983) has the migrant workers percentages of 
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the total Swaziland employment dropped to below 15%. The average 
for the 9 years is 16.1%. Since the late 1970's unemp"loyment has 
become acute in Swaziland. So there is no natural labour market for 
the migrant VJorkers. This dependence on the South African labour 
market is disturbing although it is not as bad as the sister BLS 
states (For Lesotho the figure was 69% of the wage labour force and 
Botswana was 18% in 1984. In the case of Mozamb·ique it was 5% and 
Malawi it was 8% for the same year. 14 
What is clear from the table is that the migrant labour system 
has basically maintained the same position since 1969 9 i.e. the 
figures remain between 10% and 20%. Only in 1975 did it rise to 
2L4%. This dependence on South Africa was noted by SA DCC at its 
formation. Hence they inaugurated the Southern African Labour 
Commission with the purpose of finding ways of breaking the 
dependence of the member-states on the migrant labour system. But 4 
years after the establishment of SADCC 9 the trend of Swazi migrant 
labour has not changed (see Table 4). This is not only applicable 
to Swaziland within SADCC. Mozambique, for instance~ negotiated for 
their quota of migrant workers to be increased when they signed the 
Nkomati Accord (a peace pact with Pretoria) in 1984. Perhaps it is 
too early to judge SADCC a failure in this area but so far there is 
no evidence to suggest that dependence on South Africa for labour is 
being reduced. 
Miscellaneous 
Swaziland's economic links with South Africa is also evident in 
the fact that most of the main rivers of the country originate from 
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South Africa. These rivers supply Swaziland with water for human 
consumption9 for industrial consumption (e.g. irrigation and 
manufacturing industries) and for hydro-electric schemes. There is 
a need to negotiate with Pretoria to allow enough water to flow into 
Swaziland. 
In the post-Independence period links seem to have 
strengthened. South Africa is gradually becoming an important source 
of aid to Swaziland. Generally 9 aid given by South Africa is for 
specific projects. For instance, Pretoria supplies Swaziland with 
some professional personnel such as veterinary practitioners and 
magistrates paid by South Africa; they second personnel to manage 
the Swaziland Railways; Pretoria gave a loan to Swaziland to 
construct the North Link and the Nsoko-Lavumi sa road. The South 
African Trade Mission in Mbabane, established in 1984 9 has made 
several donations, namely 9 support to the Cheshire Homes (a 
rehabilitation centre for the crippled), youth organisations, a 
donation to the Manzimi Industrial Training Centre (an institution 
involved in vocational training of youth in carpentry9 agriculture, 
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motor vehicle repair, skills in building and other things); they 
have given support to one of the most popular vocal music groups in 
the country - Asihlabelele Choral Society9 and they have made 
donations to build houses in the Malolotja Game Reserve and they 
gave some elephants and rhinos to the Reserve itself. This 
diversity of aid draws Swaziland closer to Pretoria. 
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This chapter gives a short account of economic 1 inks between 
Swaziland and South Africa. Most of Swaziland's imports come 
through South Africa and are brought into Swaziland by S. African 
trucks. The majority of tourists are South African or people 
resident there. Since 1921 Swaziland has been using South African 
currency~ although in the 1980's there is a gradual move to de~link 
lilangeni from the rand. South African investments have increased 
tremendously, and have eventually surpassed the British. The 
Southern African Customs Union keeps Swazi 1 and within the South 
African economic sphere and this relationship is "no free lunch" 15 
for Swaziland. The problem of unemployment in SWaziland is 
alleviated by migrant labour to the South African gold, coal and 
platinum mines. Pretoria's offer of aid to Swaziland brings the two 
countries into closer economic and political co-operation. 
What can be concluded from this wide spectrum of economic links 
is that Swaziland needs South Africa more than it does Britain in 
order to survive. Although Swaziland sells more goods (in value 
terms as shown in Table 2) to Britain than to South Africa, the 
other aspects indicate that South Africa is more important as 
Swaziland's economic partner than Britain. Hence the tightrope 
policy adopted by the Swaziland Government towards Pretoria. This 
policy is discussed in the next chapter. 
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CHAPTER 7 
Swaziland•s Regional Strategy : Its Convergence 
and Divergence with British and South African Pol_icies 
Introduction 
The purpose of this chapter ·is to discuss the evolution of 
Swazilands strategy in the Southern Afri~a region since Independence 
in 1968 and to show some elements of convergence and divergence with 
both the British and South African pol·icies in the region. The 
contention is that Swaziland•s policy within the Southern African 
setting has mostly been pragmatic since Independence and that the 
Swazi State adopted a tightrope strategy in order to survive. The 
main factors that have been at play in shaping the country•s 
strategy are: 
(i) economic consideration; 
(ii) the existence of minority regimes in the region; 
(iii) the existence of liberation movements fighting 
against these regimes; 
(iv) the nature of the Swazi State; 
(v) security considerations against internal political 
opposition; and 
(vi) Swaziland•s membership to international organizations 
like the Organization of African Unity (OAU) and 
SADCC. 
In trying to satisfy the variety of interests that arise from 
these factors 9 it is argued 9 Swaziland has adopted a tightrope 
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stra_t~gy which at times appears to be so ambivalent that in the eyes 
of some Swazis and protagonists in the regi-on Swaziland is running 
with the hare and hunting with the hound. It is further argued that 
in pursuit of these inter~sts Swaziland's policy has sometimes 
converged on and~ at other instances9 diverged from both British and 
South African policies in the region. In adducing evidence to prove 
these contentions a selected list of historical events and themes 
since 1968 are discussed within the context of the 6 main policy 
considerations mentioned above. 
The Strategy in the 1968~1975 Period 
The contention is that all the 6 main considerations were 
applicable in th·is period. When Swaziland became independent there 
were 5 countries (South Africa9 Mozambique9 Rhodesia9 Namibia and 
Angola) in the region ruled by minority regimes. Swaziland was 
sandwiched between two of them ~ South Africa and Mozambique. As a 
micro-state and because of economic relations with both of them (in 
the case of Mozambique it was mainly the use of Laurence Marques 
port for Swazi 1 and's imports artd exports) Swaziland adopted a 
co-operative strategy with these governments. For instance9 
Swaziland did not allow Mozambican combatants against the Portuguese 
Colonial Government to use Swazi territory. Under Portuguese 
pressure many were asked to leave; some left under threats of 
deportation to Mozambique and there were allegations that some 
activists were actually deported to Mozambique. Mozambican 
combatants who lived in Swaziland in the 1960's included the first 
president of independent Mozambique9 the late President Samora 
Machel. In the case of South Africa9 the Swaziland Government did 
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not a 11 ow activists or refugees who Pretoria considered to be a 
threat to its security. In co~operating with Pretoria in this was~ 
Swaziland was followtng a policy adopted by the British Colonial 
Government which banned South African refugees from the High 
Commiss·ion Territories unless they signed an undertaking that they 
would not ta!<e 11 an active part in the politics of this territory or 
of either of the other High Commission Territories or of any other 
territory bordering on any of the High Commission territories. 111 In 
the early 1960's the British Colonial Government asked Mr. and Mrs. 
Hodgson to leave Bechualand and banned Mr. Joe Slovo and Mr. J.B. 
Marks from the territory in pursuit of this policy. 
The policy adopted by Swaziland towards refugees from the 
neighbouring states reflected an interest of a micro-state to 
survive within the tentacles of two powerful states. The 
deportation of refugees who threatened the interests of these 
minority regimes was co-operation with them. However, there was a 
divergence of interests in that Swaziland supported the call for 
decolonization and removal of apartheid in the region. At its 
Independence Swaziland joined the OAU which championed, inter alia, 
the total liberation of Africa from colonial rule. Perhaps to 
compensate for the co-operation with the minority regimes, Swaziland 
sought to assert its membership in the OAU by being one of the most 
regular contributors to the OAU Liberation Committee Fund. 
Swaziland is rarely in arrears whereas the majority of 
member-states, including leading states like Tanzania, are quite 
often in arrears. 
Swaziland's dislike of minority rule was in line with the 
British policy in the region. Britain adopted a policy of 
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decolonisation so that when it withdrew from Swaziland in 1968~ 
Swaziland was the last British colony in the continent except 
rebellious Rhodesia under Ian Smith. In 1960 British Prime Minister 
H~rold Macmillan addressed the South African Parliament. He spoke 
about the need for majority rule in Africa and the possible 
consequences if the peaceful transfer were not effected gradually in 
his ~~~Jind of Change 11 speech. Macmillan warned that if peaceful 
change was denied the Africans~ they would turn to the communist 
countries for help. By the time of Swaziland's Independence 
1 iberation movements in Angola, Namibia, Rhodes ·ia, Mozambique and 
South Africa had turned to the communist bloc for the material 
support to fight these regimes. This link between the potential 
future governments of five states of the region and the communist 
countries was a concern for the Swazi State. The Swazi State, being 
a Monarchy and conservative~ did not like communism. The degree to 
which Sobhuza hated communism was demonstrated in the quotation from 
Hilda Kuper (1978, pp. 212-213) made in Chapter 3. Swaziland hoped 
that the African movements would not adopt communist ideology, just 
as much as the British Governments wished. Another example of 
convergence of policy was that both the Swazi and British 
Governments renounced the use of force or violence as a solution to 
the region's political problems. 
The British concern about the dilemma of the micro-states in 
the region, especially BLS was made clear in the Commons at the time 
of their Independence. The feeling was that substantial aid should 
be given to BLS so that they could maintain a degree of 
independence, particularly from South Africa. For instance on 19 
November 1968, the Conservative MP, Major Patrick Wall asked the 
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Minister of Overseas Development ff he \:'Jould make a statement on 
financial assistance to Swaziland for the first 3 years of 
Independence and the Minister•s reply was that discussions on this 
issue were due to begin in London on 25 November 1968;2 and on 20 
October 1972 Mr. Judd~ MPg asked the Secretary of State for Foreign 
and Commonwealth Affairs whether he t~ould make a statement on the 
level of official aid flows to BLS with special reference to future 
UK aid and development policy in Southern Africa. The answer gave a 
breakdown of aid in the form of development loans and grants to BLS 
which amounted to £21.42 million for the period 1970 to 1973. The 
share of Swaziland was £6.395 million. 3 So the British Government 
adopted an aid policy to help Swaziland maintain its Independence. 
The adoption of a tightrope policy by the Swazi State was also 
influenced by internal security consideration. At Independence 
there was no opposition representation in Parliament. So there was 
no official voice in Parliament to criticise the King•s Party - the 
Imbokodvo National Movement (INM). However~ in the 1972 general 
elections the Ngwane National Liberatory Congress (NNLC) won 3 seats 
and for the first time there was official opposition in Parliament. 
As shown in Chapter 3 this upset the Swazi Monarch and his 
supporters. As a result he abrogated the Independence Constitution~ 
declared a State of Emergency~ banned political parties and assumed 
all executive~ legislative and judicial powers. The Monarch•s 
reaction showed the extent to which he feared the opposition by 
modern political forces. There was close co-operation between South 
African Movements - ANC and PAC - and Swaziland modern political 
parties - NNLCg Swaziland Progressive Party (SPP) and the Swaziland 
Democratic Party (SDP) - at the time of formation of the latter. 
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This co-operation continued even after Independence~ especially 
between NNLC and PAC. More over~ the rhetoric of the NNLC was that 
of African Socialism and Nkrumahism which Sobhuza detested. He 
therefore established the modern army - the Umbutfo Swaziland 
Defence Force - to secure his position. It was allriged that 
Pretoria he 1 ped Swaziland estab 1 ish the a \'1lly but no evidence is 
available to prove this. Having adopted a tightrope policy 
Swaziland would not disclose this information; the only known 
country which helped inaugurate the army is Israel. 
However~ there were cases of open co-operation between 
Swaziland and South Africa which aimed at consolidating the power of 
the Ngwenyama. Firstly~ Mr. Thomas Bhekindlela Ngwenya~ whose case 
triggered of the 1973 ~ajar political changes was deported by 
Swaziland to South Africa. Pretoria readily accepted Ngwenya and 
dumped him in KaNgwane homeland. Secondly~ there was co-operation 
between South Africa and Swaziland police and Pretoria gave 
equipment to the Royal Swaziland Police. 
But Swaziland did not establish diplomatic links with any of 
the minority regimes and this was in accordance with the OAU policy. 
However 7 it had political meetings with some of them. For instance, 
in 1971 Prime Minister, Prince Makhosini led a delegation to Cape 
Town where they discussed matters of mutual interests with the 
Pretoria delegation. No details of these discussions were disclosed 
but it was reported that they were concerned with general 
co-operation. In the case of Mozambique 7 the Portuguese offered 
Swaziland technical assistance in the form of training young Swazis 
in their university in the 11 province 11 • A few Swazis went there 
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immediately after Independence but did not complete the courses due 
to the language problem. They were lfJithdrawn and some went to the 
University of Botswana~ Lesotho and Swaziland (UBLS). 
The Changing Balance of Forces since 1975 
The downfall of the Portuguese empire in Angola and Mozambique 
in 1975 shifted the balance of forces in the region in that only 3 
countries (Namibia9 Rhodesia and South Africa) remained under 
minority rule. This change had a direct impact on Swaziland and 
South African strategies. Swaziland's reaction to Mozambique's 
Independence was double~edged in that it wanted to be friendly9 
seeing that Swaziland's nearest outlet to the sea is Maputo~ while 
at the same time Swazi rulers feared a Marxist government in the 
neighbourhood. The gesture of friendship was displayed when 
Swaziland gave the newly independent state bags of grain and opened 
a diplomatic mission in Maputo 5 one of the only two Swazi diplomatic 
missions in Africa (the other is in Nairobi). In turn~ Mozambique 
opened their mission in Mbabane. In 1976 a meeting was held between 
King Sobhuza and President Mathel at which the policy of friendship 
was sealed. 
However 9 the Swazi Government did not trust the Marxist 
Government. When Frelimo took over9 Swaziland decided to construct 
a railway to the south - the South Link - linking its system with 
that of South Africa at Golela9 then to Richards Bay9 as an 
insurance against unprecedented action by the Frelimo Government. 
As it turned out 9 Swaziland did not have to divert her goods from 
Maputo port and the South Link was being under-utilised until the 
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North Link was constructed~ in the 19so·s~ which l-inks SvJaziland 
with the eastern Transvaal. South Africa now uses this link instead 
of the detour from Durban via Johannesburg. 
South Africa•s reaction to Angola and Mozambique•s Independence 
was to tighten security 9 especially on the Namibia ~ Angola border. 
They even went to the extent of supporting the rightwing UNITA to 
fight the MPLA Marxist Government. At the same time Pretoria 
continued their policy of detente, started in 1974 9 to try and reach 
accommodation with the black states in the region. The detente 
policy was affected by? first 9 the 1975 invasion of Angola by South 
African troops 9 and 9 secondly 9 the 1976 schoo 1 children uprising. 
In the latter event South Africa used repression and the result was 
that the neighbouring states criticised Pretoria for using such 
force. Dialogue between Pretoria and a number of African leaders 
was 9 therefore 9 suspended. The 1976 uprising also resulted in an 
inflow of young South Africans into Swaziland and other neighbouring 
states. These countries became fertile grounds for the S. African 
liberation movements to recruit for training. 
After the Independence of Mozambique and Angola Swaziland 
allowed South African liberation movements {ANC and PAC) official 
representation for the first time. This was a shift of policy. 
Swaziland was trying to reach accommodation with the liberation 
movements in view of the fact that it would have to do business with 
a future majority ruled South Africa. There was some degree of 
understanding between the Swazi rulers and these movements, although 
officially Swaziland declared that it would not allow its territory 
to be used as a springboard for attack against its neighbours. 
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Officially~ Swaziland advocated a peaceful solution of the regional 
problems. But it became an open secret by late l970 1 s that Sobhuza 
had told officials of these movements that if he closed his left or 
right eye, their guerrillas could pass through Swaziland. Swaziland 
did become an important conduit for ANC guerrillas from Mozambique. 
In the late 1970 1 s and early 1980 1 s Pretoria complained that the 
Swaziland frontier was leaking. To pre-empt the situation Pretoria 
started clandestine raids into Swaziland to kidnap guerrilla 
suspects or South Africans whom Pretoria suspected of abetting the 
guerrillas. For instance, early in 1981 a South African refugee 
teacher, Mr. Joe Pillay, was kidnapped by the Resistance National 
Movement (MNR) of Mozambique and handed over to S. Africa. 
Swaziland arrested the MNR people involved. But negotiations 
between Mbabane and Pretoria resulted in the release of both Pillay 
and the MNR people. 
The Independence of Zimbabwe in April 1980 further shifted the 
balance of forces and encouraged Swaziland to give a high profile of 
the ANC (PAC was expelled from the country in 1978 allegedly for 
their in-fighting). Joseph Hanlon and John Daniel remark that 
11 
••• the independence of Mozambique and then Zimbabwe gave King 
Sobhuza an opportunity to move away from South Africa, while the 
unrest and crackdowns of 1976-1978 inside South Africa gave him 
increased motivation to support anti-apartheid forces. 114 
The appointment of a non-traditionalist prime minister, Prince 
Mabandla, in 1979 also gave Swaziland an impetus to pursue an 
independent policy. Prince Mabandla had been a supporter of the 
NNLC before he was 11 converted 11 to accept the Monarch's rule. During 
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his premiership (November 1979 to March 1983) there was a marked 
shift of policy. For instance~ Swaziland rejected South Africa's 
proposed Constellation of Southern African States (CONSAS) - a 
proposed economic grouping of States in the region whose membership 
now consists only of S. Africa and its homelands. Instead Swaziland 
joined SADCC. In February 1980 9 Mabandla visited President Machel 
and~ amongst other things9 they discussed matters of security. 
Consequent to this meeting? Swaziland detained a number of MNR men 
and expelled people involved in recruiting Mozambicans in Swaziland 
for training in South Africa as MNR cadres. In April 1981 the Swazi 
Prime Minister hosted a meeting of Presidents Quett Masire 
(Botswana), Samora Machel and Lesotho's Prime Minister9 Chief Leabua 
Jonathan. A communique was issued at the end of the meeting which 
condemned South Africa 1 s destabilization policy. In a speech 
delivered at the UN General Assembly in 1980 9 Mabandla spoke 
critically of racism 9 declared support for the struggle for 
self-determination of the people of Western Sahara and condemned the 
Camp David Accord. The Swazi premier used this august body to 
announce a policy shift by his Government: he was the first Swazi 
leader to openly speak against Pretoria and Israel (who have an 
embassy in Swaziland and are training the Swazi army) and he also 
openly supported violence as a solution to political disputes9 
especially violence against a Monarch in Morocco. 
In the economic front Mabandl a wanted to 1 essen dependence on 
South Africa. For instance he started a second power generating 
station - the Luphohlo Hydro-electric Power Station and he banned 
the importation of fruit and vegetables under the pretext of 
preventing the spread of cholera from South Africa into Swaziland. 
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A E3 million earth station for satellite telecommunication links was 
constructed to delink from Pretoria. In 1981 Swaziland blocked CDC 
and Courtaulds• plan to sell their Usuthu Pulp Company shares to 
South Africa•s Mondi Company, 
Corporation. During Mabandla•s 
farthest distance from Pretoria. 
a subsidiary of Anglo-American 
premiership Swaziland kept its 
However, Many people were shocked 
when he want to live in exile in Bophuthatswana after his downfall 
in March 1983. 
South Africa•s Total Strateg~ 
The changing balance of forces in the region, coupled with the 
shift of policy by the usually co-operative or controllable states 
like Lesotho and Swaziland, and the deterioration of internal 
security arrangement both within South Africa and at its borders 
compelled Pretoria to revise their regional policy and strategy. In 
the late 1970 1 S Pretoria came up with what is commonly known as 
11 Total Strategy 11 and some of its elements forced Swaziland back to a 
more co-operative stance. Total Strategy meant the mobilisation of 
economic, political and psycho-social, as well as military 
resources, in order to defend and advance the interests of the 
apartheid state both at the regional and internal levels. At the 
regional level South Africa sought to offer economic benefits to the 
majority ruled states. Hence the idea of CONSAS. However, none 
joined CONSAS but reacted by forming SADCC, Pretoria to offer 
economic incentives by giving bilateral aid to the more conservative 
states - namely Malawi and Swaziland. Writing about Pretoria•s 
economic incentive Robert Davies and Dan o•Meara observed that: 
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11 The most striking example was that of 
Swaziland. Among the incentives offered and 
accepted by the Swazi regime were assistance in 
building a railway line through Swazi territory 
linking the Eastern Transvaal with the port of 
Richards Bay and a supplementary R50 million 
payment in 1982 under the customs union 
agreements, 11 5 
Pretoria continues to give Swaziland aid for specific projects and 
these were identified in chapter 6. 
In addition to economic incentives South Africa adopted a 
military strategy in the region. They continued to back up UNITA in 
Angola~ tremendously increased their support of MNR after Ian 
Smith 1 s government had gone~ supported surrogate armies like the 
Lesotho Liberation Army (LLA) of the Basotho Congress Party (BCP) 
and 11 Super-ZAPU 11 in Zimbabwe, They also conducted commando raids 
into Mozambique~ Lesotho and Swaziland where they hit at ANC men as 
well as local civilians. 11Action against the neighbouring states 
now seemed to be designed to force these states to withdraw support 
from the ANC and perhaps even become forces pressurising the ANC to 
dampen down its armed struggle. 116 The South African Foreign 
Mi·nister~ Mr. R.F. (Pik) Botha is quoted in the Rand Daily Mail (13 
October 1983} as having said 110ut - they (ANC) must get out. There 
is no compromise on this one. 11 For instance, in Swaziland Pretoria 
organised the kidnapping of a South African refugee school teacher 
in February 1981; in December 1981 South African commandos killed 
two ANC men, Pretoria complained that Swaziland 1 S frontier was not 
well guarded and threatened Mbabane that if the security situation 
was not remedied~ it would turn Swaziland into another Lebanon. 
Under this pressure Swaziland police arrested several ANC men and 
charged them with illegal possession of firearms. 
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The Land Deal and the Crackdown on ANC 
In the early 19so•s Pretoria came up with the land deal carrot 
to win Swaziland•s collaboraton in tightening security. South 
Africa offered Swaziland parts of its homelands land - namely 
Ingwavuma (which is part of Kwazulu) and Kangwane homeland. 
Pretoria made this offer on the pretext that people who live in 
these areas were Swazis who wanted to be joined with their own 
people in Swaziland. However, the ulterior motives were (i) to put 
pressure on Kwazu 1 u and KaNgwane to opt for 11 i ndependence 11 ; ( i i) if 
they still refused to become independent, then to denationalise 
close to a million South Africans who would then work in South 
Africa as migrant workers because Swaziland•s economy would not 
offer them enough employment; and (iii) to use the land deal to buy 
the Swazi State•s co-operation in expelling the ANC from Swaziland. 
Answering a question by one MP as to what the South African 
Government intended to do with homelands which did not opt for 
independence, President P.W. Botha did imply the first two motives. 
He said: 
11 ln my opinion it is a tragedy that in the 
entire planning for Southern Africa, an 
agreement was not reached earlier in our history 
between Britain and the then Union of South 
Africa with regard to the arrangement of borders 
in Southern Africa ••. I believe that if we have 
a proper understanding of the economic welfare 
and the distribution of wealth which has to take 
place in Southern Africa, we should accept a 
second principle, viz. that we shall not stand 
in the way of nations who wish to unite with one 
another anew in cases where they have 
predominantly common pasts, cultural ties and a 
common future. This Government will not be slow 
to respond as far as encouragement it • s 
concerned when nations wish to think in this 
direction .•. 11 7 
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This was an indication that even other states (apart from Swaziland) 
and homelands could enter into border adjustments with Pretoria if 
they so wished. The effect would have been to de~nationalise 
several million black South Africans by handing them over to the 
small and economically weak states who in turn would be drawn closer 
to South Africa. This was in line with the aims of the 11 Total 
Strategy 11 • 
On the other hand~ the Swazi Monarch approached the land deal 
from a different angle and he probably did not understand the full 
implications, economic and political, of receiving these pieces of 
land which are of poor fertility. King Sobhuza saw a chance of his 
old time dream being fulfilled, i.e. a desire to reunite the Swazis, 
create a greater Swaziland and have access to the sea through Kosi 
Bay. The Swazi authorities grievance over the distortion of 
boundaries dates back to the nineteenth century and this is 
mentioned in chapter 2. At Independence the Swazi leaders raised 
the issue of the lost land. For instance Prime Minister, Prince 
Makhosini told the Swaziland Parliament that he would raise the 
border issue with the British Delegation during one of their final 
conferences before Independence. He stated that 11 It is the 
intention of this Government to consult with the British Government 
on the boundary dealings she had with the neighbouring states. 118 
Although the border adjustment was an old dream of the Swazi 
leadership, to carry it through in the 1980 1 s under Pretoria•s terms 
would have brought Swaziland closer to S. Africa and relegated it to 
a status closer to that of homelands. 
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Attached to the land deal package was the requirement by 
Pretoria that Swaziland sign a security pact with it and expel the 
ANC. On 17 February 1982 Sobhuza agreed to a secret security pact 
with Pretoria. The pact was kept secret until the signing of the 
Nkomati Accord between Pretoria and Maputo in March 1984 when the 
Swazi leadership felt proud to disclose that their pact preceded the 
Nkomati Accord by 2 years. Amongst other things 9 the secret pact 
called for individual and collective action by Pretoria and Mbabane 
to eliminate the use of force in or from their countries. In 
essence this was an agreement to use the other party's security 
forces to eliminate what was considered to be evil elements. Thus 
Pretoria could be allowed to come to Swaziland to eliminate the ANC 
if Swaziland so desired. Consequent to this agreement Pretoria 
demanded that the ANC's chief representative 9 Mr. Stanley Mabizeia 9 
leave Swaziland and the Swazi leadership agreed. But within a short 
time9 in June 19829 Mabizela's deputy9 Mr. Petros Nzima, was 
assassinated by a car bomb at his flat. Anti-apartheid activists 
pointed their fingers at Pretoria. 
The Death of Sobhuza and Intensification of Crackdown on ANC 
Six months after the signing of the secret pact King Sobhuza II 
died. The death of Sobhuza resulted in uncertainty in South 
Africa's policy. Firstly 9 it called into question Swaziland's 
internal security because Sobhuza had held together the Swazi 
nation, including forces opposing each other. When the power 
struggles (discussed in chapter 3) began, Pretoria's fears were 
confirmed. Pretoria also doubted if the Swazi speaking South 
African leaders who had indicated that they would like to join 
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Swaziland would still be interested now that Sobhuza was dead and a 
civil war was looming over the country. Due to this consideration 
Pretoria decided to delay the proceedings of the land deal. It 
engaged itself in court battles with the homelands leaders (Chief 
Gatsha Buthelezi and Enos Mabuza) who were against the deal. When 
Pretoria lost the court battles they set up the Rumpff Commission to 
study the historical and legal implications of the deal. Before the 
Commission had finished its work~ it was disbanded by the Government 
which announced in 1984 that if Swaziland wanted the land deal to go 
ahead they should negotiate with the Kangwane and Kwazulu 
leadership. This decision can be understood in the context of 
Pretoria's policy considerations, after Sobhuza's death, mentioned 
above and the security situation in the region which is discussed 
below. 
After the death of Sobhuza in August 1982 there was a power 
struggle to fill the vacuum left by the Ngwenyama (lion). As stated 
in chapter 3 the Supreme Council of State (Liqoqo) became de facto 
rulers although constitutionally they were supposed to be advisers 
to the Queen Regent. This body came closer to Pretoria than any 
previous Swazi government, and the relationship between the Liqoqo 
government and the ANC p 1 unged to its 1 owes t ebb ever. L i qoqo 
lacked the diplomacy which Sobhuza had acquired in dealing with all 
the protagonists in the region. 
Tough action against the ANC began late in 1982. It was during 
this period that Pretoria informed Swaziland that it would turn the 
country into another Lebanon if the Swazi Government did not tighten 
up on the ANC. Swaziland understood this message more clearly when 
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South Africa made commando raids into Maseru in December 1982 ~ 
killing ANC men and Lesotho civilians. Swaziland•s reaction was to 
round up ANC members and expel them. In December 1982 there were 
incidents of border shoot-out near Lomahasha between ANC cadres and 
the Swaziland Defence Force. Despite the tightening stance adopted 
by the Liqoqo Government Pretoria was not satisfied by the security 
situation. Hence the occasional raids into the country by S. 
African security forces. For instance~ in November 1983 a Swazi 
national~ Keith Macfadden and an ANC refugee~ Zwelakhe Nyandar~ were 
murdered and the anti-apartheid forces blamed Pretoria. The Liqoqo 
regime made no protests. To put more pressure on Swazi 1 and South 
Africa closed borders on two important holiday weekends from which 
Swaziland would earn substantial revenue from tourists - an economic 
leverage by Pretoria. 
Security deteriorated further at the Swaziland frontier after 
the Nkomati Accord between Maputo and Pretoria in March 1984. This 
non-aggression pact committed the two parties to forbid any forces 
fighting their respective governments to operate from each other•s 
territories. Pretoria undertook to stop supporting MNR while Mapufo 
promised to expel ANC from Mozambique and that ANC would maintain 
only an office manned by not more than 10 officials. When Maputo 
expelled ANC cadres~ many entered Swaziland and this caused tension 
in the country 7 Swaziland and South Africa•s reaction was to tighten 
security. 
In April 1984 the Swazi State issued an official general 
expulsion order to the ANC. In the same month shootings started 
between ANC cadres and the Swaziland security forces. There were 
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allegations that South African security men helped the Swazi forces. 
For instance 9 some witnesses to the 15-hour battle at Ngwane Park 
(in Manzini) on 19-20 April 1984 vowed that they saw white men in 
camouflage uniform on the Swaziland side and that their number was 
more than the existing Israeli and British officers training the 
Swazi army. Another allegation was by arrested ANC activists that 
they were interrogated and tortured by South African security men in 
Swaziland custody. There were also several allegations that 
Swazi 1 and Government handed to South Africa some ANC cadres and 
supporters. 
In 1984 Swaziland almost became "another Lebanon". There were 
South African forces in the fighting9 there was the ANC9 the MNR 
(its presence increased after the Nkomati Accord as S. Africa 
pretended to have stopped supporting them when in fact it trained 
them in the remote mountains of Swaziland). there were shoot-outs 
between the Maputo security forces and the MNR across Swazi 1 and 
border; and there was the home security forces. The situation was 
so confused that at some stage there would be an unintended exchange 
of fire between Swazi security forces and MNR. and in December 1984 
the Swaziland forces erroneously ki 11 ed a 12 year Swazi boy in 
Manzimi during their operations which ended with the killing of a S. 
African suspected to be an ANC cadre. 
But by the end of the year more than 100 ANC activists had been 
arrested and deported. Some went underground in Swaziland. The 
situation was so bad that it called for the intervention of some 
leaders of the Southern African States. For example, President 
Kenneth Kaunda of Zambia urged the top leadership of the ANC to go 
258 
to Swaziland to solve the problem. Oliver Tambo~ President of the 
ANC, was expected to arrive in the country in mid~l984. He did not 
turn up and there was much speculation about this. One version was 
that there was a South African plot to assassinate him with the 
connivance of Swazi authorities. The other version was that the ANC 
leadership felt that there would be no point in talking to Liqoqo 
because of their present relationship with Pretoria. (ANC 
leadership used to discuss issues of security with Sobhuza whenever 
a need arose after ANC was allowed to establish itself in the 
country in the mid-1970's). Kaunda prevailed and a meeting was held 
in August 1984 between the Swazi delegation and the ANC leaders in 
Lusaka. The host was Kaunda. However, shootings, arrests and 
deportation of ANC continued after that meeting, which indicated 
that not much had been achieved by the meeting. 
The close relationship between Swaziland and South Africa was 
consolidated by the establishment of the South African Trade Mission 
in Mbabane in 1984. The head of the Mission, Mr. Sam Sterban, is a 
career diplomat and the Mission does work that is normally handled 
by an embassy ~ viz. administration of South African aid to 
Swaziland; the head of the Mission was unvited, together with 
foreign diplomats, to the reception of the January 1985 SADCC 
conference hosted by Swaziland. In the opening of that meeting the 
Swazi Prime Minister, Prince Bhekimpi, said that he wanted to assure 
the SADCC delegates that there was nothing wrong with Swaziland's 
policy towards South Africa. Ironically, Swaziland Broadcasting 
Service had announced that morning that the South Africa's surrogate 
army, MNR, had blown up the Swaziland Railway to Maputo. Bhekimpi's 
Government sent several delegations to Pretoria to discuss 11 matters 
of mutual interest ... 
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Now there were 4 factors which influenced the Swaziland 
regional strategy during Liqoqo regime. The first was the land deal 
and the fact that a promise had been made to rid Swazi 1 and of the 
ANC. The traditional oligarchy did not want to be seen to be a 
failure in this sphere after Sobhuza•s death. Hence an open 
crackdown on the ANC9 coupled with their invitation to South African 
security forces where they deemed necessary. The second factor was 
the power struggles within the ruling elite in the country. There 
was instability in the higher echelons of government and each 
faction wanted their position to be secured. They reckoned that 
South Africa as a powerful and friendly neighbour could guarantee 
their security. Therefore in the power struggle all factions 
threatened to undermine Swaziland•s independence by moving to close 
to Pretoria. This is why there was a drastic shift of strategy 
vis-a-vis Pretoria and the ANC. Thirdly~ the influx of the ANC 
cadres into Swaziland after they were pushed out of Mozambique in 
honour of the Nkomati Accord of March 1984 threatened the security 
of the Swazi State. Lastly~ South Africa•s threats of turning 
Swaziland into "another Lebanon" was conceded~ more so that Pretoria 
demonstrated its seriousness in Lesotho and Mozambique by conducting 
several commando raids between 1981 and 1983. 
The fact that Sobhuza was dead~ the looming civil war in 
Swaziland~ the fact that the ANC was. largely pushed out of 
Mozambique and Swaziland, internal opposition (anti-apartheid 
forces, certain factions with Pretoria Government itself~ 9 KaNgwane 
and KwaZulu leadership)~ and external pressure especially Pretoria•s 
allies in the Western bloc~ all combined to make South Afria 
re-consider the land deal. Hsnce their announcement in 1984 that 
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Swaziland should negotiate with Ch'ief Gatsha Buthelezi and Enos 
Mabuza if they wanted the deal to go ahead. But how can Swaziland 
negotiate with them when they do not want to be seen to be giving 
credibility to the homelands? 
British Policy in the 1980 1 s and the Sanctions Issue 
As stated earlier~ British policy since the 196o•s when they 
withdrew from the region was that majority rule is necessary. But 
this did not happen in the Portuguese colonies, apartheid South 
Africa, Namibia and rebellious Rhodesia. Change in the Portuguese 
colonies and Rhodesia had to come under pressure of guerilla warfare 
and international calls for change. South Africa still maintains 
apartheid and occupies Namibia in defiance of the UN resolutions. 
Because of the intransigence of the South African regime the 
anti-apartheid forces (both internally and externally based) have 
intensified their opposition to Pretoria. A section of the 
international community has demonstrated its solidarity with the 
victims of Apartheid in South (now in Southern) Africa by giving 
material support~ calling on Pretoria to dismantle apartheid and 
even ca 11 i ng for sanctions. The ca 11 for sanctions on minority 
regimes, including South Africa, dates back to the 1950 1 S. Some 
types of sanctions have been imposed on South Africa, for instance~ 
sports boycott, no supply of military equipment, and cultural 
isolation. But the real pressure for comprehensive and mandatory 
economic sanctions has intensified in the 1980 1 s in international 
platforms like the UN meetings and Commonwealth summits. 
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The rna ·j n target of the ca 11 for the more comprehensive and 
mandatory sanctions is the Western bloc countries which are major 
investors in and trading partners with South Africa. Britain is one 
of these countries. In essence these countries are asked by a 
section of anti~apartheid forces inside South Africa and Britain 9 
the external South African anti~apartheid activists and a section of 
the ·international community to disinvest and stop trade in key 
products which would have an effect of weakening South Africa 
economically and militarily. There is serious disgreement about the 
effects and ultimate outcome of comprehensive economic sanctions. 
This disagreement is basically between the supporters of sanctions 
and the target states. It is not the purpose of this chapter to 
venture into the general debate. This chapter focuses on the 
British position and that of Swaziland. 
The British Government position on comprehensive economic 
sanctions is basically that they do not work; that instead of 
softening the Afrikaner's attitude they will harden them and cause 
them to retreat inside their 11 0ld laager 11 ; that sanctions will hurt 
blacks more than the white South Africans; and that sanctions will 
affect the economies of the neighbouring states 9 thus damaging the 
whole regional economy. There is also the concern of loss of jobs 
in Britain although this point is not frequently mentioned in public 
debates. These points form the cornerstone of the argument advanced 
by the present Tory Government9 on both international and domestic 
fora, against sanctions on South Africa. 
In the 1985 Nassau Commonwealth summit the British delegation 
raised these points. However, in that conference limited sanctions 
were agreed upon by the heads of State and Government, viz. (a) a 
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ban on all new government loans to the Government of South Africa 
and its agencies; (b) no Government funding for trade missions to 
South Africa; (c) a ban on the sale and export of computer 
equipment capable of use by South African military forces~ police or 
security forces; (d) a ban on new contracts for the sale and export 
of nuclear goods, materials and technology; (e) a ban on the sale 
and export of oil; (f) a strict and rigorously controlled embargo 
on imports of arms, ammunition, military and para-military equipment 
from South Africa; (g) an embargo on cultural and scientific events 
except where these contribute towards ending of apartheid; and (h) 
they proclaimed their readiness to take unilerally what action might 
be possible to preclude the import of Krugerrands. 10 The 
Commonwealth states leaders agreed to that they would assess the 
situation in South Africa in 6 months and if there were no 
significant progress other measures would be considered. 
These agreed measures were seen by some heads as too 1 i ttl e 
whereas Mrs. Margaret Thatcher, British Prime Minister, proclaimed 
that she had not conceded and yet had conceded. When interviewed by 
the press she said "Well, they have joined me now" and later when 
asked if she had shifted she answered "Just a tiny 1 ittle bit. A 
tiny 1 ittle bit" •11 Perhaps it is true that there is no zero-sum 
game in the process of negotiations in politics. 
The Tory Government frequently refers to the potential 
suffering of black South Africans if comprehensive sanctions were to 
be imposed. Mrs. Thatcher used this defence in the House of Commons 
in July 1988 when answering questions on the issue from the Labour 
Party leader, Mr. Neil Kinnock. She retorted: 
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11 Unlike you 9 I am not prepared to stand here 
comfortably in this House and impose starvation 
and poverty on millions and millions of black 
South Africans and black children. You are 
prepared to do that. 11 12 
She reiterated this point on her visit to Australia in August 1988. 
Answering a question by a Sydney Television journalist on sanctions 9 
Mrs. Thatcher said sanctions would add to the little suffer·ing by 
the Blacks in South Africa whereby the interviewer inte~jected and 
told her that the suffering is not little. 13 The debate on 
sanctions in British itself is sometimes a heated one but the 
Conservative Government have maintained their stand 9 publicly using 
the abovementioned points as the cornerstone of their anti-sanctions 
argument. The Tory Government a 11 ege that change in South Africa 
has to come through peaceful negotiations. Hence they tell the ANC 
to renounce violence, lay down their arms and negotiate with 
Pretoria. However, there is presently no clear-cut policy of the 
Tory Government towards the ANC. The Prime Minister constantly says 
that her Government wi 11 not ta 1 k to the movement as 1 ong as it 
refuses to renounce violence whereas the Foreign Secretary, Sir 
Geoffrey Howe, has said: 
11 We sha 11 keep open our channe 1 s of 
communication with all the representative black 
opposit1on organisatons ... The ANC are one of 
those organisations. We acknowledge their role 
in any negotiations and we shall maintain 
contact with them as we 11 as with others. 11 14 
There seems to be lack of consistency of policy towards the ANC 
within the Tory Government. 
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Britain's alternative policy to sanctions is economic and 
military aid to the states neighbouring South Africa~ and 
educational or training facilities to Blacks in South Africa since 
1979. This aid to Southern Africa goes to SADCC as a body and to 
individual members (9 in all) of the organisation. 11 0ver the five 
years 1982 to 1986 Britain has provided an estimated £540 million in 
gross bilateral aid to the region. 1115 To SADCC Britain had, as at 
January 1988, committed £35 million Britain is expecting to spend 
some £21 million over 5 years from April 1987 in the educational or 
training schemes to benefit black South Africa. 16 A large sum 
allocated to SADCC is used to rehabilitate the infrastructure, 
namely railways, cable lines, electri pylons and roads, most of 
which were, and still are being, destroyed by opposition forces like 
MNR and UNITA. In some countries British aid is used to train their 
armies, viz. Mozambique, Zimbabwe, Lesotho and Swaziland. Some of 
it goes to genera 1 economic projects. Besides mi 1 itary assistance 
Swaziland receives aid for purchase of alienated land (historical 
background of this is in Chapter 2), for providing safe drinking 
water to homes in rural areas, technical personnel seconded by 
London and the training of Swazis in various skills in Britain. 
Britain argues that their extension of aid to the region serves 
as 11 A Force for Peaceful Change and Development 11 in that it will 
reduce SADCC dependence on South Africa •17 However, the 
anti-apartheid activists who call on Britain to impose comprehensive 
sanctions on South Africa argue that aid should not be used as an 
alternative to sanctions. Pressure is still exerted on Whitehall. 
Until the Liqoqo regime, Swaziland was always quiet on the 
sanctions issue in international fora. Although they imposed 
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sanct·ions on Smith 1 s government~ when the discussion shifted to 
Portuguese East Africa (Mozambique) and South Africa~ Swaziland 
immediately kept quiet. (The point to note is that Swaziland had 
little or no trade with Rhodesia. In any case Swaziland•s sanctions 
on Rhodesia was an inheritance from the British Colonial 
Government). In international bodies like the UN 9 OAU and 
Commonwealthg Swaziland either abstained or absented themselves at 
the time of voting. This neutral policy was adopted for economic 
reasons. Swaziland was sandwiched between the two minority ruled 
countries and a 11 its exports and imports went through them. So 
Swaziland reasoned that to support sanctions wou1d be tantamount to 
committing political suicide. At the same time Swaziland paid its 
dues to the OAU Liberation Committee Funds 9 and at some stage 
allowed ANC official presence in the country. This is a clear case 
of a tightrope strategy. Even after the changing balance of forces 
when Angola, Mozambique and Zimbabwe became independent, Mbabane 
maintained their silence on sanctions. It is worth remembering that 
this change in the balance of forces did influence Swaziland•s 
policy towards the ANC9 at least until Pretoria came with a carrot 
(the land deal) and a big stick (the threats of turning the country 
into another Lebanon). 
During the Liqoqo period - the era when Swaziland was closest 
to Pretoria - the Swaziland Government stood out against sanctions. 
In the 1985 Commonwealth summit at Nassau, there was a rapport 
between the British and Swazi delegates and an understanding was 
reached that sanctions would hurt Swaziland more than they would 
hurt South Africa itself. Subsequent to the 1985 Commonwealth 
summit Sir Geoffrey Howeg representing the European Community went 
266 
on a working tour of some Southern African states~ including 
Swaziland. In Swaziland the Prime Minister9 Prince Bhekinpi 9 told 
him in no uncertain terms that the Swaziland Government's view was 
that sanctions on South Africa would kill Swaziland. In August 1986 
he repeated the message to a group of visiting West German 
Parliamentary deputies when he said "Sanctions will adversely affect 
our economy ... "18 So during the Liqoqo period Swaziland was Britain 
and South Africa's vocal ally on the issue of sanctions. 
s~2Zi~~p·s Strategy since 1986 
Towards the end of 1985 two key members of Liqoqo 9 Prime 
Mfanasibili and Dr. George Msibi were dismissed. This marked. the 
dwindling power of L iqoqo and the ascendance of the forces which 
opposed it. These forces had prevailed in deciding to instal Crown 
Prince Makhosetive early in 1986. He was eventually crowned in 
April 1986 as King Mswati III. 
The new government of Swaziland made a regional policy shift -
they moved away from Pretoria. The new Government seemed to have 
been embarassed by Liqoqo's very close relationship with South 
Africa. A move was made to put Swaziland back on a tightrope policy 
and re-establish its credibility in Africa. This point was 
demonstrated in Chapter 3 and reference No. 57 illustrates it 
clearly. The shift away from South Africa was further demonstrated 
by what happened on 1 June 1987 when the South African Trade Mission 
in Mbabane celebrated the 26th anniversary of Republic Day. The 
Mission invited the Swaziland Cabinet and senior Governments 
officers but no one turned up. A local paper remarked that: 
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11 0ne notable aspect of the celebrations t'l!as the 
absence of any senior government officials. Even 
foreign mission heads based here sent juniors to 
the function. Th8 head of the Trade Mission 9 Mr. 
Sam Sterban disclosed that an invitation was 
extended to the cabinet. But no Minister showed 
up. 11 19 
The present Government protests heavily against South African 
raids into Swaziland. For instance, in December 1986 South African 
agents raided several houses in Mbabane and Manzini, abducted 5 
people and killed two. The new Swaziland Prime Minister 9 Mr. Sotja 
Dlamini9 immediately called a press conference accusing Pretoria for 
the raids. Eventually a meeting was held in Mbabane between Pik 
Botha and the Swaziland Prime Minister. It was understood that in 
that meeting there were serious disagreements. When he 1 eft the 
meeting and was interviewed by the press, Pik Botha said 11 No 
comment 11 • 20 When interviewed back home by the press Both a admitted 
that there was no agreement on the raids, killings and kidnapping 
but he was so defiant that he retorted: 
11 They (those who were abducted) planned devilish 
-plans •• --. -They were personally responsible for 
the killing of South Africans ... They were in 
any event illegally in Swaziland .•. We would 
have taken them even if it had been in London ... 11 21 
However, 3 (2 Swiss and 1 Swazi nationals) victims of the kidnap 
were released and returned to Swaziland. 
The attitude of the present Swazi Government towards the ANC 
seems to have changed as well. Inspite of the mass expulsion of 
1984, ANC once more uses Swaziland as their main conduit. For 
instance, The Independent reported in May 1988 that .. Western 
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intelligence sources estimate that there are 8~000 to 10 9 000 ANC 
guerillas in Angola and Tanzania. Their main infiltration routes 
are through Swaziland and Botswana. One might want to argue it is 
not a question of Swazi Government attitude towards the ANC 9 but the 
fact that the Swazi security system is not efficient enough to stop 
the infiltration. But that point is matched by the fact that 
Swaziland officials have been heard talking in defence of the ANC in 
cases where somebody smeared the ANC for some criminal activities in 
the country. During the Liqoqo period this did not happen. They 
took this as an opportunity to castigate and deport ANC cadres. In 
contrast the new Commissioner of Police 9 Mr. Sandile Mdziniso, 
defended the ANC on two criminal incidents which occurred in July 
1987, whereby the perpetrators of the crimes claimed to be ANC. He 
said 11 They are definitely not ANC. They are just making that claim 
to cover their real identities." 22 
As a result of this more sympathetic attitude towards the ANC 
Pretoria has increased its incursions into Swaziland. For instance 
more than 10 ANC cadres were killed by South African agents in 
- -- --- - -
Swaziland in 1986 alone. 23 The figure was the highest ever recorded 
in one year9 except perhaps in 1984 when there was a general 
shoot-out. 
However Swaziland does not officially allow the ANC to operate 
from its territory. In public Mbabane still declare that their 
policy of peaceful change in the region has not been altered. But 
the Trade Mission is still there and continues to disburse aid. On 
the sanctions issue the present Swazi Government seems to have 
shifted back to its old position of neutrality and silence on public 
platforms. 
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Summary and Conclusion 
The discussion of Swaziland's regional strategy has revealed 
that at some stages and in some areas Swaziland's policy converges 
upon and at others diverges from both the British and South African 
policies. For instance 9 Swaziland agrees with Britain on the need 
for change in South Africa, but Britain condemns violence by any 
protagonist~ whereas Swaziland pay their dues to the OAU Liberation 
Committee Fund, and Sobhuza was known to have told the ANC that if 
he had closed his left or right eye, they should pass through. In 
the case of South Africa there was 1 ittle convergence except when 
Swaziland was offered a carrot (e.g. land deal) and a stick was 
applied (e.g. raids and threats to turn the country into a common 
battle ground). 
It is argued that there are 6 main factors which influence 
Swaziland's policy and regional strategy, namely 
1. Economic consideration, i.e. the fact that the country's 
economy is asymmetrically linked to that of South Africa, as 
shown in Chapter 6. 
2. The existence of minority regimes in the region, viz. Angola 
and Mozambique under Portuguese rule up to mid-70's; Rhodesia 
under Smith and South Africa, and the fact that Swaziland, a 
micro-state, was sandwiched between Mozambique and South 
Africa. All her goods pass through the two countries. 
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3. The existence of liberation movements fighting these regimes; 
for instanceg Frelimo in Mozambique and the ANC in South 
Africa. These movements, on the one hand 9 and the Portuguese 
and South African regimes on the other 9 were (the ANC and 
Pretoria still are) breathing down the Swazi Government•s neck, 
4, The nature of the Swazi State, i.e. the Monarchy and 
conservation. There was fear of Marxism in the region, 
particularly neighbouring Mozambique. This is why Swaziland 
rushed a decision to build a railway to link with South Africa 
in the South at Golela when Frelimo took power. 
5. There were security considerations against internal political 
opposition. The NNLC was close to South African movements, the 
PAC in particular. In fact, when Dr. A.P. Zwane escaped from 
detention in 1978 he stayed with PAC in Dar es Salaam. This 
fear of internal opposition forced the Swazi Monarch to 
establish an anny and it is alleged, though not proven 9 that 
Pretoria had a hand in the formation of this army. This army 
was formed for internal conflicts as it was revealed in Chapter 
3 when discussing the repeal of the Independence Constitution. 
6. Swaziland•s membership to international organisations like the 
OAU and SADCC. The countries honours some OAU membership 
obligations. For example, it pays its financial dues to the 
Liberation Committee although it does not officially offer 
sanctuary to the ANC guerillas. 
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The work has shown how Swaziland adopted a tightrope strategy 
during the 1968-1975 period. The Independence of the Portuguese 
colonies 5 especially Mozambique reduced pressure on the Swazi 
leadership when they found that they could trust a Marxist 
Government. This trust~ coupled with the idea that in future they 
may have to live with a majority ruled South Africa 9 persuaded 
Swaziland to accept an official presence of ANC and PAC (initially 
in the case of the latter). The Swazi Monarch even turned a blind 
eye to ANC cadres in transit to and fro South Africa. This worried 
Pretoria. 
Due to changes in the region Pretoria initiated a "Total 
Strategy". As a result of this strategy Swaziland was offered both 
carrot and stick which eventually forced the country to swing back 
under Pretoria•s wing up to 1985. However 9 since 1986 there has 
been an attempt to come out of this. 
From this study it can be cone 1 uded that Swaziland • s region a 1 
policy has 9 on the whole, been pragmatic; that it walks on a 
tightrope 9 trying hard to ba 1 a nee so that it does not fa 11 on one 
side or another. It can be said that Swaziland adopts a policy and 
strategy for survival because it is a micro-state largely dependent 
on South Africa and, to a certain extent, on Britain as well. 
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CHAPTER 8 
Conclusion: Towards a Policy for Survival 
of a Micro~State 
This chapter provides a summary of the work already presented 
and the Conclusion. The study is about the examination of 
Swaziland's relations since Independence in 1968 with two powerful 
states : Britain (its former colonial master) and South Africa (its 
neighbour which until the 1950's anticipated that it would absorb 
Swaziland). The main focus is (a) Swaziland's political and 
economic 1 inks with Britain and South Africa~ (b) the effects of 
these links on Swaziland's political system and (c) Swaziland's 
policy in the Southern Africa setting and its regional strategy. In 
the regional context account is taken of the fact that Swaziland is 
a micro-state in the troubled Southern Africa region. 
Chapter 1 introduces the issues at stake and suggests their 
significance. It is pointed out that up to the late 1950's the 
British Governments and academics did not think it feasible that 
small territories~ including Swaziland~ would become independent 
states. Now that Swaziland has been independent for more than two 
decades it was a worthwhile academic exercise to conduct research on 
how far it has progressed or retrogressed as a micro-state. It was 
alleged that this assessment can be better understood in studying 
the territory's relations with its former colonial master and its 
powerful neighbour. 
It was felt that in order to understand Swaziland's relations 
with the two states, it was necessary to give a historical 
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background of the links including the economic~ polit·ical~ social 
and cultural links since the late nineteenth century. These were 
examined in Chapter 2. The significant points which came out were: 
1. That the British rule over Swaziland since the turn of the 
century was parallel rule~ i.e. British colonial 
institutions existed alongside the Swazi traditional ones. 
Britain did not practise indirect rule as experienced by 
its colonies elsewhere in Africa. 
2. That economic and social ties between Swaziland and South 
Africa during the colonial period were very close. The 
reason for this was that Britain had contemplated the 
i ncorpora ti on of the High Commission Territories by the 
Union of South Africa. The conspicuous economic and 
soc i a 1 1 in kages were ( i ) the existence of the Southern 
Africa Customs Union (SACU), (ii) trade (especially 
imports from South Africa) between Swaziland and South 
Africa, (iii) the use of South African currency by 
Swaziland (and the other High Commission Territories 
(HCTs)), (iv) the transport system, (v) South African 
investments, having been stimulated by the post-war 
British capital investments, (vi) migrant labour to the 
South African mines, and (vii) the existence of a large 
white settler community in Swaziland compared with the 
other HCTs. About 60 per cent of these were born in South 
Africa 1 and sometimes made gestures of appeals to South 
Africa if they felt their interests were threatened in 
Swaziland. 2 
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3. That the post-war British and South African investments in 
various sectors viz. sugar9 fruit 9 forestry~ 
manufacturing and mining - resulted in the diversification 
of Swaziland•s trade compared with the other HCTs. 
In the discussion in Chapter 3 of the post-Independence 
politics of Swaziland9 an effort was made to show that parallel rule 
continued. Modern institutions (e.g. Parliament, the Cabinet, the 
Civil Service, the Judiciary) existed alongside traditional ones 
(e.g. Ngwenyama, the Swazi Nation a 1 Counc i 1 - L i bandl a, the Inner 
Council - Liqoqo9 and the Chieftaincy). The difference between the 
colonial and post-independence parallel rule is that the Swazi 
Monarch became a key decision-maker in both governmental systems 
whereas during the colonial period the British High Commissioner to 
South Africa, and later Her Majesty•s commissioner, was the key 
decision-maker in the Colonial Administration. It was argued that 
the Swazi Monarch usurped, to a certain extent9 the powers of 
decision-making from the Swazi National council (SNC). Inspite of 
this he was not satisfied with the Independence Constitution which 
restricted his powers. Hence his occasional attack of the 
Constitution and its ultimate repeal in April 1973. 
The repeal of the Independence Constitution meant a shift from 
the political system inherited from Britain. Political parties were 
banned, Parliament was suspended, freedom assembly restricted and 
detention without trial introduced. The King ruled by decree. 
However, some basic tenets of modern government as inherited from 
Britain remained. The Civil Service, the Police, the Judiciary 
(albeit excluded from cases of detention and citizenship), the 
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Cabinet9 the Prison Service 9 all continued to function, This is why 
this period was referred to as a period of 11 Change and Continuity 11 , 
But it was observed that the repeal of the Independence 
Constitution 9 the rule by the King • s decrees and the subsequent 
introduction of Tinkhundla System marked a shift in the balance of 
parallel institutions in favour of the traditional ones, The fact 
that political parties and political organization were banned 9 and 
the fact that Tinkhundla System operates within the chieftancy and 
the Ngwenyama structures meant that modern political opposition was 
severely curtailed, The personality cult of Sobhuza characterised 
Swazi politics until he died in August 1982, It was argued that 
Sobhuza's domination of Swazi politics denied the State the 
development of a political culture which would ensure continuity and 
permanent political stability, This point was illustrated by the 
brief discussion of the power struggle which ensued after Sobhuza's 
death. The submission in this work is that Swaziland has not 
developed effective domestic political institutions which will 
ensure political stability for the twentieth century Swazi society, 
It has less success in this than it has in developing a regional 
policy for survival. (The regional policy is assessed below.) 
Despite these constituti ona 1 and pol itica 1 changes, relations 
between Swaziland and Britain remained close. A few days after the 
repea 1 of the Constitution, the British Government proposed 
11 business 11 as usual, seeing that 11 ••• Westminster constitution or 
no, the reality of power lay with the King before the abrogation of 
the constitution, just as much as it lay with him after. 113 On its 
part, Swaziland did not wish to have strained relations with 
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Britaino This is particularly seen ·in the fact that the Swazi 
Monarch continues to invite members of the British Royal Family in 
important events (e.g. Independence Anniversary celebrations and 
Sobhuza 0 S Diamond Jubilee in 1981) and the fact that the Swaziland 
Constitution Commission included Britain in their itinerary when 
seeking opinions for a new constitution. 
South Africa's reaction to the 1973 changes was to welcome the 
move. Pretoria was happy when the co~operative government of the 
Swazi Monarch was entrenched. It endorsed the rule through Libandla 
(SNC) because according to Pretoria it was rule by consultation and 
consent. 4 Another reason for Pretoria to be happy was that it was 
promoting inside South Africa the homeland•s policy9 with the view 
to granting "independence"9 using the chieftancy or traditional 
institutions. So these changes in Swazi 1 and enhanced its 
determination on this policy. 
In Chapter 4 a discourse on British investments in Swaziland 
was undertaken. It revea 1 ed that the post-war British investments 
demonstrated a diversification of the economic activity of 
Swaziland. For instance 9 new sectors which were established were 
forestry9 sugar industry, fruit9 commercial sector and the mining of 
iron ore. This diversification of economic activity necessitated 
new markets outside SCA for the products. Thus Swaziland avoided 
total economic entanglement by South Africa. One academic observed 
this diversification process in the following words: 
" while an increasing degree of economic 
integration with a richer and larger neighbour 
may be a prudent course for many small states9 
political considerations may dictate a search 
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for more distant and perhaps less lucrative 
markets. Recent developments in Swaziland 
exemplify this tendency for certain of its 
products."5 
Swaziland's new industries increased their sales to Britain and 
started selling to European countries~ the Far and Middle East~ 
North and South American states. 
It was observed that while British investments helped to 
diversify Swaziland's economy and exports markets 9 it also 
stimulated South African investments in areas like sugar 9 fruit 9 
mining and manufacturing. At Independence South African investments 
were quite substantial although they did not surpass the British. 
However, over the period since Independence South Africa has grown 
to be the largest single investor in the territory. But the British 
investments still act as a check against total domination by South 
African capital. It was also argued that in terms of economic 
links9 in the form of investments and trade~ Swaziland are closer to 
each other than they are in terms of political links - Swaziland 
having moved severa-l steps away from a "Westminster Model 
constitution". 
The final observation made on British investments~ and other 
investments, is that the economic activity and employment patterns 
which result from them act as a catalyst to undermine traditional 
institutions. An example is that of Mphumalanga constituency which 
voted for 3 NNLC candidates who were returned as MPS in the 1972 
general elections. Mphumalanga straddled the sugar industry, citrus 
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fruit and Vuvulane Irrigated Farms (VIF) complex, It was also shown 
that during strikes, workers tended to ignore the voice of the 
Monarch and traditional rulers, 
A discussion of trade between Swaziland and Britain in Chapter 
5 showed that (a) at Independence Britain was the largest single 
market for Swaziland produce~ (b) that over t·ime South Afr·ica has 
become equally important, and even more so in some years (see TABLE 
2) and (c) that South Africa supplies Swaziland with 90 per cent of 
its imports (see TABLE 3). It was argued that British membership to 
EC and the Lome Conventions did not necessarily open up the EC 
market for Swaziland•s products. Rather British membership meant 
the fixing of the terms of trade in the form of quota allocations 
for Swazi products, and STABEX for compensation in case of loss of 
earnings. The discussion revealed that South African firms use 
Swaziland as a base to gain access to markets and faci 1 ities not 
normally available. For instance, the Mpaka coal mine is operated 
by a South African company but Kenya is the major market for this 
coal. Kenya does not have open trade with South Africa. 
When the industries in Swaziland make use of SACU market 
effectively and Pretoria thinks they are a threat, South Africa use 
subtle ways of undermining their expansion. The experience of the 
Swaziland Chemical Industries (SCI) is a good example of sabotage of 
Swaziland•s industrialisation programme. This point leads to the 
argument that in order for Swaziland to maintain economic growth, 
the micro-state needs foreign markets. The population is so small 
that the domestic market cannot satisfy the ambition of firms. 
Small states need foreign markets to achieve economies of scale. In 
281 
this light it was observed that the shrinking market of cane sugar 
in Britain is cause for concern to the sugar industry in Swaziland. 
By far the most important economic links Swaziland has are 
those with South Africa. This is due to two main reasons. The 
first is that Swaziland is geographically linked with its big and 
rich neighbour. Secondly~ the assumption that the HCTs would be 
incorporated into the Union resulted in the creation of economic and 
social structures which linked them to South Africa. The most 
conspicuous structures are (i) SACU, (ii) South African investments 
in Swaziland, (iii) the transport system- most of Swaziland's goods 
go through South Africa? (iv) tourism - the majority of tourists in 
Swaziland are either South African or people resident there, (v) 
monetary co-operation - Swaziland used South African currency as the 
sole legal tender until 1974 when lilangeni was introduced to 
circulate alongside the rand, (vi) migrant labour - between 10 and 
20 per cent of the total employment figure in Swaziland, in any 
given year since 1968, work in the South African mines (see TABLE 
4), and (vii) trade- about 90 per cent of Swaziland's imports come 
from South Africa and it is a major market for Swaziland products. 
These economic links are a major factor which influence 
Swaziland's policy and strategy in the Southern Africa region. 
Although the Swaziland Government is against apartheid, it cannot 
openly pro vi de material support to anti-apartheid activists. The 
contention here is that Pretoria has it in its power to strangle 
Swaziland's economy as retribution for what it regards as hostile 
attitude. This contention is not far-fetched if one were to recall 
the experience of Lesotho in 1986. In that case South Africa simply 
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closed the borders and stopped the movements of goods. The result 
was a military coup which overthrew Chief Leabua Jonathan's 
Government. Granted, Swaziland is not as vulnerable as Lesotho in 
that it is not totally surrounded by South Africa and that 
Swaziland's source of revenue is more diversified than that of 
Lesotho. But this does not mean that Mbabane is insulated against 
the possible punishment by the racist regime in Pretoria. Most of 
its imports come from South Africa9 most of its exports either go 
there or pass through South Africa to the outside world 9 between 10 
and 20 per cent of the total employment figure get work in the Rand 
and coal mines of northern Natal, etc. These economic factors 
feature prominently in Swaziland's policy formulation towards 
Pretoria. It is true that South Africa also benefits from these 
economic links. But this does not mean the big neighbour cannot use 
economic blockade to punish the micro-states of the region- if it 
thinks their behaviour has become wayward and intolerable. The 
relationship is not of equal partners as one academic observed in 
one of the treatises on small states : 11 lt has been suggested indeed 
that in some cases the degree of concentration may be so great that 
the small country is in an essentially satellistic position 
vis-a-vis the large country to which it sells the bulk of its 
produce. 116 
The other factors which influence Swaziland's policy and 
strategy in the region are: (i) the existence of anti-apartheid 
forces and 1 i be ration movements, ( i i) the existence and demise of 
minority regimes other than South Africa and Namibia (iii) the fact 
that Swaziland is a Monarchy and is conservative, and its fear of 
left wing and Marxist governments, (iv) Swaziland's internal 
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that in some cases the degree of concentration may be so great that 
the small country is in an essentially satellistic position 
vis-a-vis the large country to which it sells the bulk of its 
produce. 116 
The other factors which influence Swaziland's policy and 
strategy in the region are: (i) the existence of anti-apartheid 
forces and liberation movements 9 (ii) the existence and demise of 
minority regimes other than South Africa and Namibia (iii) the fact 
that Swaziland is a Monarchy and is conservative9 and its fear of 
left wing and Marxist governments, (iv) Swaziland's internal 
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security consideration~ and (v) Swaziland(s membership of 
international organisation like the OAU and SADCC. All these 
factors were examined in Chapter 7. Suffice it to say these factors 
are pregnant with contradictory interests both for Swaziland and for 
protagonists in the region. A micro~state like Swaziland needs both 
ingenuity and dexterity to accommodate all these interests 
simultaneously. The content·ion ·in this thesis is that Swaziland 
has, on the whole, been ingenuous in its policy formulation 
for the region by following a 11 tightrope strategy11 • However, there 
has been occasions when the country moved too far to please the 
minority regimes. For instance, Liqoqo shifted from the 11 tightrope 
strategy 11 in its efforts to please Pretoria. The Land deal was also 
a strategic blunder. But since 1986 there seems to have been a 
correction of the liqoqo•s faulty policy and there is no more talk 
of the land deal. Hence the contention that Swaziland•s strategy 
has largely been that of balancing its interests and convictions 
(against apartheid and minority regimes) in the troubled Southern 
Africa region. The submission in this thesis is that this is 
essentially a policy for survival of a micro~state in a troubled 
area. Swaziland has concluded that arrogance and recklessness 
towards any side of the protagonists in the region could turn it 
into 11 another Lebanon 11 • 
This policy for survival has been reinforced by the economic 
relations Swaziland has with other countries, especially Britain. 
British investments, aid and trade between the two countries provide 
Swaziland with breathing space in that it is not 100 per cent tied 
to its big neighbour. The political changes of 1973 did not affect 
economic relations between Britain and Swaziland. These relations, 
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therefore, continue to be an insurance against possible domination 
of Swaziland 1 S economy by South Africa capital and this enhances the 
political options for a 11 tightrope strategy 11 so that Swaziland can 
survive. This strategy has to be played within severe limits and 
with great subtlety for it has implications vJithin Swaziland itself 
as well as in relations with neighbouring states and the 
international bodies to which Swaziland belongs. In the period 
covered by this study the overall judgement must be that the policy 
has been pursued with reasonable success. 
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-The Alienated land in Swaziland and future development aid. 
Parliamentary Debates (Commons), Vol. 27, 1981-1982, (col. 310, 317 
and 355) - Level of Trade between the United Kingdom and 
Swaziland. 
Foreign -and Gommonwealth-Office-- Bri-tish Pol icy Towards South 
Africa, 1988. 
Overseas Development Administration - British Aid to Southern 
Africa, January 1988. 
Overseas Development Administration - Gross Bilateral Aid to 
Swaziland 1968-1985. 
Overseas Development Administration - British Aid to Southern 
Africa, London, 1987. 
Sobhuza II Vs Allister M. Miller and the Swaziland Corporation 
Limited, In The Privy Council No. 158 of 1924. 
296 
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A Rail Link between Swaziland and Gollel. 
Republic of South Africa, House of Assembly Debates, No. 4, 24 to 28 
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Sir Brian Marwick of Castletown~ Isle of Man. 
Sir Francis Loyd of Aldeburgh~ Suffolk. 
Mr. James Johnson9 retired Labour MP. 
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Mr. B. Moorhouse of the Overseas Development Administration, London. 
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Mr. M.V. Simelane of Swaziland Fruit Canners~ Malkerns. 
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